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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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ARMED FORCES

Critical Shortages of Junior Officers

94UM0479A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Col Anatoliy Belousov: "Junior Officers Need the Help of Their Elders More Than Ever. Will They Get It?"]

[Text] How wonderful a lieutenant's years are! How can any of us, servicemen who have already lived and seen a few things, possibly not recollect an officer's youth with trepidation!

I remember three of us, lieutenants still wet behind the ears, arriving at our assigned unit. The surprises started almost right away. The equipment of the unit turned out to be more recent than what we had in the school. That meant doing some retraining. And there was a platoon-full of subordinates, every other one of whom was far from an expert. How were we to work with them? And even we weren't much of a gift to the company commander—there was always something about us that displeased him.

Nevertheless, life went on. In the evening, upon returning from our work area, we would wash off the dust and grease, fry some potatoes, and then spruce up and head for the Officers Club for some dancing and some socializing with tenth-year coeds.

But what is most memorable to me from those times is the people under whose direction I served, and the people with whom I was fortunate to serve. Of course we had different commanders, but I remember that first company commander we had, who seemed at first to be such an overly stiff, has-been soldier. How much unpleasantness he shielded us from, how many lessons he taught us about life! There were many of this sort who were truly concerned for us.

These of course aren't just idle recollections. Today the situation in the reforming Russian Army is such that we have to ask ourselves this question: Will today's young officers have such memories of father-figure commanders? Will they remain in the army, or will they leave for greener pastures?

The problem of young personnel has become extremely painful to the army and navy. In 1990-1993 (as of the beginning of this year) more than 95,000 young officers, up to 30 years old, left the army ranks. This was in a time when there is no one in the troops to appoint to primary officer positions. If you look at each of the armed services separately, you will find that the situation is most favorable in the Strategic Missile Forces. At least in recent times a tendency for young officers not to want to revert to civilian life can be clearly discerned. In the ground forces, 6,623 young officers left in 1993. Of 3,214 who left the Air Defense Forces, 1,206 did so because they wanted to, while the rest left because of incompatibility with service and for

discrediting the honor of the military. In the navy, in the words of Rear Admiral Vasily Viktorov, chief of the navy's Personnel Training and Placement Directorate, the number of vacant primary positions now reaches into the thousands. Even with regard for this year's military school graduates, the personnel hunger in the lowest ship units will be less than 50 percent satisfied. The picture is similar in the air force as well.

The reasons why young people leave are generally well known. Some long for the motherland—for what are now sovereign states, while others part with the army because of problems in establishing homes for their families, and still others are simply unable to feed their families. This is on the backdrop of a general decline in the prestige of military service. But I think it would be wrong to reduce everything just to this.

There can of course be no debate that a young person possessing the diploma of a military engineer and radio technician, a programmer, or a motor mechanic could set himself up reasonably well in civilian life. But let's think about the particular reasons why junior officers leave. Let's consider the two main ones—because they want to, and because of incompatibility with service. As it turns out, in most cases lieutenants and captains don't leave on their own, but are forced out. This is even considering the fact that some junior officers (who were unable to get an honorable discharge) were forced to commit violations, and thus they fell into the category of officers leaving due to "incompatibility with service."

What is behind this? Are they really professionally unsuited, or is there something else here, and namely, were they unable to find a person at the beginning of their career who could have supported them, taught them, and reinforced their faith in their own strengths? Can it really be true that there are no longer mentors of this sort in the army or, if you wish, the sort of educators that we associated with when we were lieutenants?

Of course there are. But our democratic society has become calloused and indifferent to the fate of others, and this bitter cup has not passed by the army either. Tell me, is it really normal for a school graduate arriving in his unit to begin his military career by serving as a sentry or unloading coal for a boiler plant? But even this could be understood. Because a battalion commander has only three soldiers to help him, and the post can't go without heat. A lieutenant, I believe, would understand this. If only they would talk with him in a civilized manner, speak kindly, explain the situation, and perhaps even ask him to participate. But no! His superiors wouldn't stoop to such pampering. That's an order, so do it!

In former times, and not really that long ago, a commander had to work directly with people. And he did. Now, with the advent of deputy commanders for educational work, many commanders took all of this all too literally: Our business is to lead, to command, and yours is to educate. So educate! In the meantime these deputies are often themselves unsure of what their new station means, and

consequently junior officers find themselves left to their own devices. It is well known what can happen when junior officers fail to sense any real concern on the part of their superiors. And such a commander easily writes off the loss of a junior officer due to objective factors—our times are hard, the impoverished existence of lieutenants—that's why they don't want to serve.

The reason things aren't bad in the Strategic Missile Forces as an example is that real concern is shown here for junior officers. For each and every one of them. And they represent more than 40 percent of all officers in the forces. It is precisely upon them that the main burden of alert duty lies, especially where the work is the hardest—in the regiments.

"Young people are the future of the missile forces," feels Colonel-General Igor Sergeyev, commander-in-chief of the Strategic Missile Forces. "We have developed and are implementing a program of social protection for junior officers and their families. And so, despite the great financial difficulties, all junior officers receive the 12 months' pay they are supposed to get after graduating from school in order to arrange their personal lives. Even before they arrive in the unit, commanders hunt up apartments for them, reserve places for their children in preschool institutions, and find jobs for their wives. Junior Officers' Day has become traditional in the forces. Commanders regularly visit their families, and delve into their needs."

There isn't any need to invent anything new in the approaches to work with junior officers—the arsenal of these methods is sufficiently rich and diverse. The work itself creates the best impact upon the mood of people, if of course it is well organized—that is, if the officer is doing what he is supposed to be doing primarily—combat training. Many commanders in the forces and in the navy understand this well, and despite today's shortage of everything imaginable, they provide subordinates the possibility to exercise their lawful rights—the right to serve in their specialty, rather than being used as gofers and errand boys. A junior officer living in such an environment begins to develop work satisfaction, and pride in having the honor to belong to a glorious cohort of tankmen, or seamen, or paratroopers.

I'm not of course trying to say that a guardian "uncle" needs to be assigned to every school graduate, like they used to do with new recruits way back when. What I'm talking about is concrete assistance to junior officers on the part of their elders, which has always been a tradition in the Russian officer corps. Whether or not they will get it depends on us.

'Ataman' Chechevatov of Far East MD Interviewed
94UM0474A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Jun 94 p 4

[Interview with Colonel General Viktor Stepanovich Chechevatov, commander, Far East Military District, by Valeriy Usoltsev, place, date, and occasion not specified,

under rubric: "A Military Leader Has the Floor." "These Will Not Be 'Potesny Troops'"]

[Text] Far East Military District Commander Colonel General Viktor Stepanovich Chechevatov is a person of indisputable authority for the region's Cossacks. They consider him one of them. And I think now it is understandable why the Cossack atamans of Far Russia unanimously chose Chechevatov as their "nakaznoy ataman" [Translator note: name given a Cossack ataman appointed by Czarist authorities in prerevolutionary Russia]...

[Usoltsev] Viktor Stepanovich, many political figures of the most varied calibers and ranks are flirting with the Cossacks today and trying to get into their good graces, i.e., to be in your position—love, esteem, respect... What do you think? What is moving these politicians toward the Cossacks?

[Chechevatov] Well, you turned out to have a whole "bouquet" of questions. So from my own experience I am to analyze the goals of people who, I assume, are simply using the Cossacks to achieve their own interests and advantages in politics? My experience will not serve. All my heart and soul is with the Cossacks. These are the kind of bright people which our homeland needs today! This is strength. That is why people stick to them. This is a special spiritual world order of our excellent ethnic "mix." And to "play" with the Cossacks today, to "flirt" with them, I believe, is to ruin, deliberately ruin, the sprouts of our state rebirth. They wish to use them, but for destructive purposes. And the Cossacks... They are an open people, they often trust those who lead them not at all where they should be going, where our Russia herself should be going...

Today so much "dirt" and "garbage" has attached itself to the Cossacks, and there are so many "masqueraders" among them... "Masqueraders" not just outwardly, but also inwardly, defective in their thoughts...

And it seems to me that there is practically no fight going on against all this that is false, counterfeit, and superficial in the Cossack environment. I often say this to Cossacks at meetings. For this compromises the whole movement and generates mistrust in the Cossacks among those around them in the best case, if such an expression is apropos in the given instance, and generates caustic gibes and open jeers in the worst case.

But I believe that the Cossacks still will not give up their banners and their military glory to the dirty hands of others.

Recently I returned from an official trip along the Amur and Ussuri. I spent time in Cossack stanitsas. Traditions are alive, and traditions are like roots for a tree. There are roots, they "pump" the earth's strength, allowing everything else to have knowledge and to exist.

Hereditary Cossacks again are here among us—the Kalmykovs, Nazarovs, Poluyanovs, Byankins. They know how to teach sense to Cossack "saplings," how to kindle love for the Motherland in their hearts, how to develop a

sense of Duty, Honor and a soldier's self-sacrifice for the sake of the land on which they were born.

And the Cossack stanitsas themselves? It is as if you are in another world. Take Mogilevka, for example. Wise, strong Cossacks live and create here. The houses are a feast for the eyes, always with a good harvest, no despondency, and the people believe in tomorrow because they are preparing this tomorrow for themselves, without indulging in vain expectations. You know, after meeting with such people, you feel an absolutely spiritual uplift and the world seems brighter...

All in all, it turns out that the district commander has become sentimental. And as one of Aleksandr Kuprin's main characters noted, this is contraindicated for us military people. No? Has the time come to talk about Cossack soldiers?

[Usoltsev] Do you mean establishing Cossack subunits in the district?

[Chechevatov] You just now used the concept of "subunit." Some Cossacks and atamans are offended if we use this word and not "formation," let's say, or "unit" at worst. It is humiliating, they say. We, they say, are ready to field corps and armies today. You are not ready. I respond. Why do you begin to compromise a good thing? And then, what kind of new game in "gigantomania" is this? Don't make the first steps painfully wide, you can sprain an ankle. And who needs the lame? Not all of them understand the jokes and they take offence... As a rule, the ones arguing about "corps" are those who are not thinking about the job itself, but about themselves in the job so as to be in the public eye and be an important figure. In general, of course, many have appeared today who wish to command "corps" and be resplendent in a general's shoulderboards, considering that for some Cossacks, I notice, it is a rather simple matter with ranks—whatever I like, is okay. I will appropriate it.

By the way, there already has been a discussion about all this.

My opinion is that the time has come to begin serious work on a program for military training of young Cossacks "locally" in their native stanitsas. For previously how was it? A Cossack would come to serve after being already sufficiently trained professionally.

We began to undertake something in this direction. Classes are held in military affairs in a number of Cossack stanitsas under the direction of the atamans and with the help of officers and NCO's discharged to the reserve. The district command element makes available its training grounds and firing ranges for these purposes and allocates weapons and ammunition. Many active-duty officers also work with young Cossacks and prepare replacements for themselves—as a rule, on days off and on off-duty time; on personal time, as we say. This already is the most genuine, selfless devotion. It turns out that despite everything, genuine officers have not become extinct here.

Today Cossacks living along the border already know where they are to go in case the situation is exacerbated and a threat arises for Russia, where to draw weapons, and in what weapon emplacement to perform the combat mission.

We have begun making it a practice to involve Cossacks in security of military depots and other Army installations. By the way, security and defense of Big Ussuri Island even now has been assigned to Cossacks. A Cossack company has been established there and young Cossacks are serving worthily.

As district commander, I would like to name the best by first and last name. All are "hereditary stanitsa inhabitants": privates Aleksandr Chernyshov, Konstantin Mamontov, Vladimir Ivanov, Sergey Petaltsev.

The district command element views Cossacks as a real military force, as its reliable reserve, and of course we will not leave them one on one with problems.

[Usoltsev] Cossacks complain of the absence of a uniform and gear. All this now costs much money. And where to get horses? Can the district help here?

[Chechevatov] We will help the Cossacks with uniforms and gear. Consider this matter taken off the agenda.

With respect to horses, they have begun to be raised in stanitsas which are being revived. In that same Mogilevka. While he was a sovkhos director, present Ataman Vladimir Torkhov founded a horse-breeding farm there, built a gallop-course, and involved dozens of boys and girls in classes in equestrian sport. It was from here for the first time in the region, and probably in the entire former Soviet Union, that young boys began leaving with their own horses to serve in the Border Guard Troops. No, any problem can be solved—if, of course, there is a desire to solve it. If there are people who dream of making Russia great and bringing up a new generation of her true sons, reliable defenders of native borders.

These will not be "poteshtny troops" [Translator note: refers to the boy-soldiers of Peter I]. These troops will be the pride of our Armed Forces.

I believe this.

Cossack Epaulets, Rank Insignia

94UM0474B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Jun 94 p 4

[Article by Aleksandr Glushko, Mosfilm associate, under rubric "Zastava Workshop": "But Everyone Had the Same Stars"]

[Text] Aleksandr Glushko, Mosfilm associate, is the consultant.

Today let us talk about shoulderboards—one of the most vulnerable elements. I would say, in the uniform of our Cossacks of today. There is very great confusion and muddle here, and with a touch of "musical comedy" and

"props," not to mention the "rank-mania" in many of those who "dress up" in Cossack uniforms nowadays. The impression is created that we have enormously more colonels and generals among Cossacks today than under the sovereign father.

Well then, the shoulderboards.

Lower ranks had dark blue shoulderboards with crimson piping on one side and camouflage color on the other. The numbering [shifrovka] was located one-half vershok [one vershok = 4.4 cm] above the lower edge. Digits and letters written in one line were seven-eighths of a vershok high, and numbering in two lines had a height of seven-eighths of a vershok for the upper line and three-eighths of a vershok for the lower line. Numbering was stencilled to the camouflage side in dark blue oil paint.


Field stripes of uryadniks [NCO rank] were orange. The light blue braid of cavalry scout-observers was sewn to the

lower edge across the shoulderboard; cavalry reconnaissance had a narrow red stripe along the shoulderboards.


Officers wore a silver galloon with one or two blue central stripes (for junior or staff officers respectively), crimson piping, and blue edging between the piping and galloon. Officers' field shoulderboards were made of khaki-color cloth with blue braided central stripes. Shoulderboards also were encountered with sewn-on red edging of blue central stripes. In 1916 the central stripe became all shades of brown and the edging essentially disappeared.

The differences in ranks were as follows:


- **kazak [lowest rank]**—bare shoulderboard (Fig. 1);
- **prikaznyy [private first class]**—shoulderboard with one narrow transverse stripe;
- **junior uryadnik**—shoulderboard with two narrow transverse stripes;
- **senior uryadnik**—shoulderboard with three narrow transverse stripes (Fig. 2);




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
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
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
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8

- **vakhmistr [sergeant major]**—shoulderboard with one broad transverse stripe (Fig. 3);
- **podkhorunzhiy [subcornet]**—shoulderboard with one broad longitudinal stripe (Fig. 4).

The prikaznyy and uryadniks had white woollen stripes 1 cm wide and the vakhmistr and podkhorunzhiy had a silver galloon 3 cm wide. The distance between stripes was 0.5-1.0 cm. The upper stripe would be sewn 3 cm from the center of the button to the upper edge of the stripe.

Shoulderboards of lower ranks, from the rank and file kazak up to and including the vakhmistr, were buttoned using [one word partially legible, possibly "eagle"] buttons 22 mm in diameter. The podkhorunzhiy wore buttons of medium (18 mm) diameter authorized for officers and generals. Shoulderboards of lower ranks to vakhmistr were five-sided, and beginning with the podkhorunzhiy they were six-sided. The width of the shoulderboard with edge was 6.5 cm, and length varied from 14 to 16 cm depending on shoulder size.

Khorunzhiy [cornet]—shoulderboard of silver galloon with one central stripe and two stars, opposite the color of trimmings, located at the level of the center of numbering at its sides and at least 5 cm from the lower edge of the shoulderboard (Fig. 5).

Sotnik—shoulderboard of silver galloon with one central stripe and three stars, opposite the color of trimmings. The stars were placed at least 5 cm from the lower edge of the shoulderboard at the level of the center of numbering at its sides, and one above the numbering. If there was a monogram, the third star would be between the crown and the monogram.

Podyesaul [junior captain]—shoulderboard of silver galloon with one central stripe and four stars, opposite the color of trimmings, stars at the level of the center of numbering at its sides and at least 5 cm from the lower edge of the shoulderboard. Two more were on the central stripe above the numbering, one 2 cm above the other from center to center (Fig. 6).

Yesaul [captain]—shoulderboard of silver galloon with one central stripe without stars.

Voyskovoy starshina [major]—shoulderboard of silver galloon with two central stripes and three stars, opposite the color of trimmings. Two stars were at the level of the center of numbering at its sides between the central stripes and the piping and at least 5 cm from the lower edge of the shoulderboard, and one was in the middle above the numbering (Fig. 7).

Colonel—shoulderboard of silver galloon with two central stripes without stars (Fig. 8).

Major general—shoulderboard of silver galloon with zigzag pattern, with two stars located as on shoulderboards of the khorunzhiy.

Lieutenant general—shoulderboard of silver galloon with zigzag pattern and three stars, located as on shoulderboards of the sotnik. The stars on all shoulderboards were the same, metal or sewn, with a diameter of around 16 mm. Stars on all shoulderboards were located at the same distance from each other, which applies to the sotnik, voyskovoy starshina and lieutenant general. And if the lower stars were moved upward because of the width of numbering, the upper star also was moved so that nearly an equilateral triangle of stars always was formed.

The **general of cavalry** wore a shoulderboard of silver galloon with zigzag and without stars. A full general did not have numbering, but he could wear the monogram of the sovereign if he was attached to the retinue.

Numbering of lower ranks was stencilled to the colored side of shoulderboards. The numbering itself requires a special, detailed discussion. I am ready to consult with whoever has questions and tell which regiments had a monogram and which simply had the number of the regiment (which, by the way, was crimson).

Well, I think that is all for today. Good luck to you, brother Cossacks.

STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

General Examines Nuclear Safety Concerns

94WP0103A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 22, 1 Jun 94 p 10

[Interview with Maj Gen Vitaliy Nikolayevich Yakovlev, deputy chief of the Main Administration of the Russian Ministry of Defense, by Kirill Belyaninov; place and date of interview not given: "Can the Nuclear Charge Be Lost: Major General Vitaliy Yakovlev From the Ministry of Defense Categorically Asserts That It Can't"]

[Text] It is said that some time ago, when the cult of personality had not yet been debunked, and people planted corn exclusively by their own wish, and not in response to a special order from the CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet military-industrial complex provided a certain number of Soviet schoolchildren with a not entirely ordinary visual aid. In the city of Semipalatinsk, where a smoky-brown mushroom created by a nuclear explosion rose above the horizon, young teachers led children into the schoolyard, and said as they pointed their finger in the direction of the test range: "That, children, is where the nuclear shield of our motherland is being forged!"

With time, of course, all that was left of the former "visual aid" was radiophobia, while the formerly vast nuclear shield was torn into such a quantity of chunks and pieces that it is now absolutely impossible to determine what part of it really remains. The Semipalatinsk test range is the property of Kazakhstan, while several of the design offices are the property of Ukraine, not to mention the radar

stations and nuclear strike early warning resources, which remain on the territory of small but proud and independent Baltic states. And if we add to this the numerous treaties on disarmament, cessation and nonproliferation, the cases of misappropriation of nuclear materials, and the absence of money for scientific developments and to support any sort of subsistence minimum for our nuclear scientists, the question that arises is quite simple, but extremely unpleasant: Is Russia left with anything of the nuclear shield, of what it was that made it a great power?

It is unpleasant all the more so because skeptical voices are already being heard both from across the ocean and from the "vast expanses" of the near abroad. "If sufficient concern is not displayed toward the arsenal of a superpower of such dimensions during political and economic reforms, the result may be historically unprecedented leakage of nuclear technology, and a catastrophe as yet unwitnessed in the world," declared U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter a month ago.

[Yakovlev] You can't really say that the situation at enterprises of our nuclear complex is very bright. And of course, the fact that radioactive materials are being stolen is a bad symptom. But we mustn't forget that the number of such cases is relatively small, and that the uranium that has disappeared was enriched to 2-4, and rarely 30 percent. It has no relationship to nuclear weapon components. And besides its use in nuclear fuel assemblies, this kind of uranium isn't much good for anything but fishing: It might be good bait for frogfish in terms of its relative weight.

When in 1992, and in subsequent years as well, reports appeared that Kazakhstan had sold some sort of warheads to Iran, that the Chechen Republic had possession of two nuclear devices, and that a nuclear weapon cropped up in Azerbaijan, all we could do was laugh. There is, after all, an extremely strict system of controlling the presence and state of nuclear ammunition. All parts of such ammunition, even those not associated with fissionable materials—automatic units such as sensors for example—bear a plant number. There is a data bank that can be used to easily determine where a device is located, when it was made, and what work has been done with it. It can even tell us how many milligrams of precious metals a particular part contains. If any sort of work is done, written confirmation of what was inspected, what parts were replaced, and so on is transmitted immediately to the ministry's central administration.

Moreover there are also a number of organizational measures: Whenever a storage site is opened, entry of less than three workers is categorically prohibited, and when charges are shipped, not only is security intensified but also an escort system is established and so-called specialized back-up systems are put into place. I can therefore state quite certainly that it is impossible to lose not only a nuclear charge but even its vehicle or any other nonnuclear part of it.

[Belyaninov] Vitaliy Nikolayevich, Western specialists are especially alarmed at the situation involving our tactical weapons: nuclear artillery devices, ammunition for aviation, and short-range missiles. In contrast to strategic missiles, use of which requires creation of an entire infrastructure, tactical weapons may be used by practically any state of the world without any special trouble. Moreover, as they assert in the United States, the exact quantity of our tactical devices is still unknown to them. Officials in Washington state a figure of 19,000, while independent experts such as, for example, Bruce Blair from the Brookings Institution cites a figure of 43,000.

[Yakovlev] It's true that we never cited a figure. Having signed an agreement with the United States to eliminate tactical nuclear ammunition for rocket forces and for ground forces artillery prior to the year 2000, we regularly hold joint consultative meetings. But no figures are thrown around in these meetings. We report that as of the given day 17 percent of such-and-such forces and resources were eliminated. And that's all. Although I can say—these data haven't been made public anywhere yet—that of the total quantity of weapons withdrawn from Ukraine, we have already eliminated 1,500 units, or over half.

And if we consider the potential danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons.... Back during the time of perestroika—and as we know, perestroika meant instability—we gave some thought to this problem, and we began withdrawing weapons from Warsaw Pact states and from USSR republics. We began with the Baltic and Transcaucasian countries, such that by the end of 1991 we still had nuclear ammunition only in Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia. After the four-way treaty on elimination was signed in December 1991, in which Kazakhstan participated in addition to the republics named above, we began withdrawing weapons from the territories of these states as well.

In this case complexities arose, and are arising now, only in regard to Ukraine. The Republic's Supreme Rada began doubting that we were really destroying the withdrawn weapons, rather than placing them into combat duty in Russia, and they stopped releasing our trains across the border. But we were able to find a solution. Beginning at approximately July 1992 we began eliminating these weapons under the observation of Ukrainian specialists. The agreement is still in force, and it also foresees the presence of specialists from Belorussia and Kazakhstan. But to be honest, this isn't cheap. Money has to be paid for the presence of specialists in Russia, for housing and the like, not counting health services. Apparently understanding this, neither Belorussia nor Kazakhstan sent their own observers.

As for Russia itself, all we are doing as far as tactical weapons are concerned is dismantling them. Our enterprises have not produced a single device since the time the agreement was signed with the republics.

[Belyaninov] How much time does it take to dismantle a single unit of ammunition?

[Yakovlev] Not much. The Americans, for example, have two main device dismantling "points." The main one of these—Panteks [transliteration]—eliminates around 2,000 a year. Our rate is not any lower.

But as with any other country, we are dismantling more than just tactical weapons. Our ammunition has a shelf life, and a guarantee period. Upon expiration of this period it is not only unsuitable but also unsafe to store it. The charge becomes more sensitive to mechanical effects, and the radiation background may rise. This is why strategic weapons are also sent to the dismantling enterprises.

[Belyaninov] Last year was marked by an entire series of conflicts between the Ukrainian and Russian defense ministries. Part of the strategic nuclear forces were transferred to Ukrainian jurisdiction, Russian specialists developing ammunition were deprived of access to weapons, and it became impossible to carry out routine repairs and maintenance. As a result several accidents occurred at bases in Ukraine.

[Yakovlev] It may sound somewhat cynical, but two factors saved the day: a visit to Kiev by the American President and Ukraine's economic difficulties. The Americans raised the issue of granting economic assistance to Ukraine that would be directly dependent on the timetable for withdrawal of missiles, while the crisis in atomic energy and the shortage of fuel for nuclear power plants, which was being produced only in Russia, compelled Ukraine to sign a trilateral treaty with fewer stipulations than before. This made our situation much easier. In accordance with the agreement Russia supplied fuel assemblies for reactors to the Republic, while our department was given permission to withdraw all remaining weapons and do all of the needed work at the bases. Such that we can now take responsibility for the safety of the weapons. But I'm not about to make any long-range forecasts: The situation changes so frequently that it is simply impossible to talk about any kind of stability.

[Belyaninov] Vitaliy Nikolayevich, the opinions of experts regarding American assistance differ. Some assert that we don't need this assistance at all, that while the Americans talk about hundreds of millions of dollars, they are barely appropriating hundreds of thousands, and that ultimately this is assisting not Russia but the American economy.

[Yakovlev] This is true to a certain extent. Little of the \$400 million appropriated by the U.S. Congress this year has in fact been spent, but the American side shouldn't be the only one that is blamed. After all, each item in the agreements must pass through a very long and complex system of consideration and approval both there—in Congress—and here—in the Duma.

On the other hand any assistance of this sort consists not of cash transfers in the millions to the Central Bank, but of materials and equipment valued at this amount. The United States does place orders with American companies. But agreements to provide such assistance are in effect, and some of them have already been realized. As an example we have received so-called "Kevlar linings" to be used in transportation of the devices. They are unique in their properties: They offer good protection against environmental effects, and several layers of Kevlar can easily stop a bullet from an automatic weapon. We did not have such a material before.

We also received special equipment for emergency teams, and an agreement to produce special railcars to transport nuclear ammunition is being implemented. These cars are being developed in the United States, and they offer several levels of protection. The Americans supply parts for these cars, but they will be assembled in Russia. There are several agreements between the Ministry of Atomic Energy and the U.S. Department of Energy regarding construction of a new storage facility for plutonium extracted from warheads, regarding delivery of supercontainers to transport highly radioactive materials, and so on.

It is evident at least from this list that the total volume of American assistance already exceeds tens of millions of dollars.

[Belyaninov] Vitaliy Nikolayevich, many in the United States associate the volume of assistance being granted with access of American specialists to Russian technology for dismantling and destroying weapons. And during one of the sessions of the U.S. Congress Defense Subcommittee its chairman, John Murtha, declared that unless all Russian enterprises of the nuclear complex are opened to the Americans, including military ones, there will be "no money at all."

[Yakovlev] An agreement to deliver processed uranium extracted from warheads to the United States was signed by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and the U.S. Department of Energy. And naturally the American side wants to make sure that the materials we are transferring are in fact coming from weapons. The actual issue is at what stage American specialists could be allowed in. We insist on the beginning of the processing cycle—that is, when the warhead has already been dismantled and the material has been extracted and delivered to the corresponding enterprise. In the meantime the Americans want to supervise the process from the very beginning, from the moment the warheads are dismantled. This is a more sensitive topic, this means access to weapon design, and access to our military secrets.

When it comes to my own point of view, the problem is easily solved: Weapon-grade uranium differs dramatically in its characteristics from that used in the fuel assemblies of nuclear power plants and nuclear submarine reactors. They're simply impossible to confuse: The

characteristics of a material with this degree of enrichment are known to any specialist both in our country and in the USA.

[Belyaninov] There is one other problem that troubles many today. What is happening with the Russian nuclear program? The test ranges are closed, tests are not being conducted, and scientists are living on starvation rations.

[Yakovlev] Testing is in fact a difficult issue. A tombstone placed over the Semipalatinsk test range long ago, and it will never again be used to test nuclear weapons. Nor is there any sense in talking about Novaya Zemlya, as long as we aren't conducting tests there, and are supporting a policy of their prohibition. But when we—I'm referring to the military department—discussed the need for tests, what we had in mind primarily was not improving nuclear weapons but improving their safety. Only by conducting experiments, by conducting tests, can we be certain of the safety of a device that is in storage. But it would be useless to argue this now. World public opinion is so negatively oriented, and specialists of all countries possessing nuclear weapons are experiencing such problems. This is one of those issues that will not be resolved as long as no country violates the moratorium and conducts tests first.

As for the nuclear program, it existed before, and it exists today, although many scientific directions have either been curtailed or significantly reduced. We have weapon systems, the design systems have been developed, several systems of nuclear devices exist, and they have been tested and proven to be reliable. Such that we aren't under the threat of falling behind in this area as yet.

There are of course difficulties with specialists. Some of them will switch to jobs in the International Center for Science and Technology currently being established in Moscow. It is being built with American assistance. Testers from the Semipalatinsk test range will most probably work in one of our scientific institutes. And as for creating new forms and systems of weapons, that's something not worth thinking about today, it's too expensive a pleasure. Such that we are concerned more today with problems of disarmament.

GROUND TROOPS

System of Fire of Motor-Rifle Battalion in Defense

94UM0465A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 2, Feb 94 (signed to press 24 Jan 94)
pp 60-62

[Article by Colonel V. Vorontsov, candidate of military sciences, under rubric: "To Assist Those Entering the Academy"]

[Text] The system of fire, structured in accordance with the commander's concept and with consideration of capabilities of all kinds of organic and attached weapons (see diagram), is one element in aligning the battalion defense.

It includes the following: artillery (including mortar) concentrated and defensive fire sectors on approaches, ahead of the FEBA [Forward Edge of the Battle Area], on flanks, in gaps between company strongpoints, and in the depth of the defense; zone of fire of antitank weapons and zone of continuous multilayered fire of all kinds of weapons ahead of the FEBA, in gaps, on flanks and in the depth of the defense for destroying first and foremost enemy tanks and other armored targets; and a prepared maneuver of fire to concentrate it on any threatened sector or axis in a short time.


The system of fire is structured with consideration of fire capabilities of all kinds of battalion weapons, attached weapons, and fire strikes planned by the senior commander, and in combination with manmade obstacles and natural barriers. Its basis is the fire of tanks, BMP's, ATGM's, grenade launchers and antitank guns and the direct fire of artillery with consideration of employment of the regiment's antitank reserve and mobile obstacle detachment on a likely avenue of tank approach.

The necessary density of tanks, antitank weapons and BMP's, established in advance and maintained in the course of battle, is of decisive importance in achieving the goals of a modern defense. It depends above all on the makeup of the attacking enemy grouping. A battalion defense area may be assaulted by one and one-half to two battalion task forces—mechanized or tank. The expected number of tanks and IFV's (APC's) and their density are shown in the table.

Table

Battalion Task Forces	Width of Zone of Advance (km)	Number		Densities per Kilometer		
		IFV's	Tanks	IFV's	Tanks	Total
Mechanized battalion task force (3 mechanized companies, 1 tank company)	3	39	14	13	5	18
Tank battalion task force (1 tank company, 1 mechanized company)	3	13	42	4	14	18
Total		52	56	17	19	36

System of Fire of Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Defense (variant)



In connection with the fact that capabilities of one antitank weapon permit fighting 2-3 armored targets, then based on exercise experience the density of antitank weapons per kilometer of frontage should be 6-9 to repel tank and IFV (APC) assaults. Organic battalion weapons permit creating such densities (17:3; 19:2) on likely avenues of tank approach.

The effectiveness of a system of fire also depends largely on selection of firing positions on the terrain for available weapons. Their disposition in the battalion defense area should be concealed and dispersed, support the creation of fire sacks, conduct of fire to maximum range and engagement of the enemy with high-density flanking fire, cross fire and surprise close-range concentrated fire, and there should be mutual contact. Their linear disposition is inadmissible.

Alternate and temporary firing positions and routes of forward movement to them are prepared for weapons in addition to the primary positions. The battalion may assign roving guns, tanks and BMP's to mislead the enemy regarding the system of fire. All weapons must be ready for wide, swift maneuver and for conducting fire at night and under other conditions of limited visibility.

Organizing the system of fire is a very important duty of the battalion commander. He performs this work based on the decision made in the course of ground reconnaissance and when assigning missions to subunits and organizing coordination.

In conducting ground reconnaissance, the battalion commander clarifies company fire zones, fire concentration sectors, and primary and alternate (temporary) positions of organic and attached artillery. He personally points out on the terrain firing positions and sectors of fire for tanks, BMP's (BTR's), ATGM systems and grenade launchers on the most probable avenues of enemy approach. Here, too, he gives instructions for organizing subunit small arms fire; outlines for them sectors of concentrated and defensive fire intended for securing flanks and boundaries with adjacent subunits and gaps between companies; and clarifies places for arranging fire ambushes and the lines of firing positions for the tank company and BMP-equipped motorized rifle company located in the second echelon (reserve).

In assigning combat missions for first and second echelon subunits, the battalion commander indicates zones of fire, secondary sectors of fire and fire concentration sectors, what forces and assets to use to secure flanks, boundaries and gaps and who is responsible for them. The procedure for engaging the enemy on his approaching the FEBA, deploying into battle formation, launching the assault and penetrating company strong-points, and the procedure for engaging the enemy when supporting a counterattack by the second echelon is communicated to attached artillery subunits and the mortar battery. The battalion commander assigns the

grenade launcher subunit primary and alternate positions, a zone of fire, secondary sector of fire, fire concentration sectors and defensive fire lines; he assigns the antitank subunit its place in the battle formation, deployment lines, and missions which it must be ready to execute.

In organizing coordination, the commander determines lines for commencing fire against the enemy from tanks, BMP's, ATGM systems, grenade launchers and other antitank weapons, and also company fire concentration sectors on the most important axes, time of commencing fire and procedure for conducting it. When the enemy comes right up to the FEBA, subunit operations are coordinated in such a way that a zone of massed, multilayered fire forms here—each point on the terrain in a zone of up to 400 m should be under effective fire. Such a zone also is created in the most important sectors ahead of the third trench. Dead ground not covered by direct fire of guns and by small arms fire is engaged by artillery and mortar fire from indirect firing positions.

Readiness of the system of fire is determined by the occupation of positions by weapons, the personnel's knowledge of their missions, preparation of firing data, and availability of ammunition. The content of the system of fire is reflected in greatest detail in the battalion defense area diagram.

If a subunit shifts to a defense in direct contact with the enemy, the system of fire is organized during the assignment of missions to companies for consolidating a favorable or accessible line. It is developed subsequently in accordance with the decision made for defense.

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Combined-Arms Battle: Security, Defense of Military Facilities

94UM0463A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 2, Feb 94 (signed to press 24 Jan 94)
pp 21-25

[Article by Colonel A. Zemskov, candidate of military sciences: "Combined Arms Battle: Security and Defense of Military Posts and Installations"]

[Text] Many regions of the country today are characterized by an unstable, criminogenic situation. The number of grave crimes, including piratical attacks using all kinds of firearms and silent weapons, has risen sharply.

Experience of recent years shows that criminal elements are choosing military installations as "promising" targets more and more often: housing areas, storage areas with stockpiles of supplies and military property, and weapon and ammunition arsenals. Attacks on guardhouses, unit checkpoints, small posts, assigned personnel of on-duty services and the daily detail, and on individual servicemen have stepped up considerably.

Investigations of the enumerated incidents permit concluding that a rehearsed system of forcible seizure of weapons and combat equipment has taken shape in a number of areas where troops are stationed. A planned attack usually is preceded by a thorough study of the installation and its security system and a detailed coordination of the criminals' actions. In essence, organized groups and entire units are active, especially in "hot spots." Unit details and subunits supporting a state-of-emergency regime are subjected to simultaneous attack. There have been cases of seizure of weapons and military property by individual citizens.

To achieve their criminal schemes, the bandits study the security system: procedure and time of sentry relief, terrain in the vicinity of installations, nature of their outfitting with technical and engineer equipment, and organization of communications. For example, an attack was made twice in the course of a month on one of the Moscow garrison units to seize weapons. An investigation showed that the criminals were well informed concerning the security system and the procedure for sentries' performance of duties and their relief.

Other techniques also are used, such as provocations with hostages (wives and children of servicemen) used for an unhindered approach to bases, arsenals and other installations, and bribery of soldiers and of servicing and maintenance personnel. All this has been done in Georgia and in other republics and areas.

A brief survey of attempts and an analysis of methods used confirm the urgent need for improving all work connected with organizing troop duties in units and subunits. Reliable security and defense of installations and military posts should be ensured above all through proper regulation assignment of routine garrison duty and guard duty. The latter holds a special place in troop life and activity. It must be regarded as performance of a combat mission in peacetime and it must become an important condition for maintaining high combat readiness and a subject of constant concern of the commander and staff.

The problem of which we are speaking is rather vast and impossible to cover in one article. Therefore I will dwell in more detail only on the substance of the concept and certain recommendations of a practical nature.

Security and defense of installations represent a complex of troop actions coordinated by goal, place and time in combination with technical, engineer and other measures. They are conducted to ensure safety of installations, keep outsiders from penetrating to them, and prevent seizure and loss of military property.

Technical and engineer measures consist of the arrangement, installation, proper operation and further upgrading of various technical and engineer security equipment. This equipment includes structures, obstacles and the following systems: signalling, communications, automatic equipment, telematics, mechanization, lighting and surveillance.

In organizing troop duties, the commander must see to it that installation security meets modern requirements—reliability, continuity of effect, activeness and flexibility—and has necessary depth.

Reliability is that state of security which precludes the possibility of intruders penetrating into installations or the illegal transporting (carrying) of arms and other military property from them. It is achieved by skilled construction of the security system, use of its most advisable methods, proper organization and precise performance of duty, maintaining high combat readiness of subunits and guard details, appropriate training of personnel, and constantly keeping technical and engineer security equipment in operating condition.

Continuity of security is where each installation checkpoint and perimeter sector is under surveillance and covered by particular forces and assets at any time.

Activeness of security presumes a wide maneuver of forces, assets and fire, and also decisive actions of subunits, guard details and sentries for ensuring reliability of installation defense.

Flexibility of security consists of reacting promptly to a change in the situation and concentrating efforts on avenues of the most likely intruder actions.

Depth of security is that disposition of forces and assets which provides for detaining intruders in or near the restricted area. This is achieved by an optimum distribution of forces and assets to lines of the zone and by assigning areas of responsibility to guards outside the installation when the situation becomes complicated.

With respect to practical recommendations, in my view it is apropos to look at the procedure for organizing the security system and one of its most important components, use of technical and engineer equipment.

The following are determined in organizing an installation security system: security methods; number and makeup of guards, security and defense sectors, guard-house locations and procedure for personnel actions; number and kinds of checkpoints; number, kinds, purpose and locations of posts and the length of routes; nature of preparation of the restricted zone with technical and engineer security equipment, its density and the procedure for installing it; makeup of unit (subunit) reserves and procedure for their employment.

Special attention is given to outfitting the restricted zone with technical and engineer security equipment (one variant is shown in the diagram). Commanders proceed from the importance of the secured area in installing technical and engineer security equipment. Thus, a category one installation is outfitted with two or more lines of perimeter detection equipment and with installation security signalling and a category two installation with one line. Only installation security signalling may be installed at a category three installation.

Based on troop experience, systems based on television, radar, vibration, electromagnetic and combination principles of action such as Luch, Klen, Shchit, Setka, Kvarts, Radian and others may find wide use. In sectors that cannot be viewed it is advisable to use remotely controlled television cameras operating with low illumination.

The use of troop details equipped with radar detection equipment is becoming a promising direction for improving the effectiveness of security and defense duty for military posts (installations). It is recommended setting up technical observation posts, which permit reliably covering an installation sector (perimeter) by creating a continuous radar surveillance zone. Each post can consist of one or two radar teams with the PSNR-2 [type of ground reconnaissance search radar] (or PSNR-5 or SBR-3 [type of short-range reconnaissance radar]). The posts are put out individually or included in the guard detail.

AMP-90, Luch-1 and Luch-2 searchlight stations and PZS [mobile battery charging station] searchlights powered from special mobile generators may find wide use at night. Use of various laser devices with a night and day branch, night vision devices of all types, and night sights is possible.

To strengthen reliability of security it is advisable to set up obstacles difficult to negotiate, such as two rows of 12-strand barbed wire reinforced by a metal net and deflectors [kozyrki]. It is recommended setting up low wire entanglements between outer and inner perimeters of an obstacle, outfitting observation towers with bullet-proof walls, and equipping personnel of the guard detail duty shift with Sirena, Palma or Romashka portable radios.

As spelled out in the Russian Federation Armed Forces Provisional Garrison and Guard Service Regulations, security and defense of installations equipped with technical and engineer security equipment can be accomplished with the posting of sentries or by the method of control and security team alert duty. Control and security team alert duty is the most effective. Here the technical and engineer equipment is consolidated in a unified system, which permits promptly sending intrusion signals to the guardhouse. Transportation is assigned to deliver such teams to the prescribed place, or armored equipment is assigned when there is an attack by armed criminals (units).

It is understandable that other measures also contribute to preventing weapon, ammunition and combat equipment thefts. In certain cases it is advisable to transfer weapons from scattered small depots for storage at one well equipped installation. A technique such as sealing off weapon storage rooms, rifle racks, and safes under control of the unit duty officer or officer of the guard has proven itself in the troops. This method also is used in storing combat equipment in closed bays of motor pools. Entrance gates in a number of units are equipped with a

call button or code pad, and a two-way communications device is mounted on the gate for conversations with arriving persons. Gates are opened and closed automatically and the control panel is in the checkpoint building to preclude an attack on a sentry or a person on duty.

From the editors.

We request unit commanders, chiefs of staff, officers of combat arms and services, and all readers to share experience in organizing security and defense of military posts and installations and to express their views and recommendations on actions of commanders and staffs under emergency conditions. Your opinion will help gain a deeper understanding of the subject touched on and thereby will facilitate accomplishment of the troops' primary mission—maintaining their constant combat readiness.

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NAVAL FORCES

Creditors Plan To Sue Pacific Fleet

94UM0477A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Jun 94 p 1

[Item from Vladivostok by Natalya Piskunova: "Will the Pacific Fleet Stand Trial?"]

[Text] **If Pacific Fleet navymen do not pay off the debt to ship repairmen, an action will be filed in court on behalf of labor collectives of the Far East Ship Repair Yard.**

That was the decision made by a conference of labor collectives of ship repair enterprises after Fleet debt, in the opinion of specialists, exceeded R75 billion. Workers have not received wages for three months, many programs have been curtailed, and enterprises have been informed that utilities are to be shut off to the yards for debts. But the Fleet also is in no position to settle the debt even if the action is filed.

Navy Bought Dud Torpedo To Counter U.S. Mk-48

94UM0477B Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 104, 2 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Dmitriy Kholodov: "'Precision Weapon' From the Soviet Military-Industrial Complex: Bow tubes... Logs... Fire!" Designation "Top Secret" is as published in original Russian source]

[Text] It is customary to believe that the Soviet military-industrial complex is something "cool," and that in contrast to everyday trash, equipment of exceptional quality goes to the troops. But in the country of the "biggest microprocessors" and "fastest clocks" it cannot be that one part of the economy does not work and another works. As it became known to MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI as a result of investigative journalism, a file is


resting in the Main Military Procuracy under a "Top Secret" [as published] classification which overturns the impressions about our military-industrial complex.

All this resembles an anecdote. The Americans contrived the Mk-48 dual-purpose supertorpedo capable of engaging both submarines at a depth of more than 900 meters as well as surface ships at a range up to 46 km. The torpedo was guided to the target by wires, i.e., its warhead had a television camera which transmitted an image of the target to the weapon operator. In addition to remote control, the warhead had the usual acoustic homing system, which switched on and locked onto the target on the approach. The torpedo had an onboard computer based on the microprocessors which had just appeared at that time and which controlled everything.

The latest Soviet torpedo, also capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, evidently was being created to counterbalance the American one. The electronic circuit of the computer in the torpedo just did not begin to work and they gave up remote control right away. It proved incapable of it. Each time in testing the torpedo suddenly would change course and swim away in an unknown direction—toward our own cruiser, for example, instead of toward an enemy cruiser. It was necessary to place an old, antiquated guidance system on the new torpedo, i.e., guiding on its wake. They also had to forget about versatility—each time, the ship commander had to manually set the target, surface or submarine, against which to fire. But even this would have been a small loss. It turned out that the new Soviet torpedo did not know how to swim. Original, right? This is all the same as a missile which is unable to fly.

The statistics are as follows: 70 percent of these torpedoes sink hopelessly. Imagine, with a nuclear warhead at that! Only from ten to zero percent of the torpedoes hit the target. But the money for developing the torpedo already had been spent, eaten up, and... the new "super-weapon" was made operational. Just think, it sinks—what nonsense! The entire Navy, including modern Tayfun submarines, which Americans allegedly especially feared, was outfitted with the innovation. True, you imperialists around the world should tremble: God forbid that our submarine should fire a torpedo with a nuclear warhead—you will wear yourselves out getting it off the bottom later. The nuclear torpedoes on the submarine Komsomolets, about whose corrosion so much is being said now, are of this very type. The Dutch refused to get them even for a billion dollars.

But what about the military, you ask? The sailors of course were outraged. Each time they would receive "twos" in firings. The Northern Fleet even took the manufacturer, the Leningrad Torpedo Design Bureau, to court. The procuracy instituted proceedings. But this problem, too, was solved, and in our own way: the inspectors began receiving an order not to give "twos." CinC Navy Admiral Chernavin actually gave the okay for further rearming—the new dud torpedoes went to the fleets by the thousands and filled the depots. The old, rather weak, but reliable torpedoes were taken out of operation. Now they are unsuitable: their caliber (533 mm) is smaller and they will "rattle around" in the torpedo tubes. The criminal case was closed; from the very beginning they classified it and sent it off to the archives, where, as we were informed in the procuracy, it



DRAWN BY ALEKSEY MERINOV

now safely abides. And seemingly everything is in order—no one knows anything. The Navy is fully armed, as they say.

And so we rearmed with the new torpedoes. Even logs are better—at least they float. It is unknown how many such files are hidden in the motherland's storehouses. It turns out the state military-industrial complex, untouched by competition a single time in 70 years, comes from the very same page as "the freest health care." Only the appetites are different. The Ministry of Defense now demands increasing the military budget by 1.5 times, including for that same planned military-industrial complex for arms deliveries. And the public just was not given an opportunity to familiarize itself with items of the defense budget, as is customary in civilized countries. But the fact is, the fight is for R55 trillion! This of course is a good figure, half of a lemon from each Russian, including children and retirees.

And it would be nice if the torpedoes swam.

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Rear Services' Vorobyev on Military Legislation, Support Issues

94UM0440A Moscow TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL VOYENNO EKONOMICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 2, Feb 1994 (signed to press 26 Jan 94)
pp 3-7

[Interview with Colonel General Vasily Vasilyevich Vorobyev, chief of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate, by R. Chekmarev, military economics and finances department editor of TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL VOYENNO EKONOMICHESKIY ZHURNAL, date, place and occasion unknown, under rubric "Pertinent Interview": "A Package of Military Laws"]

[Text] Our correspondent's questions are answered by Colonel General V. Vorobyev, chief of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate.

Colonel General Vasily Vasilyevich Vorobyev was born on 11 May 1946 in the settlement of Gidrotorf, Balakhninskiy Rayon, Gorkiy Oblast. He completed the Yaroslavl Military School imeni General of the Army A. V. Khrulev in 1966 and the Military Faculty at Moscow Finance Institute in 1974. He successively went through various positions in the troops: chief of finance service of a battalion, regiment, division, army and military district (Siberian Military District, Southern Group of Forces, Ural Military District, Far East Military District). He has been on the central staff since June 1990 (first deputy chief, then chief of the Main Directorate). Married, has two children.

[Chekmarev] Vasily Vasilyevich, our country is experiencing a very difficult time. It is fully natural that the

situation which formed in the Russian Armed Forces fully reflects the socioeconomic and political situation in society. Therefore, evidently from the very beginning of establishment of the Russian Army the military leadership has encountered very difficult problems that demand solution without delay. In your view, which of these problems are most acute?

[Vorobyev] The first and probably most important one is the insufficient legislative base for Armed Forces vital activities. Because of this, so-called irregular situations often arise which make both the central staff and the troops feverish. Many of Russia's fundamental laws entering into the "military package" have not yet been adopted, and those which were adopted are not "working" to full capacity, since the mechanism for their realization has not been completely adjusted. In particular, this concerns the Russian Federation Laws "On Defense" and "On the Status of Servicemen."

One other very acute problem is establishment of a Russian Army military-technical base meeting modern requirements. It is no secret to anyone that after partition of the USSR Armed Forces our state basically got the troops of interior districts, i.e., the second strategic echelon, and Russia's share of the newest arms was only 20 percent.

Moreover, battle management, communications, intelligence, and missile and air attack warning systems and the system for providing troops with necessities of life and combat training were disrupted.

Closely adjoining this problem is the need for removing troops from the territory of other states and settling-in hundreds of thousands of officers, warrant officers and enlisted men at new permanent station locations, difficulties in solving problems of servicemen's social protection, and the near-crisis situation with manning of military units and ships.

And finally, economic disorders in the country, a new system of troop manning providing for contract service, conversion being carried out hastily and, unfortunately, not always in a well thought-out way, involvement of troops in regional conflicts, and also the very rigid framework of the military budget generate additional problems in Armed Forces organizational development.

[Chekmarev] What has been done lately and what is planned to be done to protect servicemen against inflationary processes occurring in the country and to improve pay for military labor?

[Vorobyev] The Russian Federation government periodically indexes pay by raising base pay and allowances. Thus, the position pay of all categories of servicemen was raised seven times just during 1992-1993.

Under conditions of inflationary processes occurring in the country the main emphasis beginning in 1990 has been placed on strengthening social protection of junior

and mid-level officers, warrant officers and extended-term servicemen whose level of base pay and allowances (pay for position and rank) periodically was increased more significantly than the level of base pay and allowances of general and flag officers.

Payment of a monetary reward for a class rating was established for the first time beginning in 1990 as a financial incentive for officers at the troop level to perfect professional expertise. It presently is 10 percent of position pay. Payment of a monetary reward for a rating category was established in these same amounts for medical servicemen.

The Ministry of Defense worked purposefully to expand the benefits of servicemen performing their duty under special conditions and whose service involves risk to health and life (pilots, navymen, landing personnel and so on).

Specific work also was done to improve supplementary payments to servicemen performing duty in remote localities and in localities with difficult climatic conditions. For example, as of 1 January 1993 payment of higher position pay was established there in the amount of the regional factors applied to wages of workers and employees in corresponding localities, if an increase in servicemen's pay previously was not provided for there in amounts exceeding the amounts of these factors. A number of restrictions were removed on paying higher position pay to servicemen performing duty in these localities.

As of 1 January 1993 significant supplementary payments and benefits were established for those servicemen who serve on territories of Transcaucasian and Baltic states and in the Republic of Tajikistan, and also who perform missions under conditions of a state of emergency and in armed conflicts (these are payments of one and one-half or two times base pay and allowances, a preferential offset for years served for pension and so on).

That is when the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen" was placed in force, providing for a number of benefits, guarantees and advantages in social protection for servicemen, citizens discharged from military service and their families. In general, this law deserves to be the topic of a separate conversation. Let us focus attention on the important thing.

Benefits and guarantees established for servicemen are in the nature of compensation. They have the purpose of compensating for restrictions on certain general civilian rights and freedoms dictated by features of military service, and unquestionably have the purpose of socially protecting servicemen and elevating the prestige of military service.

Guarantees of pay for military labor are legislatively incorporated for the first time in this important document. Thus, Article 12 of the Law points out that pay for

initial military positions of privates and seamen performing contract military service cannot be less than five minimum amounts of pay, and pay for rank cannot be less than half of military position pay. Consequently, the Law now guarantees payment of base pay and allowances to servicemen performing contract service in the initial position in an amount of at least 7.5 times the minimum amount of pay for labor. In addition, the amount of servicemen's station allowance was doubled, including for family members, on official reassignments.

The Law also did not ignore servicemen being discharged on reaching the maximum age for active military service and also being discharged for sickness and in connection with table of organization measures. As of 1 January 1993 the one-time allowance on being discharged for those reasons was set in the amount of from 5 to 20 times base pay and allowances (depending on overall duration of military service) instead of that previously paid in the amount of five times base pay and allowances.

Active work has been going on in recent years to unify the system of base pay and allowances for warrant officers, extended-term servicemen and officers in order to establish a uniform system for paying for the labor of servicemen performing contract service. For example, payment of a percentage increment for years served was introduced for extended-term servicemen and warrant officers in the very same amounts as for officers, and increments for special conditions of service, an increment for continuous service in remote localities, and others were established in identical amounts with officers.

The Ministry of Defense will continue systematic work to strengthen social protection of servicemen and their families and to improve the system of base pay and allowances, especially with respect to servicemen serving under contract.

[Chekmarev] Many critical letters about late payment of base pay and allowances and wages to Army and Navy personnel come to the editors, and probably also to the Main Directorate you head. And many are inclined to place the blame for this on military finance officers. I would like to learn your opinion on this problem.

[Vorobyev] There is no denying that an enormous load and responsibility will fall on the Armed Forces Finance Service in the situation at hand. On the one hand, a periodic or, more correctly, systematic increase in base pay and allowances, wages and pensions demands considerable labor inputs for recomputation. But on the other hand, the constant shortage of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense financing and its unsystematic accomplishment in terms of volumes and time, beginning with the Ministry of Finance and ending with the military unit level, create a nervous atmosphere in Army collectives and give rise to unfavorable criticism of Finance Service work.

And how many troubles are brought to us by the instability and contradictoriness of hastily adopted laws, which as a rule are not backed up economically! Whoever you like can argue about a poor rule of law, but just not finance workers. They must make decisions and assume responsibility for the blunders of others. I must declare with all responsibility that the heads of the Ministry of Defense and Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate are taking all necessary steps to stabilize the situation of financial support of the Army and Navy. But the state's economic situation is such that numerous efforts for now are not producing the desired result, and this circumstance cannot be blamed on the Finance Service, since on the whole it is coping with its tasks. Officials of our Directorate work a great deal in central economic and governmental entities, defending Armed Forces interests. We are giving most careful attention to ensuring a very strict regime of economy in expending the resources being allocated for defense, to strengthening fiscal control, and to coming up with proposals aimed at strengthening social protection of servicemen and Armed Forces veterans and their families.

[Chekmarev] One other important problem is the construction and procurement of housing for servicemen, especially those arriving on the territory of Russia from abroad. What kind of funds are being spent for these purposes?

[Vorobyev] In accordance with Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 796 of 21 July 1992, the Ministry of Defense received the right to direct not only appropriations provided by the federal budget for financing centralized capital investments, but also extra-budgetary funds obtained from selling freed-up military property, for building and purchasing housing for servicemen.

In 1993 over R600 billion from the republic budget and an additional R5 billion of extra-budgetary funds for constructing and purchasing apartments were sent to pay for construction of housing under the state defense order. In 1994 it is envisaged allocating funds for building 73,300 apartments—more than in the past year.

[Chekmarev] Are Russian Federation Ministry of Defense enterprises and organizations subject to privatization?

[Vorobyev] In accordance with the State Program for Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation for 1994, Ministry of Defense enterprises are not subject to privatization. Considering that Russian Ministry of Defense enterprises and organizations are a very important element in ensuring Armed Forces combat readiness and vital activities, in my view it is advisable to refrain from privatizing them even subsequently. It is necessary to perform purposeful work to strengthen the Army and Navy material-technical base, to outfit them with modern kinds of arms and military equipment, and to keep equipment service life at the proper level based on upgrading and developing the performance of military repairs.

[Chekmarev] Many letters come to journal editors from Armed Forces veterans who are military retirees on matters concerning their pension support, and in particular on ensuring timely payment of pensions in new amounts when there is a mass recomputation of them. How is this matter being resolved presently and what steps are being taken by the Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate to accelerate getting pensions in the increased amounts directly to military retirees?

[Vorobyev] A solution to this problem is very important at the present time under conditions of the rise in prices on goods and services and inflationary processes occurring in the country, inasmuch as a delay in paying a pension in the new amount devaluates it and lowers its buying power.

By decision of the Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate, almost all military commissariats were supplied with personal computers to improve pension support and shorten the time for getting pensions in the new amounts to military retirees. This permits recomputing pensions in 2-3 weeks, and even faster for those military commissariats where a small number of retirees are registered. In addition, pension entities of military commissariats are attempting to adjust close business contacts with Savings Bank establishments in order to help the latter's employees complete documents for payment of pensions.

And still there continue to be shortcomings in pension support work. The callousness and bureaucratism of some military commissariat workers have not yet been fully eradicated. Delays in assigning and recalculating pensions are allowed in places. There also are simply mistakes in determining the amounts of pensions and allowances, as a result of which the rights of some retirees are infringed. We see omissions and defects in the work of pension entities. Exactness toward them has been raised.

The majority of military commissariats and finance and economic directorates of military districts have been reinforced by experienced officers of finance and pension entities by decision of the minister of defense in order to improve the quality of work of servicing retirees. In short, everything depending on us is being done and will be done to strengthen the social protection of Armed Forces veterans.

[Chekmarev] Vasily Vasilyevich, tell me, please, what social guarantees are envisaged for servicemen in case their health is harmed, and also for their families in case they are killed or die, for it is no secret that many Russians now serve in so-called "hot spots"?

[Vorobyev] I agree with you that many Russian servicemen presently are performing military duty honorably in areas with an unstable sociopolitical situation, under conditions of a state of emergency, and in regions where armed conflicts are taking place. In order to socially protect servicemen in case their health is harmed or to protect their families in case the breadwinner is

killed or dies, the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen" provides for state personal insurance. In accordance with this Law, insurance coverage norms which substantially strengthen the social protection of servicemen and their families were introduced beginning 1 March 1993 by decree of the Russian Federation government.

I will give just one example. In case a servicemen performing contract military service dies in the line of duty, his family, consisting of his wife, two children and parents, altogether will receive 125 times the base pay and allowances authorized the serviceman on the day of his death.

The procedure for completing documents and also for paying allowances and insurance is spelled out by the Russian Federation Minister of Defense Order of 6 May 1993. I would like to emphasize that it is the responsibility of the Military Insurance Company to make payments in accordance with the order I mentioned in order to shorten the time of paying the insurance sums so needed by families specifically at this moment. As of today, that insurance coverage answers the realities of the present moment.

The Military Insurance Company is joining more and more actively in the work of social protection of servicemen. To assist families with many children, it has transferred from its funds R50 million each to the Far East Military District and Northern Fleet and R75 million each to the Transbaykal Military District and Airborne Troops. The Military Insurance Company purchased 35 apartments for servicemen with an overall area of 2,000 m², and other charitable acts are being carried out. Was such a thing really possible two or three years ago, when the Gosstrakh [Main Administration of State Insurance] "called the tune"?! Meanwhile, Army and Navy personnel still are making insufficient use of capabilities of the Military Insurance Company, although it can insure the lives of children and other members of the serviceman's family, a summer house, a car and much more.

[Chekmarev] Changes in the country's economy, the trend toward a reduction of defense expenditures and of the economic foundations of Russian Federation military doctrine dictate the need to perfect the mechanism for providing troops with arms, military equipment and other material-technical resources, and consequently also with finances, which are the circulatory system of the military economy. Our journal's readers would be interested in learning how the activity of the Armed Forces Finance Service will be transformed under market conditions.

[Vorobyev] You are right, the country's transition to market relations, the sharp reduction in defense expenditures, instability in allocating appropriations, and an expansion in Armed Forces relationships with enterprises and organizations with various forms of ownership require developing new approaches aimed at ensuring thrifty, rational use of resources being allocated

for defense, especially for developing arms and military equipment programs and for capital construction. Successful performance of these tasks will be determined to a considerable extent by the status of economic activity at all levels of military management.

The Economic Service was established to develop and implement a unified economic and financial policy in the Armed Forces. Its tasks include performing an economic analysis of measures envisaged by basic provisions of Russian Federation military doctrine, forecasting military-economic decisions being made and determining the economically substantiated need for appropriations for financing troops and naval forces and for socioeconomic development of enterprises and organizations engaged in industrial production and construction. The Economic Service is to function along with existing finance entities. Economic structures presently permeate all military management entities, beginning with formations.

[Chekmarev] In connection with the reduction in the Armed Forces, a considerable amount of arms, military equipment and property is being freed up. How does the Ministry of Defense plan to dispose of this wealth?

[Vorobyev] The Ministry of Defense is given the right to sell freed-up military property in accordance with Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 1518 of 30 December 1992. In preparing the draft of this edict the Russian Goskomimushchestvo [State Committee for Administration of State Property] demanded that there be a maximum limitation on the number of persons engaged in sales to preclude instances of abuse in selling military property. In this connection it is permitted to sell Ministry of Defense property in the domestic market only through the Specialized State Cost-Accounting Enterprise, and in the foreign market exclusively through the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Central Directorate of Material Resources and Foreign Economic Relations.

But it stands to reason that not all property will be sold directly to the national economy. A portion of it may be used only after presale preparation. In addition, arms and military equipment cannot be used directly in the national economy. For their effective use it is necessary to arrange for their parting and thorough conversion, using industrial enterprises. It is for these very purposes that special state programs are being developed for recycling arms and military equipment.

[Chekmarev] What are the main problems in selling and recycling arms, military equipment and property?

[Vorobyev] Improving the sales mechanism, for example. At the present time a considerable portion of military property is being sold on the exchanges, but used property, as you realize, is not considered exchange goods. The auction form of trading in property should have been developed to a greater extent, but unfortunately the advantages of auctions are not being used to the full extent for now. The question is being examined of

organizing small wholesale and retail trade stores, which in our opinion will allow simplifying the very process of selling property. Today that process requires completing a considerable number of documents, which gives buyers of products certain inconveniences.

[Chekmarev] Vasily Vasilyevich, the final question: What is the role of fiscal control under conditions of market relations?

[Vorobyev] Under conditions of a reduction in the Armed Forces and the country's transition to market relations, the main task of fiscal control was to monitor fulfillment of Russian Federation Presidential Edicts, Russian government decrees and instructions, and Russian Federation minister of defense orders and directives on financial and economic matters, to monitor observance of state and financial discipline in expending funds, and to monitor timely, correct financial support to Army and Navy combat readiness.

A basic direction of control is the study of causes of deficiencies and disruptions in financial and economic activity, prevention of excesses and mismanagement in expending funds and supplies, development of proposals for improving financial and economic activity, and assistance to commanders and chiefs in organizing and managing finances.

Under present conditions, when commerce and, let's put it this way, illegal entrepreneurial activity of some heads of military force elements is actively penetrating the Armed Forces economy, Finance Service inspectors are faced with new problems concerning a check of the legality of this activity and computation of the amounts of damage and losses which our Armed Forces suffer because of this. Such commercial and entrepreneurial activity has assumed especially wide scope in the Air Force, Navy (Pacific, Baltic and Northern fleets) and GLAVTU [Main Transportation Directorate].

Materials of audits and inspections of financial and economic activity of various military force elements indicate that a number of officials are taking advantage of connivance and the absence of control and are using aircraft for transporting commercial cargoes, personal cars and passengers. As a result, earned funds did not end up in the cash boxes of military units, but accumulated in the accounts of commercial organizations, which did material damage of many millions of rubles to the state.

During 1992-1993 a number of Air Force servicemen illegally were founders or held leadership positions in commercial structures. This is clear nonfulfillment of the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen"...

Many violations have been uncovered by audits and inspections in connection with the sale of automotive and aviation equipment to outside organizations and commercial structures. Control over legality of operations and proper establishment of prices is not being

carried out and the sale was made at underestimated prices, which was one of the reasons for material damage being done to the state.

Rather serious violations in commercial and business activity were uncovered, for example, in the Directorate of the Commander, Military Space Forces and in military units subordinate to him.

I would like to note that control and audit entities and Finance Service inspectors maintain close contact with entities of the military procuracy in their practical work. Based on materials of audits and inspections, criminal proceedings have been and are being instituted against guilty persons.

A number of orders of the minister of defense, commanders in chief of branches of the Armed Forces, commanders of military districts and fleets, and chiefs of main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense have been issued based on results of audits and inspections. Guilty officials are being held strictly liable disciplinarily as well as financially.

The organization and accomplishment of control is a very important function of the Finance Service. In connection with this, it is necessary to continue the search for ways of improving it and raising its quality. The main efforts should henceforth be aimed at preventing financial violations and giving practical help in troop activity locally. And of course, the demand on officials who have allowed violations in use of funds and supplies must be strict, in accordance with demands of the laws.

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Status of Black Sea Fleet Logistics

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[Article by Rear Admiral B. Bogdanov, deputy commander for Rear, chief of Fleet Rear of Black Sea Fleet, under rubric "Army and Navy Rear": "A Special Fleet in a Special Period"]

[Text] The Black Sea Fleet performs missions in its operational zone as a component part of the Russian Federation Navy. The missions are responsible and important and are aimed at achieving peace, tranquility and stability of the political situation in the given region.

Keeping Fleet forces in constant readiness and success of performing combat missions largely depend on the status of logistic and technical support systems, i.e., they are determined by the capacities and capability of these systems to bring permanent readiness forces up to full allowances of arms, ammunition, fuel and other supplies

in a short time and carry out mobilization and deployment of Fleet forces in the logistic sense.

What are the features of functioning of the Black Sea Fleet logistic support system today? Above all it is the Black Sea Fleet's simultaneous operational subordination to two Presidents—of Russia and Ukraine. Fleet rear units and establishments are on the territory of two sovereign states, experiencing the painful process of reorganization of the economic base of CIS states and all complexities of the transition of their economy to market relations and of the break in economic ties. Financial resources for military expenditures have been reduced considerably and centralized deliveries of supplies have stopped. Regional conflicts (Georgia, Moldova, Abkhazia) have affected us directly.

Despite all difficulties and problems, the alignment, composition and manning of the Fleet rear, the availability of supplies and their echelonment as a whole for 1992-1993 permitted supporting Fleet forces with everything necessary and getting prescribed standards of allowances to each seaman, warrant officer and officer. Along with performing missions inherent to it, the Fleet rear has performed much work to fulfill Russian government assignments. An operation was carried out to evacuate servicemen's families and the civilian population from Abkhazia, Poti and Batumi. A total of around 50,000 persons were evacuated. Tens of thousands of tonnes of stockpiles were evacuated from the territory of Georgia and a peacemaking mission of Black Sea Fleet ships and naval infantry to the city of Poti was successfully supported to protect lines of transportation.

The operation of all rear elements was and is continuing to be carried out in an extremely unstable political and economic situation in the Crimea and Ukraine. The absence of a precise legal status of the Black Sea Fleet and of course of a legislative and legal base both for the Fleet as a whole as well as for the personnel and for servicemen's families is having an especially negative effect on the activity of rear entities. Together with Ukraine's discriminatory laws and with the constant ideological pressure on Fleet personnel and their families, the inaction of Russian Federation laws "On Defense," "On the Status of Servicemen," "On Military Obligation and Military Service" and "On Pension Support to Persons Who Have Performed Military Service..." especially with respect to provisions on social protection and benefits and against the background of old social problems which remained, engenders a feeling of uncertainty about tomorrow and apathy in many.

And the duality of Black Sea Fleet operational subordination is causing serious problems and difficulties in timely, complete support of Fleet ships and units with supplies. The chief problem is that the procedure for financing and supplying the Fleet has not been worked out or defined up to the present time. The Yalta agreements between Ukraine and Russia are being violated unilaterally by Ukraine and are leading to disruption of centralized deliveries of supplies coming from Russia.

Thus, new Ukrainian customs rules placed in force as of 1 April 1993 provide for a 0.15 percent customs duty on military cargoes; financial resources have not been allocated for these needs. Ukraine is taking enormous funds from the Fleet in the form of a tax on land (13 billion karbovantsy for 1993), which is leading to actual disruption of Black Sea Fleet financing. Officers and warrant officers arriving from Russia for duty in the Black Sea Fleet pay 300,000 karbovantsy each, i.e., almost one month's pay, for customs inspection of containers of household goods. Ten dollars, or this amount in karbovantsy at the bank rate of exchange, is collected for each flight of aircraft from the territory of Russia to the Black Sea Fleet. Five dollars is collected for each customs worker arriving to inspect the aircraft, and it is based on double rates if this occurs on days off or holidays.

Pay for Fleet servicemen in karbovantsy is much below the financial support to Russian Armed Forces servicemen in real buying power. Compare. The pay of a Black Sea Fleet officer is \$15-20 according to the local rate of exchange. Benefits envisaged for a serviceman by Russian laws are not being applied in the Black Sea Fleet up to the present time. The Fleet has a colossal debt for fuel, food, electrical energy and water. Power and water supply agencies disconnect garrisons and housing areas where thousands of people live for systematic nonpayment of accounts. All the above leads to a strained social situation in the Fleet.

The established 50-percent support of the Fleet in equal proportions by Russia and Ukraine is not being upheld. The main reserves of supplies come basically from Russia. Thus, while 81 percent of fuel oil, 88 percent of diesel fuel, 75 percent of aviation kerosene, and 67 percent of clothing and related gear were supplied from Russia in 1992, 100 percent of fuel oil, diesel fuel, clothing and related gear, and equipment came from Russia in 1993. In August of last year Ukraine unilaterally stopped all financial support of the Black Sea Fleet. The Fleet rear is supported only by Russia, which once again confirms that only an economically highly developed state is capable of maintaining and supporting the Navy and keeping its combat readiness at a sufficient level.

The reduction in the Armed Forces, reorganization of the country's economic base, and the need for increasing the effectiveness of work by rear units and establishments in the course of military reform dictate the advisability of accelerating a transition to a system of supporting Black Sea Fleet forces on a territorial principle. The main content of this principle must be an increase in responsibility and effectiveness of using rear units and establishments existing in peacetime for autonomous, reliable support of Fleet forces by making fixed bases, depots, and transportation, repair and other rear establishments into primary ones and investing them with additional rights and obligations.

The essence of the territorial principle of logistic support of Fleet forces is that a rear grouping deployed in a

designated basing area supports all ships, units and formations performing missions in or near the given area, i.e., they are assigned to the corresponding rear grouping for support. The territorial (zonal) support system permits concentrating all Fleet forces and assets and all resources, maneuvering them flexibly and using them effectively in full accordance with the operational-rear situation.

Fleet rear departments, on whose basis we propose to establish Fleet logistic and technical support areas without increasing the numerical strength of the management apparatus, are the basis of the territorial system of Black Sea Fleet logistic support. In peacetime this will permit reducing the time periods for delivering supplies to consumers, organizing centralized supply, simplifying the system of records and accounts, increasing effectiveness of control over support to Fleet forces, and also using the local economic base most advisably. Most important, the alignment of the peacetime rear will correspond to the operational alignment of Fleet forces in the initial period of war.

And in wartime this will enable distributing and sheltering supplies promptly, increasing the survivability and autonomy of the system of logistic support to Fleet forces, improving the effectiveness of command and control of the rear and, of course, ensuring stability of the system of logistic support to Fleet forces because of the fixed base.

Subordinating the management entities performing logistic, technical, transportation, medical and basing support functions to one official must be the basic principle of operational development of the Navy rear. It is necessary to observe the unity of administrative and functional subordination. With consideration of this principle, in my view it is necessary to concentrate forces and assets in the makeup of rear management entities in fleets, naval bases and formations to perform tasks of providing all kinds of supplies; repairing ships, weapons, arms and equipment; providing basing and medical and other kinds of logistic support; and providing means of transportation for military movements and delivery of supplies.

The history of Navy development shows that the rear was centralized and unified for a lengthy period of many centuries. History itself moves us to conclude the presence of a stable trend, tested by war experience and peacetime combat training, toward development and perfection of a centralized, unified rear in the center and in the fleets, and a unified fleet logistic and technical support system.

Wherein does the positiveness of a unified fleet rear structure lie? First of all, under a unified command element the rear accomplishes a mutually coordinated, comprehensive, and complete integrated support of fleet forces in all zones and areas of support, which contributes to more effective and precise use of forces and assets.

Secondly, it meets requirements for centralized delivery of supplies, permitting performance of assigned missions with a lesser detail of forces and assets

Thirdly, it permits increasing, in a logistic sense, the autonomy of combat force groupings by creating integrated, autonomous support subsystems in individual areas and on specific axes, which creates favorable conditions for performance of support missions by available peacetime forces and assets with the sudden beginning of combat operations.

The division of the rear which occurred in 1989 and the removal from its makeup of organs of technical and engineer support, medical service, military transportation service and armored service created difficulties in planning and accomplishing logistic support to forces, especially with the establishment of rear groupings for integrated support. Alas, planning and implementation of these plans were under the purview of two entities subordinate to each other. In essence, the unified system of integrated logistic and technical support was disrupted. The division of the rear occurred only at the fleet level; the organizational structure of formations and units did not undergo changes. As a result, the principle of identity of organizational structure at all levels of the fleet rear was violated.

The breakup of the rear complicated command and control of logistic support forces and assets in peacetime (especially with a transfer to a wartime footing). Therefore we propose to establish a Fleet rear organizational structure in the Black Sea Fleet that unites logistic, technical and engineer support forces and assets under a unified command of the Fleet chief of rear.

Successful functioning of the Fleet logistic support system is impossible without means of transportation.

The low strength level of basic types of vessels negatively affects the possibilities of support to Fleet forces in ocean and forward logistic support zones, at mobile basing facilities, at supply facilities, and at permanent station facilities of the Black Sea Fleet main logistic support zone. The auxiliary fleet has a special need for universal artillery ammunition carriers, marine dry-cargo carriers, technical tankers, seagoing harbor tugs, and water carriers. And in the future the construction of comprehensive and special support ships (vessels) with a fleet speed of 20-24 knots, of air-cushion transport vehicles (boats) with a speed of 80-100 knots and hydrofoils with a speed of 50-60 knots is needed. This will allow increasing the operational use factor of vessels and lowering the need for them by 1.5-2 times, i.e., reducing the need for vessels and realizing the principle of preferential use of the floating rear in supporting ship groupings by increasing quality parameters.

An extremely serious situation has taken shape with auxiliary fleet ship repair. Today vessels are being operated with expired periods between repairs and periods between drydockings. The actual percentage of ship repair support in 1992 was 30. Because of the absence of

financing, the question of accommodating vessels for repair has not been resolved up to the present time.

With the present nature of warfare, the effectiveness of all kinds of operations and combat operations of naval forces depends to an even greater degree on reliability of their logistic support. An analysis shows that the volume of logistic support in modern operations is growing by approximately 10-15 times compared with the Great Patriotic War period. In conducting combat operations it is necessary to replenish supplies, above all of weapons and fuel.

The existing system of storing supplies in the Fleet shows that norms in force for dispersal and echelonment of unit-level operational supplies are not being sustained.

A high concentration of supplies in categorized cities with a low degree of their shelter in protected structures can lead to great losses in the very first days of war, since dispersing considerable volumes of weapons and supplies in short time periods is a very complicated task. The basic cause of the unfavorable state of affairs with dispersal and shelter of supplies is the poor state of Fleet support with depot spaces and fuel tanks. This means the status of the material-technical base for storing supplies in the Fleet does not conform to rates of development of Fleet needs, which in turn is determined by the absence of necessary funds for construction materials and poor capabilities of Fleet construction organizations.

A serious situation has formed with echelonment of supplies in the first echelon—on ships and in units and formations. The lowering of reserves in the troop rear due to a shortage or absence of depot spaces not only affects the combat readiness of unit and formations, but also in the final account leads to a disruption of the entire system of echeloning supplies in the Fleet and to an overloading of Fleet depots and fuel bases with unit-level supplies to the detriment of their containing operational-level supplies.

The lag of the material-technical base behind the quantitative and qualitative development of Fleet combat forces is a stable trend in the Black Sea Fleet, which is showing up especially at the present time. While in their development based on the newest achievements of science and technology, combat forces are at the level of the 1990's for many qualitative parameters, the material-technical base is at the level (yes, yes!) of the 1960's and 1970's. This relates above all to the basing system, to the ship and vessel repair and drydocking base, and to the presence and status of storage areas and tanks for keeping weapons, ammunition, equipment, fuel, provisions and other supplies. As a result of the insufficient capacity of the material-technical base, ship and vessel repair and drydocking time periods increase. The incomplete state of support involving storage areas and tanks does not permit keeping stockpiles in necessary amounts and leads to their losses and to a decrease in survivability of reserves.

The principal direction for solving this problem is the elimination of disproportions between the development of Fleet combat forces and development of the material-technical base. Development of the rear should be constantly balanced with consideration of quantitative and qualitative changes in the order of battle of Fleet forces and in its combat assets, arms and equipment. These changes should occur simultaneously and even with a certain lead time for entry into the Fleet of rear equipment needed for supporting new ships and for preparing and delivering weapons and other supplies. Realization of this direction can be achieved only by increasing the funds for development of the material base at the expense of a quantitative and qualitative reduction in the construction of new ships and by excluding obsolete ones from the Fleet makeup.

In my view, it is advisable to bring the material-technical base into line with needs for supporting forces along the following directions:

- ensuring a proportional ratio between combat forces and their supporting forces (assets). Under conditions of a reduction in numerical strength of the Armed Forces, this ratio should be changed in the interests of the rear already in peacetime. In developing a long-range program for Navy development it is advisable to develop and provide for a ratio of 1.0-0.8 between combat forces and the rear;
- achieving an outstripping development of rear equipment and armament, i.e., it is advisable to apply the principle that new rear equipment should be created and enter the Fleet before new ships and aircraft are included in the order of battle;
- a balanced development of the shore (fixed and mobile), floating (surface, underwater and amphibious) and airmobile rear;
- creating technical equipment on ships (vessels, transports) that supports mass, rapid transfer of cargoes from vessels (transports) to ships, and also the loading and unloading of vessels off an austere beach.

An improvement in the rear management system is impossible without accelerated establishment of an automated system for managing the Navy rear, without modelling logistic support processes using modern operations research methods permitting choice of the optimum option based on an evaluation of alternative options of decisions and logistic support plans; and without introducing methods of military and economic substantiation and forecasting of the directions of rear development and methods of a military and economic evaluation of rear operational and combat training measures. Realization of the main directions for development of the Fleet rear in peacetime will help attain stable logistic support of Fleet forces.

The Fleet rear has considerable plans. Would that energy, knowledge and persistence were enough. We must create a highly developed territorial system of

support for the Black Sea Fleet meeting the defensive nature of military doctrine and the adopted structure of the national economy, ensuring effective satisfaction with everything necessary for life, everyday routine and combat training in peacetime and contributing to the

buildup of the rear's forces and assets in a short time when it is mobilized and placed in full combat readiness

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UKRAINE

**Leaders Comment on Black Sea Fleet Division,
Ukraine's Interests****Navy Commander Bezkorovaynyy Interviewed**

94UM04594 Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
1 Jun 94 p 1

[Interview with Ukrainian Navy Commander-in-Chief Vice-Admiral Volodymyr Herasymovych Bezkorovaynyy by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondents Captain 2nd Rank Yuriy Kondratyev and Captain 2nd Rank Oleksandr Shcherbakov, Sevastopol: "Ukrainian Navy Commander-in-Chief Vice-Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy: 'The Problems of the Black Sea Fleet Are Being Resolved. The Naval Forces Are Being Replenished With New Cadres'"]

[Text] *The latest round of negotiations of government delegations from Ukraine and Russia, headed by Yukhin Zvyahinsky and Viktor Chornomyrdyny, on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet have concluded in Moscow.*

As in Sevastopol during the meeting of the ministers of defense of Ukraine and Russia, a final and mutually acceptable solution was still not able to be reached, but the negotiations will be continued in a few days.

The military delegation of Ukraine at the meeting in Moscow was Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Navy [VMSU] Vice-Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy and the VMSU Operations Directorate Chief Rear-Admiral Viktor Fomin

Vice-Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy answered the questions of our correspondents immediately after his return to Sevastopol

[Kondratyev, Shcherbakov] Volodymyr Herasymovych, the latest round of negotiations pertaining to the Black Sea Fleet have unfortunately ended with their postponement. But doesn't there have to be some resolution?

[V.H. Bezkorovaynyy] Yes, there has to be a resolution, and there will be. There is still no conceptual framework, however, that would satisfy both Ukraine and Russia. But there is much. I am confident, that will be accomplished by the delegations over the time until the next round, and our positions will move even closer together. I want to emphasize that the negotiations on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet are proceeding in constructive fashion for the first time, even though there are plenty of mutual claims

[Kondratyev, Shcherbakov] What were the initial positions of the parties to the negotiations?

[V.H. Bezkorovaynyy] The Moscow Resolution of the presidents of Ukraine and Russia regarding the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the gradual split of the forces was made inherent in them. The data worked out by the

military delegations in Sevastopol have become the base data on the vessel inventory. Our figures and the Russian ones, true, differed when they were put forward. The reason is that we did not have time to confirm the lists of ships in Sevastopol. The April negotiations, you may recall, were broken off suddenly. The military experts of the Black Sea Fleet that are part of the Russian delegation have now advanced new data with regard to the numerical composition of the ships in the fleet. We will return to this question and continue to coordinate it.

The aircraft and shore troops of the Black Sea Fleet will also be divided "fifty—fifty" in accordance with the Yalta agreement.

The most problematical issue in the negotiations is the basing of the fleets and the use of the infrastructure. It is too early to comment on that; it has not been worked out.

[Kondratyev, Shcherbakov] Volodymyr Herasymovych, you may recall that the Minister of Defense of Russia, General of the Army Grachev, stated in Sevastopol that the negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet could last into eternity with the Ukrainian approach to them. How would you comment on that statement?

[V.H. Bezkorovaynyy] The Moscow meeting proved that the work of both the Russian and the Ukrainian parties is being conducted in the required channels. Ukraine has a mutually accepted formula that permits the preservation of all constitutional provisions connected with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. An enormous number of legal and economic aspects must be taken into account.

I have said earlier, and will emphasize again, that we are discussing deeply the details at the negotiations on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet for the first time. Because any political problem that is resolved from above but has not been worked out at the technical level will always be declarative, as it was before. The fact that we are working on each object in the fleet that is subject to division in profound and concrete fashion is a cause for optimism today.

[Kondratyev, Shcherbakov] What, in your opinion, is the difference between the negotiations in Sevastopol and Moscow?

[V.H. Bezkorovaynyy] The difference is that the Russian delegation has taken a clear-cut position for the first time in Moscow. They have been discussing the questions that came up in Sevastopol for the first time. It is felt from everything that the delegation has the aim of resolving the problem of the Black Sea Fleet.

[Kondratyev, Shcherbakov] The Minister of Defense of Ukraine, General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetsky, stated in Sevastopol that the servicemen of the Ukrainian Navy would be receiving the same pay as the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet. At what stage of resolution is that question?

[V.H. Bezkorovaynyy] That question has been coordinated with the government of Ukraine. It remains only to resolve the problem of the Black Sea Fleet. I think that the signing of an agreement on the fleet and an increase in pay for our sailors will coincide.

[Kondratyev, Shcherbakov] Draftees are coming into the Black Sea Fleet today only from Russia. How do you regard that fact on the eve of the division of the fleet?

[V.H. Bezkorovaynyy] I feel that it should be regarded just as it is.

[Kondratyev, Shcherbakov] The negotiations in Moscow on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet coincided with the well-known decision of the Crimean parliament and the unprecedented state of mind that is being fanned by the mass media...

[V.H. Bezkorovaynyy] The literally explosive situation on the peninsula has been created by those forces for which it is advantageous. Even Minister of Defense of Russia General of the Army Pavel Grachev has been drawn into the swirl of disinformation. I met with journalists from Ostankino. Even those people, with their particular approach to covering the situation in the Crimea, were struck by the unbridled nature of the sources of information, or rather disinformation.

The situation in the Crimea is calm, and is being monitored. There is no objective data regarding a worsened situation. Everyone needs to calm down and stop "making waves." I have to say on this account that several days ago there was scarcely any explosive situation in Izmayil. It was done by the hand of one person alone.

The commander of a brigade of river vessels of the Black Sea Fleet, very "relaxed," started issuing commands for which epaulets were removed during the times of the USSR. Sounding the alarm, he shifted the formation to heightened readiness. He did, in short, wholly intolerable things that even his subordinates did not accept, and they were forced to calm down their furious commander.

It seems to me that this occurred owing to the aggravation of the situation in the Crimea. Remember the television and newspaper "canards" about thousands of Ukrainian special-forces troops that had landed on the peninsula? This was funny and sad at the same time. This information, if I can call it that, after all, had a very strong impact on the nerves. The figure of 60,000 special-forces troops was bandied about in the press. But what were these special forces? They were a specific subunit, very small in size. The number of these specialists in any nation is tens or, at a maximum, hundreds of people, or in any case not more than a thousand. You would only get 60,000 people if you added up the numbers of the Black Sea Fleet, the armed forces of Ukraine, the police and National Guard in Crimea anyway. So there was nothing for the Crimeans to be worried about.

[Kondratyev, Shcherbakov] Volodymyr Herasymovych, let us return to the affairs of the Ukrainian Navy. What were the results of the winter training period?

[V.H. Bezkorovaynyy] We recently summarized the results. A commission of the General Staff was working on it. The evaluations that we assigned to the formations, units and ships were confirmed. I personally regard the fulfillment of the plan for the winter period as successful. This was thanks to the fact that the staffs prepared the aircraft and shore troops well, we were supplied with fuel and the ships went out to sea.

[Kondratyev, Shcherbakov] The shipbuilding program has been lost to view under all of the political events. What ships will be joining the navy in the near future?

[V.H. Bezkorovaynyy] The missile cruiser *Ukrayina* and an air-cushion assault ship will be joining the force composition this year. A small hydrofoil ASW ship is virtually finished.

[Kondratyev, Shcherbakov] The idea is circulating that the Ukrainian Navy does not need the *Ukrayina*, and it could be bought by Russia.

[V.H. Bezkorovaynyy] If we had a considerable selection of ships, then we certainly could talk about that. But since we do not have such a selection today, we can make use of this cruiser. As for "buying" it, I feel that Russia is not able to do that. It has not found either the forces or the funds to finish the aircraft carrier *Varyag* that is at Mykolayiv. The cost of finishing off the *Varyag* is equivalent to the cost of the cruiser *Ukrayina*.

The *Varyag* has been abandoned, so the question of finishing it (I speak as an expert) has passed forever, even though some political figures of Russia, visiting Sevastopol, have announced that they are ready to buy the whole Black Sea Fleet. Sevastopol and a portion of Crimea all together right now. If they are that rich, why can't they buy an unfinished ship? Why can't they finish the repairs of ASW ships at our yards? Why are they not able to pay for the overhaul of ships in Bulgaria and pay others for the repair of a single ship? The question of finances is just as difficult for Russia as for us. The *Varyag* will most likely go for scrap, while the *Ukrayina* will "float."

[Kondratyev, Shcherbakov] We also hope that the Ukrainian Navy will soon become a mighty force, able to defend the interests of the state at sea.

Deputy Commander Ryzhenko Reviews History of Conflict

94UM0459B Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian
4 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Rear-Admiral Oleksiy Ryzhenko, chief of staff and first deputy commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Navy: "The Statements Are Reassuring, the Actions Are Dangerous—Once Again on the Myths and Realities Surrounding the Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] The development of events lately has induced me to return to the topic to which my prior article, under the title "The Black Sea Fleet: Myths and Realities," was devoted. It made an attempt to dispel only one myth—the supposedly high combat readiness of the Black Sea Fleet and its ability to defend the interests not only of Russia, but also of Ukraine at the southern maritime boundaries.

In the article offered here I would like to dwell once again on some of the persistently widespread myths surrounding the Black Sea Fleet, and express my own view of the realities.

Since the time the state sovereignty of Ukraine was proclaimed, the command of the Navy of the Russian Federation and the Black Sea Fleet, many political figures in Russia and some highly placed officials in the Crimea and Sevastopol, Russian and pro-Russian, and the mass media so inclined, have obsessively and purposefully tried to instill in the consciousness of the citizenry the idea that Ukraine does not need its own Navy, that its interests, like the interests of Russia in the southern maritime regions, are soundly protected by the Black Sea Fleet.

My prior article discussed the emptiness of that assertion because of the poor fighting ability of the Black Sea Fleet, which is continuing to grow weaker, and its poor current and future combat readiness. That is just one side of the coin, and not even the main one. The main one is the fact, as practice shows, that the Black Sea Fleet has not once in the last two years shown itself to be disposed in a friendly manner toward Ukraine, to be passionate about its sovereignty and state interests. Its command and certain structures, including such as the editors of the newspaper FLAG RODINY, the press center and some others, are constantly spreading—among the personnel and inhabitants of Sevastopol, Crimea and outside its boundaries—an exclusively negative attitude toward Ukraine and its armed forces, especially the Navy. This frenzied anti-Ukrainian propaganda, often based on shameless lies and disinformation, is growing stronger. It is not for nothing that the Minister of Defense of Ukraine was recently forced to declare that the press center of the Black Sea Fleet, in being transferred to the territory of Ukraine, was waging direct subversive activity against it.

The command of the Black Sea Fleet, while constantly professing its readiness to protect the interests of Ukraine, acts quite the contrary when even small practical steps are required of it. When, for example, a mine was discovered recently at the mouth of the Danube, they refused passage to the Ukrainians to disarm it. The same thing had occurred in the Black Sea Fleet before, when ordnance was found on the territory of Holland. One cannot count on the Black Sea Fleet, as we see, even on such issues. But the events in Odessa and many other instances provide convincing grounds to conclude that even today, when the Black Sea Fleet is still the joint property of the two states, Ukraine not only cannot

count on the protection of its interests, but is also itself in need of protection against its provocative and unfriendly actions. And what will happen when it becomes the property of Russia alone?

The situation that has taken shape in Crimea and Sevastopol shows that anti-Ukrainian political forces see in the Black Sea Fleet solid support for their attempts to violate the territorial integrity of Ukraine and separate the Crimea from it. The Black Sea Fleet command is not only not impeding the dragging of the fleet into political intrigues, but is even encouraging them and serving as an example of them themselves.

The command of the Navy of the Russian Federation and the Black Sea Fleet, trying in every way possible to discredit the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and its Navy, accusing them of supposedly forcibly resubordinating some of the subunits and units of the Black Sea Fleet to themselves. Matters have even come to such absurd assertions as, they say, an officer of the Ukrainian Navy has in some way resubordinated more than a hundred units and subunits. They are quite silent about the "prigrabization" actions of the Black Sea Fleet therein. Those, meanwhile, are quite striking, and were launched much earlier, back in 1992. They are being carried out in three directions—seizing what is others', moving things to the Russian Federation, and selling things off.

The Black Sea Fleet, in unilateral fashion grossly violating the agreements that had been reached earlier between Ukraine and Russia, grabbed—so that they would not get into the armed forces of Ukraine—all of the units and subunits in the Black Sea region that used to be subordinate not to it, but rather to the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Naval Main Staff—that is, to central elements.

That fate befell, for example, the test center in Feodosiya with its subordinate units stationed on a territory of 256 hectares. A shipyard in the same Feodosiya, which occupies an area of more than 30 hectares. The Metalist shipyard in the city of Balaklava was seized, with grounds of close to six hectares that belonged to it. In Sevastopol they include the 13th Shipyard (16.2 hectares), the missile and artillery weaponry repair plant (7.4 hectares), and certain design bureaus (0.72 hectares).

The naval planning institutes, the general-contractor administration of the chiefs of operations, ZBI plants, plants for metallic structural elements, the directorate for production and engineering equipment and many other facilities of the navy of the former USSR in Sevastopol, Yalta, Yevpatoriya, Myrnyy, Sakakh and other garrisons passed to the possession of the Black Sea Fleet in the same manner.

The Black Sea Fleet began the redeployment of a number of ships and vessels and the removal of valuable equipment and property to the Russian Federation as early as

February of 1992. Decoding gear whose estimated value is approximately 120 million dollars was removed from Odessa.

Three special vehicles of the medical service were sent to Moscow in May of 1992, along with five UAZ vehicles from the inviolable reserves of the Black Sea Fleet chemical service in Novorossiysk. An experimental submarine was sent for repairs in November, and has not returned to the Black Sea Fleet.

A similar practice of replenishing the other fleets of Russia at the expense of the Black Sea Fleet has continued in 1993 as well. Two assault craft and the VOKhR command of the Black Sea Fleet air forces were relocated from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk in May. A small ASW ship went to the Northern Fleet. This is a far from complete list of the transfers of forces and funds of the Black Sea Fleet to Russia without the consent of the Ukrainians. That is how the Black Sea Fleet is "protecting" the interests of Ukraine.

Seventy percent of the facilities from the system of communications gear uniting the 170 laboratories of the Black Sea Fleet have been commercially leased since the start of 1992 by their chief, Colonel V. Kostrov. The Samarkand small enterprise was given a hectare of land at Kozachiy Bay for the organization of its production the same month by decision of the Black Sea Fleet command.

Eleven motor vehicles that belonged to the Black Sea Fleet medical service were sold to commercial structures for 300,000 rubles apiece in August of 1992, with the sanction of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet approved a purchase-and-sale agreement for a fleet facility for 60 million rubles the same month.

The commander of the Black Sea Fleet issued a directive for the refitting and sale of two motor vehicles of the chemical service of the Black Sea Fleet through the 115 traffic service offices in October of 1992.

The chief of the OFI of the Black Sea Fleet gave written permission in 1992 to the Akhtiar small enterprise to sell as scrap metal four decommissioned submarines on which the removal of equipment containing non-ferrous metals, including precious metals, had not even been carried out.

Two submarines and the PS Kuban that had been repaired in Bulgaria were left in that country, supposedly in payment for debt, in 1993 by decision of the deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy.

The Donbass exploratory vessel was sold to commercial structures that same year.

Ukraine is to receive 50 percent of the funds from the sale of Black Sea Fleet property in accordance with the international agreements. It has not received a single kopeck, however. That is how the Russian admirals show their "concern" for the interests of Ukraine and the

combat readiness of the Black Sea Fleet; while selling off the Black Sea Fleet, they are noisily shouting that the Ukrainian Navy is encroaching on it, constantly increasing tensions so as to hide their dishonorable deeds. That is why they have offered so much resistance to the desire of the Ukrainians to inventory the Black Sea Fleet.

The Russian media, from the representations of the Black Sea Fleet press center, are constantly stirring up public opinion and making attempts to accuse Ukraine and its Navy of destabilizing the situation in the Crimea and Sevastopol. Numerous instances, however, testify to something else—the Black Sea Fleet itself is doing all its can for that purpose. It is today incapable of performing the operational-strategic tasks in the Mediterranean and other areas of the world's oceans that it used to be assigned; not knowing what to do in the Black Sea, it has, based on the territory of Ukraine, selected for itself one of the main tasks of opposing the affirmation of its independence and the building and emergence of its Navy. Corrupting itself and destroying itself, it has an attitude toward the Ukrainian Navy not as the fleet of a friendly nation, on the territory of which it resides and whose waters, land and means of existence it makes use of, but rather as its enemy.

Here are just a few instances of this aspect. As soon as the staff of the Ukrainian Navy [VMSU] had begun to be formed in April–May of 1992, a mobile reconnaissance system of the Black Sea Fleet mounted on a GAZ-66 truck made a systematic radio survey of the radio systems and radio emissions of the communications gear of the VMSU.

A group of Marines from the Black Sea Fleet made an incursion onto the territory of a SAM brigade of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on 31 March 1993, and attacked its servicemen. Private Levchuk was beaten, and the windows in the housing complex were smashed.

An Mi-8 helicopter of the Black Sea Fleet air forces made unsafe overflights and photographed the military compound of a battalion of Marines and other facilities on 2 July 1993.

The patrol service of the Black Sea Fleet at a checkpoint near the entrance to the city of Sevastopol committed the illegal act, on 12 July 1993, of detaining and listing servicemen from the Ukrainian Navy, with the discovery of the numbers of their military units, ranks, positions and so on.

Similar and more sweeping unlawful actions by the Black Sea Fleet against the armed forces, including the Navy, of Ukraine have not stopped. Periodic announcements to units and formations of "enhanced combat readiness," the recent attempt to attack the command post of a PPO [air-defense] unit in Sevastopol, the sending of their agents to naval subunits, the ban—by order of Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet Vice-Admiral P. Svitashov—on unsanctioned contacts by officer personnel with the officers of the VMSU, the removal of

some pilots of Ukrainian nationality from flights in units of the air forces of the Black Sea Fleet—this is a far from complete list of the “fraternal” acts of the Black Sea Fleet with regard to Ukraine and its servicemen.

Much could be said about the dishonorable acts of the Black Sea Fleet command. And however they may strain, whatever unpleasantness and ill will some Black Sea admirals and officers may resort to, independent Ukraine will never yield the right to have a mighty, battleworthy and modern Navy on the Black Sea. As for the statements of the commanders of the Black Sea Fleet about its high battleworthiness and ability to protect the southern borders of the interests of Ukraine and all of the CIS countries as well as Russia, that is nothing more than empty talk. As the facts cited above and many others testify, the Black Sea Fleet, first of all, does not want to do it, and second, as I emphasized already in my last article, it is not—to put it mildly—battleworthy.

The Black Sea Fleet had already begun to deteriorate as early as the end of 1989. As many as a hundred combat vessels have been decommissioned over the last year and a half alone. While its combat core used to be close to 350 ships, it has only 15–20 percent of that number today.

The statements of Admiral A. Kalinin, the former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, are of a certain interest in this regard. He justly complained in a recent television appearance that whereas several years ago the combat might of the Black Sea Fleet was roughly at a ratio of 4:1 compared to the Turkish Navy, this year it is at 1:1 and could even fall further. The commander of one of the SKRs of the Black Sea Fleet that has been under repair for several years now declared quite candidly on that same television program that the Black Sea Fleet is aging, it is dying, that it would not be battleworthy at all in 2–3 years.

And that is indeed so. Virtually all of the combat vessels of the Black Sea Fleet are 15–25 years old, and their planned repairs and dockwork are not being performed on time. Russia is not currently building a single ship for the Black Sea Fleet. They are pilfering, selling off and carrying off property, the shore support infrastructure for the ships and units. The Black Sea Fleet, as a result of all this, is already unable to perform the task of covering maritime sectors of the territory of both Ukraine and Russia. It requires protection itself now. Ukrainian PPO units are forced to provide air cover for its ships and shore facilities, insofar as it does not have its own system of air defense.

The interaction of the fleet with the Odessa Military District, which is part of the armed forces of Ukraine, and with the Ukrainian naval border units has been lost virtually entirely through the fault of the Black Sea Fleet command.

The financial situation of the Black Sea Fleet is very grave. It is, so to speak, in debt up to its ears. The officers and warrant officers have not received their pay for two

or three months in some subunits and units, especially in Odessa, Ochakov, Izmayil and some other remote garrisons.

This situation is naturally having an effect on their morale and psychological state. And they are coming to serve in the Ukrainian Navy—a new and promising structure—entirely voluntarily, without any pressure on the part of the Ukrainians and without any promises whatsoever.

Some may not believe me, but the naval command has appealed to those collectives that have decided to pass under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian fleet to think seriously about that step, warning that the salaries in the navy for both servicemen and for civil employees are lower than in the Black Sea Fleet. The commander of the Ukrainian Navy, Vice-Admiral V. Bezkorovaynyy, has moreover directed the attention of the Black Sea Fleet command to the alarming signals from the Ochakov, Mikolayevka and some of the other so-called remote garrisons. They have only promised “to investigate without fail” in the Black Sea Fleet, however. This ended with the fact that the people who did not want to be hostages to the situation, to watch as the fleet disintegrated and is sold off, made the choice in favor of the Ukrainian Navy.

I can thus state with all certainty that the information that has been spread about some forced resubordination of certain units and subunits to the Ukrainian Navy is malicious slander that cannot withstand any critical analysis. Only in contradiction to any common sense could one imagine that the navy would permit the formation of its subunits from people who were forcibly transferred into them.

The Ukrainian fleet is being built and developed. The fleet of Ukraine will exist despite any opposition. And only it should and will protect the national interests of its state on the Black Sea. And Ukraine, strictly speaking, has never made the request that the Black Sea Fleet protect its state or any other interests. We believe that it will not rely on such protection in the future all the more. And for granting its bases, its territory and facilities, its waters in lease to the fleet of Russia in the future, it has the right to count on a fraternal and good attitude toward it and respect for its laws, its armed forces, its citizens. How could it be otherwise? How could any lessor nation permit its own lessee to have an ill-disposed, the more so hostile, attitude toward it?

Supreme Council Head Moroz Comments

94UM0459C Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian
1 Jun 94 p 1

[Unattributed news item: “The Black Sea Fleet Can Be Divided, but the Black Sea Cannot...”]

[Text] Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Oleksandr Moroz, commenting at his first press conference on the status of the division of the Black Sea Fleet, indicated

that the time when that fleet could have become an element of collective defense has already been lost. It must now be realized that the Black Sea zone is a zone of specific interests, both for Ukraine and for Russia. The question of the Black Sea Fleet must be resolved proceeding from that as well.

It seems to me, indicated Oleksandr Moroz, that we should provide guarantees to the officers and warrant officers of the Black Sea Fleet with regard to their treatment, and to all Ukrainians with regard to their rights, while working concurrently on the creation of our own fleet.

Shmarov-Bizhan Delegation Meets With Russians

94UM0459D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
9 Jun 94 p 1

[Unattributed news item: "From Sevastopol—The Problems of Division Are Being Clarified"]

[Text] A delegation led by Vice-Premier of the Government of Ukraine Valeriy Shmarov, which included Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Borys Tarasyuk, Deputy Minister of Economics of Ukraine Leonid Minin and Chairman of the State Property Fund of Ukraine Volodymyr Pryadko, made a working trip to Sevastopol.

The purpose of the trip, as Valeriy Shmarov informed the journalists, was to clarify the problems of the city and to prepare for the next round of negotiations of the government delegations of Ukraine and Russia on the division of the Black Sea Fleet.

The high officials visited military garrisons of Sevastopol and Crimea where units of the Ukrainian Navy and the Black Sea Fleet are stationed and became acquainted with the state of the military facilities on the scene, as well as talking with representatives of the local authorities.

They talked about the political and economic situation in the state and the progress of the building of the armed forces of our nation at a meeting with officers of the staff and the directorate of the Ukrainian Navy, and answered a host of their questions.

Kravchuk: PGMs as Alternative to Weapons of Mass Destruction

94UM0479B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Grigoriy Nesmyanovich: "A New Weapon May Be an Old One but Totally Forgotten"]

[Text] Ukraine essentially intends to turn to the idea of creating and producing high-precision weapons as alternatives to weapons of mass destruction. This was stated

by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk during a visit to the Zhitomir Higher Military Electronics School of the Air Defense Forces.

He emphasized that work has been going on for a long time in this direction in the United States, Russia and a number of other states. The main advantage of such weapons is guaranteed destruction of military objectives.

Prospects for Peacetime Use of Ukraine's Space Assets Examined

94UM0445A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
20 May 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Major Volodymyr Knysh: "American Nuclear Missiles No Longer 'Cover' Ukraine"]

[Text] The strategic missiles of the United States will not be aimed at Ukraine as of 30 May 1994, and the launch stages of the SS-24 missiles may be utilized for the needs of the peaceful Ukrainian space program.

As is well known, a governmental delegation from Ukraine composed of Vice Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasyuk, National Space Agency General Director Volodymyr Horbulin and Deputy Minister of Machine Building, VPK [the Military-Industrial Complex] and Conversion Valeriy Kazakov, has returned from Washington.

Meetings were held at the Pentagon with U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, at the State Department and at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Consultations were held pertaining to the fulfillment of the trilateral agreements among Ukraine, the United States and Russia, cooperation between Ukraine and the United States in conversion programs for the defense industry, the monitoring of missile and space technologies, power engineering and the safety of nuclear reactors.

Questions associated with the early deactivation of missile complexes in Ukraine, among other things, were explored during the meetings with the head of the Defense Department of the United States, W. Perry.

American strategic missiles, as journalists were informed at a recent press conference by Valeriy Shmarov, will no longer be "looking" in the direction of Ukraine. A joint statement of the governments of both countries was adopted in which their devotion to relations of partnership, mutual trust, respect and the development of relations in the realm of security and defense was affirmed. The government of the United States announced that American strategic missiles will no longer be targeted either at Ukraine or the territory of any other countries as of 30 May 1994.

Ukraine, in the words of U.S. Vice President Gore, has proved that it is a reliable and responsible partner,

especially in matters of arms control and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Valeriy Shmarov called question number one the negotiations on Ukraine's joining with the control regime for the proliferation of missile technology and equipment for its production.

The idea that Ukraine has somehow refused to participate in that prospective area thus does not conform to reality.

A memorandum of understanding between the governments of Ukraine and the United States was adopted on the transfer of missile equipment and technology. This document, signed by Vice Prime Minister Shmarov and U.S. Vice President Gore, provides for strict monitoring of the proliferation of nuclear technologies, the performance of joint inspections, and consultations and an exchange of information in the event of the transfer of missile equipment and technology. It was emphasized that this missile technology control regime rules out the creation of impediments to the development of the Ukrainian national space program, or to cooperation with other missile and space powers in that sphere.

The United States has thus *de facto* recognized the right of Ukraine not only to preserve, but also to develop further its own scientific, technological and production potential in the missile and space field. Our country has also been recognized as a full-fledged participant in international cooperation and a participant in the world aerospace market.

Common missile-engineering interests exist, by the way, between Ukraine and Russia as well. Valeriy Shmarov, answering a question about this, stated that Russia is ordering missiles and satellites from Ukraine. And we are ordering missile engines.

As concerns the prospects for the existence of "Ukrainian space" programs and the participation of our state in the space market, Ukraine will "go in" for that if it has something to go with, and if there is a consumer for our goods... The legal support exists today. A harsh market fight is expected. We are already feeling pressure on the part of the American firms that dominate the space field today, said Valeriy Shmarov.

But the Americans acknowledge today, as they have before, that we have one of the best and cheapest launch vehicles, especially the Zenit-3, a modification of the well-known Mir series. There is also a place for them in the Freedom-Mir program. It is acknowledged that our space components have "substantial weight" in that program. They are talking about systems for guidance, docking, on-board systems etc. There is interest in the United States in our developments in the field of space welding, and problems of the effects of gravity on the person. The general director of NASA acknowledged, during a meeting with Valeriy Shmarov, that the United States is prepared to cooperate with Ukraine in the world space field.

The utilization of converted launch stages is a very attractive project. The placement of a satellite in orbit using the launch stage of the SS-24 missile is entirely possible. The more so as we already have a legal basis for the activity in the missile and space sphere.

It was indicated that the Americans are implementing conversion programs somewhat slowly. A corresponding discussion pertained to this. The so-called "List No. 1" exists in the United States, on which there are 35 Ukrainian enterprises that are subject to conversion. The corresponding partners for them are already being sought in the United States. There is also a project being carried out by the American firm of Westinghouse and the Ukrainian firm of Khartron (Kharkiv)—the installation of an ASU [automated control system] for operation in nuclear-power plants and other power-engineering projects. The Nunn-Lugar fund allocates five million dollars, with another 20 million from Westinghouse...

We will hope that the partnership of the two nations in conversion programs will develop in the future as well.

New Weapons Control Official Interviewed on Warhead Removal

94UM0445B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
28 May 94 p 2

[Interview with Center for Administrative Management of Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Chief Colonel Oleksandr Serdyuk by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Senior Lieutenant Serhiy Zhurets under the rubric: "First Interview in the New Post": "The Warheads Will Be Removed From Ukraine Over Three Years.—The Rest of the Problems of Nuclear Disarmament Will Be Gotten Rid of as Quickly as Possible"]

[Text] **Background information on the interviewee:** *The military path of Colonel Oleksandr Serdyuk began from the Suvorov School, then on to the Kharkov Command-Engineering School and officer service. He served first in the Kartalinskyy Division, in an OS missile regiment, and then went to the Academy imeni Dzerzhinskyy. After graduation he was assigned to the Plesetsk test range.*

Colonel Oleksandr Serdyuk returned to serve in Ukraine in 1992. We was deputy chief of the directorate for missile and space weaponry, and then was named by order of the Minister of Defense to the position of chief of the Center for Administrative Management of Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Ministry of Defense [MO] of Ukraine

[S. Zhurets] A Ukrainian delegation headed by Vice Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov recently returned from the United States. There they discussed, among other things, the question of deactivating the missile systems stationed in Ukraine. How do you, directly heading up the structure of the MO that is performing this crucial and difficult work, regard the status and prospects for the nuclear disarmament of our nation?

[O. Serdyuk] The fulfillment of deactivation is naturally an additional demand on the officers of the 43rd Army and the officers of our Center, insofar as the task of removing the missile systems from combat duty and performing the tasks of deactivating them are being added to the everyday tasks of maintaining the missile and special equipment in proper condition. These tasks are work of enhanced security in and of themselves, and their performance requires quite a bit of human and material resources.

The principal burden of performing this work lies on the officers of the 43rd Missile Army, with considerable organizational activity performed by the specialists of our center as well.

[S. Zhurets] And Ukraine will be able to fulfill unconditionally the obligations it has assumed at the international level, for the deactivation of the 46 SS-24 missiles, within the ten-month time period stipulated in the trilateral statement of the presidents?

[O. Serdyuk] There are no grounds today to say that we will not be able to perform those tasks. The removal of the combat systems from duty is proceeding according to plan, and we are fulfilling the schedule that was approved by the government, as well as the schedule that was stipulated in addition to the trilateral statement of the presidents. We have already performed more than half of the deactivation work.

[S. Zhurets] The separation of the warheads from the strategic missiles is perhaps the simplest of what awaits the servicemen of the 43rd Army, with the more difficult problems—in particular the subsequent destruction of the launch stages and the missile silos, and the ecological support for that process—still ahead. That work, as is well known, envisages a comprehensive program of gradual cutbacks and the elimination of land- and air-launched nuclear weapons. How is the fulfillment of that program proceeding?

[O. Serdyuk] We are doing work in the preparatory stages of fulfilling this comprehensive program that was approved by the government. Ukraine, in accordance with the decree of the Supreme Soviet ratifying the START-I Treaty, is to eliminate 36 percent of the launch stages and launchers. Disarmament, as we see, is thus a very prolonged process, which must be provided with financial resources first and foremost. We have gotten into a paradoxical situation today—it is much cheaper to maintain the missile systems, to keep them in a proper state, than today, under conditions of harsh economic crisis, when we have to strain to remove those systems from duty. That process is not an advantageous one for us economically. The amount of money that we need for that has already been noted in the press. Without sufficient financing we could get into a situation where we will be forced, whether we want to or not, to lengthen the time period or halt the work. I have in mind here not the deactivation, but the work on the elimination itself. And it would be a shame, of course, if the funds that are

allocated for the elimination measures (talking here about the trillion karbovantsi allocated by the budget of Ukraine for 1994 for elimination measures) were received very irregularly. As of today, with a whole quarter virtually gone by, we have received only approximately 27 billion karbovantsi of that required. That is far too little. The more so as the comprehensive program is not only, and not so much, the elimination measures alone. It is also the resolution of the social problems of servicemen in the strategic forces, which we have always put in first place. The discussion here concerns the building of housing for officers, the creation of jobs, medical support for the servicemen who take part in the elimination measures and deactivation work.

The officers of the strategic forces are laboring under highly strained conditions today. They have to perform three tasks simultaneously—be on combat alert duty and maintain combat readiness, remove the RS-18 missiles from service, and carry out the deactivation process. These are one and the same crews, one and the same people. And they, in performing their crucial work to destroy one of the largest strategic arsenals in the world, have to be certain of their future, of their social protections.

That is why under today's conditions, with inadequate financing, it would be expedient to adopt a model of the elimination process whereby that elimination is carried out in stages. After all of the work has been performed on one missile system—that is, it has been removed from duty, broken down and the equipment dismantled, social problems have been resolved and work has been completed on recultivation of the terrain—only then should the elimination of the next ballistic-missile system begin. And not the way it could occur—all of the missiles taken away, the silos closed up in accordance with the START-I procedure, the holes left and the social problems of the servicemen unresolved.

[S. Zhurets] What assistance can we expect from the United States—so much talked about, especially lately—under these conditions?

[O. Serdyuk] Comparative indicators of our expenditures on the path of nuclear disarmament with the actual payments to this process on the part of the United States is far from to the advantage of the latter. As of May, we have received just 2,000 tonnes of fuel, three truck cranes and six specialized vehicles out of the promised American aid, defined as 185 million dollars.

The principal shortcoming of the American aid is more-over not so much the amount of it, as the very narrow area for its utilization. This was caused by the restrictions of Nunn-Lugar, which does not permit that aid to be directed to the resolution of such topical problems of the Armed Forces as social protections for servicemen who will be discharged from the Army owing to the elimination of the nuclear weapons. There will be, after

all, no "real" money, we will receive only the material and technical means for the elimination work in the indicated amount.

It must be pointed out that the assistance of the United States should be considered not an act of charity, but rather as natural compensation for the military and economic losses of Ukraine connected with their nuclear weapons.

[S. Zhurets] One could perhaps recall here that one of the recent consultations pertaining to the distribution of the additional financial assistance of the Americans insisted that 50 million dollars be directed, first and foremost, to dismantling the 46 SS-24 missiles.

[O. Serdyuk] Yes, that was the approach. The Americans have a vested interest in that elimination, and that is naturally why they pose such questions. We have, in my view, so many problems with regard to the elimination of those missiles whose guarantee periods have expired, the RS-18s, that to say that we should begin the elimination of the SS-24s would be absurd. Ukraine has not assumed any international obligations whatsoever on that score.

[S. Zhurets] We are to salvage more than a third of the launch stages. A considerable portion of them were manufactured in Russia. Wouldn't it be more advantageous to resolve the problem with the salvaging of those missiles at Russian plants, rather than invest funds in the expansion of a salvage base in Dnipropetrovsk that will scarcely be needed after that work?

[O. Serdyuk] The decision has already been made pertaining to the building of a yard and neutralization station at the Pivdenne KB [Design Bureau]. That work has already started. That is first; second, the Russian Federation has actually offered to take those missiles for salvage. Those proposals, however, were far from being free. Taking into account the fact that the construction of the neutralization station is being done at the expense of the American funds, that approach would obviously be expedient.

[S. Zhurets] How do matters stand with fuel storage?

[O. Serdyuk] The construction of storage facilities for the missile-fuel components is being done today at the expense of that trillion for elimination, which is being allocated in very erratic fashion. Quite a bit of effort will have to be applied here to fulfill that task.

More than half of the heptyl could be used for the needs of the national space program. The guaranteed storage time of heptyl (close to fifteen years) would make it possible to count on such an option.

[S. Zhurets] Since you have already brought up the prospects, one fundamental issue concerns the future of the infrastructure of the 43rd Missile Army. It would be regrettable, after all, if those multi-billion facilities were to be reduced to nothing.

[O. Serdyuk] The infrastructure of the missile systems stationed on the territory of Ukraine could doubtless be preserved and used again, with the corresponding government decision and with the corresponding capital investment. It could be preserved and used or wasted irreversibly, since after the elimination of the missile launch silos in Ukraine, the aura that is created by the status of a nuclear-missile state would essentially be destroyed as well.

This decision is doubtless exceptionally important for the future of Ukraine. A considered approach, in my opinion, has been demonstrated by our parliament in designating a quota for the elimination of launch stages and missile silos—36 percent. The rest of the potential could and should be used for the accomplishment of tasks connected with ensuring the country's security. If all of this is destroyed, then we cannot expect that Ukraine will be able to restore that infrastructure some other time.

[S. Zhurets] Thank you for the interview, and I hope that NARODNA ARMIYA, with your assistance, will return again to the complex and exceptionally important topic for Ukraine of nuclear disarmament.

As the material was being prepared for press, it became known that an agreement has been signed between the governments of Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the fulfillment of the trilateral declaration of the presidents in Moscow. That document stipulates deadlines for the removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine—no later than 1997—and the obligation of Russia to send fuel for nuclear-power plants to Ukraine and account for the value of the tactical weapons that were removed from our territory, to be counted toward our debt to Russia for power carriers.

National Guard Formation, Troop Training Explored

Kukharets, Staff Visit Pontoon Brigade

94UM0468A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
12 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Guard Lieutenant-Colonel Anatoliy Pihilov under the rubric "In the National Guard of Ukraine": "With Experience to the Pontoon Troops"]

[Text] The officers of the Main Directorate of the Commander of the National Guard of Ukraine, as well as the commanders of formations and certain units within the context of the training session being held, visited the military compound of a pontoon and bridging brigade of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Unit commander Colonel N. Malkov, who received the National Guard personnel, personally familiarized them with the celebrated history of the military collective, and talked about the current daily life of the personnel.

The brigade, by the way, will be celebrating its fifty-year anniversary in August of next year. Its credits include the

rebuilding and mine clearing of the city of Kiev, destroyed by the Germans, and the bridges across the Dnipro and other water arteries. In April of 1986, when Chernobyl caught fire, the unit was present at full strength at the scene of the disaster and worked to clean up the consequences of it.

The generals and officers of the Guard visited the sleeping quarters, enlisted-men's mess, subsidiary plots and combat vehicle motor pool, and saw with their own eyes the splendid organization of the daily detail service and the irreproachable regulation order in the facilities and on the grounds. And even though the "tourists" have many decades of service among them, many of the officers were not ashamed to note down in the course of their discussions the elements that interested them, so as to employ what they had seen in practice in the Guard collectives.

Commander of the National Guard of Ukraine Guard Lieutenant-General V. Kukharets warmly thanked the commanders of the unit for their hospitality, and wished the bridging troops new successes in their noble service to the Fatherland.

In the Guard collectives themselves, which are still undergoing an active process of emergence, many of the problems connected with the placement of personnel have to be resolved, so to speak, on the run, so as not to harm the most important thing—combat readiness. The Guard troops (this is the opinion of many officers), regardless of the difficulties, are able to create conditions for people that are in no way worse than those in the storied ranks of the pontoon troops.

New Recruits' Education, Humanitarian Training

94UM0468B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
26 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Guard Major Yuriy Sychoy under the rubric "In the National Guard of Ukraine": "Maximum Respect to the Young"]

[Text] The ranks of the National Guard are being replenished with young personnel today. The youth from various corners of Ukraine, who after the corresponding training will be protecting the constitutional order and territorial integrity of independent Ukraine along with their senior comrades, will be protecting people against criminal infringements and protecting their rights and freedom.

The main concern today is to provide the young soldiers with suitable conditions for training and service. The discussion was about that at the meetings of deputy commanders of the formations and units, which discussed ways of increasing the effectiveness of indoctrination and humanitarian training for the young Guardsmen and expanding closer ties with the parents of the soldiers as well as resolved a number of urgent issues.

The meetings were conducted by NHU Commander Guard Lieutenant-General Volodymyr Kukharets.

Rear Services Personnel Training

94UM0468C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
21 May 94 p 2

[Article by KNGU press service officer Vira Valerko under the rubric "The National Guard Trains Cadres": "New Reinforcements for the Rear Services Troops"]

[Text] The Department of Military Management of the Kharkiv Higher Military School of the NHU [National Guard of Ukraine] was called before August of last year the Department of Food and Matériel Support, and employed military-economic gaming as an experiment with the cadets of the graduating class. Many changes have occurred today, and games have now become a constituent element of the educational process. Its title is "The Operations of the Rear Services of the NHU Regiment in Various Economic Situations."

This is, true, not just a game. The cadets took it seriously, since it revealed their capabilities and, most importantly, their ability as future military specialists.

The dynamism with which the action began during the game did not give them an opportunity to think for long, forcing the immediate resolution of any problems and, later—profound theoretical knowledge. The cadets played many roles over just one day: senior officers and deputy commanders of units, chiefs of the food and matériel services, young specialists in rear services. Business manager, say, or the chief of a bathhouse etc.

The point of the game, in the broadest sense, was to check the quality of the assimilation of the basic curriculum, evaluate the ability to orient themselves in situations that arise unexpectedly, and evaluate their decision-making skills and ability to plan and forecast their activity under the new conditions of economic activity and supervise subordinates. There was also one more important purpose of this game—to assist the cadets in understanding and being aware of the harsh realities of the present day.

It was carefully arranged into three stages: business, role-playing and organizational-business games. And while the first stage was an entirely pre-programmed affair with a plan known in advance and a finish that was a hundred percent predictable (the cadets were even permitted to use a great deal of reference material), just the problem was put before the cadets in the remaining ones. The actual methods, ways and quality of their resolution depended on the level of training of the cadets. Stereotyped scenarios thus had no success at all. Only new, fresh and original solutions were suitably evaluated. Each graduate was left alone with himself in the final stage, and could count only on his own knowledge, quick thinking and resourcefulness. Acting decisively, sometimes improvising, but only within the bounds of the law, they were able to achieve their aims

and find foodstuffs, dress, technical gear, to achieve precise reasoning in a persuasive key in their discussions with the supplier, and to select that combination of actions that would lead to success. The cadets, in other words, were placed in extreme conditions that were as close as possible to the actual state of affairs in our life.

It can be believed that they will withstand the difficult trials of life in worthy fashion, as well as the rest of their educational ones. The good results of the military-economic game undoubtedly testify to that.

Some Recruits Unfit for Service

94UM0468D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 May 94 p 2

[Article by Vira Valerko of the NHU command press center under the rubric "Draft-94": "Are the Sick Are Being Taken Into the Guard...?"]

[Text] It is, of course, a rhetorical question. But the impression is being created that it may not be for all. How else to explain a situation where 16 young men from last year's fall replacements for the National Guard of Ukraine were immediately sent home as unfit to serve, and 78 were sent for medical examination to determine their fitness?

Incredibly, among the diseases with which the draftees were commissioned were stomach ulcers, cardiosclerosis, oligophrenia at the stage of mild debility, arthrosis and even psychopathy. Just what guided the physicians of the draft commissions, if they knowingly signed the documents on the supposedly satisfactory state of the health of the sick people? They must bear that responsibility as malefactors, among other things, since one such falsification ended tragically for Guard soldier Dmytry Rezyk, who died in December of last year from a perforated stomach ulcer. Strange? Only in November of that same year, after all, the military medical commission of Zavodskyy Rayon of the city of Dnipropetrovsk has officially established the full fitness of the youth to serve!

Why recall today these sad events, six months old? The new recruits will soon be welcomed. Reports are coming in from everywhere on the completion of the work of the groups for preliminary selection that were working in contact with the regional military commissariats. Certain oblasts have already sent the lists of the candidates selected. There is no assurance whatsoever, however, that the military commissariats are sending namely those youth to serve in the NHU. The experience of the prior draft—when, for example, the Ternopil city military commissariat sent only three of the 42 draftees selected for the National Guard—forces one to have doubts again.

The indoctrination of the draftees, their moral and spiritual qualities, their abilities and the state of their health require especially careful attention today, as was emphasized by Guard Colonel Vasyi Romanovskyy.

That is possible, however, only provided there is personal contact with the future soldiers. Financial difficulties unfortunately hold sway here as well. The shortage of funds has led to the fact that business trips connected with preliminary selection have been cut back to a few days, while the transportation that could accelerate and improve that work is effectively lacking. So how many populated areas can you cover on foot in five days? So they have to familiarize themselves, as a rule, not with people but with their personal files. They are often highly falsified. It becomes a vicious circle.

The Guard is ready to receive its young replacements. The difficulties that are expected as a consequence of the quantitative imbalance between last year's and this year's replacements have even been taken into account. The training centers of the National Guard of Ukraine are awaiting their new recruits, and the officers are prepared to begin the training of the newcomers and to educate them as true Guardsmen.

Kukharets Meets Veterans' Affairs Leaders

94UM0468E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
4 Jun 94 p 2

[Report from press service of the commander of the National Guard of Ukraine under the rubric "In the National Guard": "Music for the Veterans"]

[Text] Chairman of the Committee for Veterans Affairs General of the Army Ivan Herasimov and Chairman of the Council of Veterans of the Internal-Service Troops Major-General (Retired) Mykola Tytov visited the Kiev Division of the National Guard of Ukraine. The guests became familiar with the everyday life of the personnel and made note of the regulation order in the subunits, the clear-cut organization of service and the pride of the soldiers. They told today's defenders of the Fatherland about the honored traditions of the older generations of soldiers who routed the German fascists during World War II.

The respected veterans warmly greeted the commander of the National Guard of Ukraine, Lieutenant-General of the Guard Volodymyr Kukharets. The model orchestra of the National Guard arranged a concert for the participants in the meeting.

Simferopol Brigade Commander Justifies National Guard Presence

94UM0472A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
14 Jun 94 p 3

[Interview with Colonel Aleksandr Kostyukov, commander of the Simferopol Brigade of the Ukraine National Guard, by Senior Lieutenant Igor Krol, press service officer of the Ukraine National Guard commander; place and date not given: "A Detachment Patrols the City..."]

[Text] [Krol] The situation surrounding the Ukraine National Guard troop unit created two years ago in the Crimea has recently become an intensely heated topic in certain of the mass media. Is everything truly taking place the way it is being presented in the sensational newspaper reports we have been reading?

[Kostyukov] In my view, the authors of many published materials on the Guardsmen lack objectivity in their approach and treatment of the issues surrounding the Guard's vital activity in Crimea. The problem lies in the fact that they make little effort to ascertain whether or not the facts they report on the pages of the newspaper conform to reality. On the other hand, no one forgets to saturate his material with sarcastic commentary, hang insulting labels on the soldiers and officers without justification, and make every possible "prediction" with respect to their future service on the peninsula...

Time and again I have been able only to marvel as I read the missions supposedly assigned the troop unit under my command. I could not even imagine that our brigade was to put its foot down somewhere or take the city by storm, that extended operation would cause our automatic weapons to burn out...

Although I am far removed from the journalism profession, as an individual entrusted with great responsibility I am directly concerned with seeing to it that truth alone prevails in the treatment of events taking place with respect to us. In developing their subject material, certain writers truly forget to look before they leap and simply throw out their report. Can it be permissible to relate to this issue in such a manner?

I want to tell everyone desiring to write about those under my command that the door to my office, and the doors to the offices of my deputies, are always open to receive editorial personnel. "Come in, be our guest!"—as they say. We are always happy to show you how we live and serve. We will answer any question of interest to you.

[Krol] What in your view are the reasons behind the appearance in the press of all kinds of attacks against the Guard?

[Kostyukov] I will tell you quite frankly that it is no accident all of this is taking place. Standing behind this flow of filthy propaganda is a certain political or other force whose agenda welcomes the newspaper accounts purposefully directed towards slandering our Guardsmen, accounts that intentionally create a negative impression of them among the local populace.

The Guard is standing in the way of certain destructive forces of society striving at any price to achieve the implementation of their plans to destroy the unity and integrity of Ukraine. These forces see us as a threat to themselves and are therefore fighting us with lies, aspersions, and mudslinging.

[Krol] In particular, there have been reports concerning a number of conflicts...

[Kostyukov] This is the way it happened. On 15 May, three soldiers in a special missions company, on leave, went into a cafe for something to eat. An intoxicated man came up to one of them and started taunting him, to the effect of—what are you doing here soldier, you with the Ukrainian uniform insignia? The soldier had to endure an abusive verbal assault, but decided not to get into a fight and did absolutely nothing in response to the insulting provocation. Only when the man put his fists in motion did the soldier respond with a professional rebuff. The servicemen sat in the cafe a while longer, then went for a walk in the city. However, they were soon subjected to attack by a militia group of eight men armed with automatic weapons.

Not understanding what was going on, the Guardsmen were forced to defend themselves from a group that constituted in fact their comrades-in-arms. In this regard, the latter acted without any explanation whatsoever... The soldiers were beat up and accused of involvement in a drunken brawl, although a panel of experts confirmed their absolute sobriety. After all was said and done, they were released to their unit.

I do not understand why the militia had to act in this manner, and under a false accusation to boot. Would it not have been wiser to report the incident to the military headquarters and have a patrol sent out instead of conducting an armed assault against innocent comrades?

[Krol] What kind of impression can such fabrications impart to people, especially if they do not have accurate information?

[Kostyukov] You can only imagine. If I were in their position I would feel far from good about it. I am horrified at the thought of such "defenders." But this has already become the system. God help us if people believe lies. As people used to say in bygone days: The truth cannot even manage to get started in the time it takes a lie to travel the world over.

[Krol] What is the military collective of the brigade doing today?

[Kostyukov] There is a great deal to be done in resolving problems concerning the rear, making the living conditions of the soldiers suitable. The main portion of our training time, naturally, is devoted to combat and special training. But the most important aspect is the official detail, operating five times a week, aimed at preserving public order in the city. We may assert that we have managed to attain fairly good results in the fight against crime, especially this year. We are assigning more and more military details to assist the militia. This is how citizens are afforded security with respect to criminal attempts on their lives and property. Since the beginning of the current year, soldiers have detained more than

3,200 individuals for administrative violations, seven persons for crimes. Three firearms have been confiscated.

A few nuances emerge here, however. In my constant inspections of duty performance procedure, I often discover that not all the internal-affairs personnel comprising a joint militia-Guard patrol treat the performance of their official duties in a fully responsible manner.

But I see my most important task as brigade commander in ensuring that all my subordinates become true Guardsmen representing the elite of the Armed Forces, that they serve as an example to all military servicemen.

Experience shows that wherever National Guardsmen are stationed and whatever missions they are carrying out, they have always earned the prestige of the local populace. Is there any reason for certain people to fear us? Yes—those who have decided to break the law, to profit from others' good deeds, to raise a hand against the weak...

By virtue of our calling, we have been and always will be found where conditions are the most difficult, where people need our help. The people of Crimea can put their complete trust in us, can rely on us for anything. We will not let them down.

Carpathian Military District Undergoing Inspection

Col-Gen Bizhan Interviewed

94UM0448A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
17 May 94 p 1

[Interview with Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Ivan Vasylovych Bizhan by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondents Colonel Viktor Shvyrov and Lieutenant-Colonel Oleh Vachayev: "Everything Begins With Order"]

[Text] *The troops of the 38th Army Corps (Carpathian Military District), as NARODNA ARMIYA has already reported, are conducting a performance evaluation for the winter training period. The center of the final drills was moved to the field, where the personnel report on weapons training, the driving of vehicles, tactics...*

[I. Bizhan] The overall preliminary evaluation could be as follows. On the one hand, the diligence of the enlisted men and NCOs everywhere they were during these days—in the barracks, in the field, at the motor pool—was noticeable.

On the other, the low level of professional proficiency of the personnel when passing the disciplines that required the expenditures of large quantities of fuels and lubricants during the winter training period was noticeable as well. And we understand that. There were objective

reasons for this, after all, that were connected first and foremost with the shortage of fuels.

There is, however, no justification for those commanders who are trying to use those reasons to cover their own passivity. We were present at firing exercises by a mechanized battalion yesterday where the organization of the exercises was far from normal. What do I have in mind? The instruction areas and target range proper had not been prepared, and the equipment of the gunnery range operated erratically. There were, for instance, disruptions in providing routine supplies for the troops in the field and informing them of the results, which ultimately led to an overall unsatisfactory evaluation of the subunit for day and night firing. There could have been no other evaluation.

I would like to emphasize once again—and I have reported this to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine—that many of the commanders and senior officers who were complaining about the lack of money and fuels and lubricants are carelessly fulfilling their duties in the resolution of rudimentary tasks.

For example, the performance of a group exercise with the commanders of platoons of two subunits was rated unsatisfactory in the same mechanized battalion (regiment). Neither fuel nor money were required to conduct it, after all. All that was needed was systematic classes with the officers.

Take even the rudimentary questions of setting up the daily routine, organizing classes, maintaining stipulated forms of dress and the internal duty roster... Tell me, what funds are required for a regiment to have order, for a firefighting team to operate well in the motor pool? But it was clearly not working in harmony.

The time for the final evaluations has obviously not yet come. But I have serious complaints today toward the command personnel of the UPO for the organization of the final drills and the upholding of stipulated procedure.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Ivan Vasylovych, the headquarters officers of a mechanized division and regiment and the personnel of one of the subunits were called out in a practice alert during the training session today. How do you rate their actions?

[I. Bizhan] We performed an evaluation of mobilization readiness with a regard for the situation that exists in the formation, and we checked out the system for notifying headquarters officers of the division and regiment.

It is still too early to be talking about final results. But there is quite a bit left to be done here. The written confirmation of the alert signal from the higher staff was received too late by the operations duty officer in particular. These are also rudimentary matters that people must learn that do not require any particular expenditures.

I would like to emphasize again that organizational conclusions will undoubtedly be drawn based on the results of the performance evaluation with a particular regard for the subjective factor that we were talking about before.

The question of how the problem of fully manning the mechanized division, especially at the platoon and company (battery) levels, with officer personnel is of particular attention in this regard.

The inspectorate includes representatives of the Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, who are studying this issue in detail. Everything possible has already been done on the part of the Ministry not only on this problem, but also on many of the other "sore spots" that exist in the division.

Work must also be done with the officers in the field, however. Their aspirations and needs must be studied more deeply, and their problems must not be brushed aside. I am sure that we will have fewer transfer or discharge requests from the young officers in that case.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] We have heard complaints more than once that bad things continue to happen in the determination of the optimal standard organizational structures of the formation. This has a negative impact on the proficiency and mood of people...

[I. Bizhan] This is, first of all, in the sphere of aimless discussions again. Take the mechanized battalion that I was talking about earlier. What reforms were made in it, say, that impeded the fulfillment of the weapons training program? There were none, but they are trying to use it to cover themselves. Is that good?

Second, everything that is being done is proceeding in accordance with the plan for the organizational development of the armed forces. I agree with the fact that everything is not being done as one would like here. Life itself makes corrections, and you cannot get away from that. One need not, however, put the problem of growth at the center.

We are not reforming the armed forces, we are building them, as has been emphasized repeatedly by Minister of Defense of Ukraine General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetsky. That is quite true. Everything is effectively being created anew, and you cannot avoid mistakes.

A large portion of the work lies ahead for us, and I am sure that the results of that will provide us with the opportunity of assessing, in objective and comprehensive fashion, the state of affairs in the formations and units of the corps being evaluated.

Command & Control Exercise

94UM0448B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
18 May 94 p 1

[Unattributed report from "Inf. NA": "Overall Results—A Lesson, Not a Failure"]

[Text] The special tactical drills [TSZ] were a common and, at the same time, serious test for the officers and personnel of the field communications center commanded by Major Petro Alekseyev. Even though the drills are monitored from start to finish by exacting review officers, the supervisory functions belong to the command personnel of the unit that is actually performing the TSZ.

The subunit of Major Alekseyev was called up at dawn. The mobile portion of the unit, headed by the commander, soon made a march to the appointed area. Taking the scarcity of fuel into account, the route that was selected was intentionally a difficult one. Some 15 kilometers was enough for the review officers to evaluate the capability of the motor vehicles and drivers to carry out the assigned task. It should be stated that the column reached the planned area in full complement and without any serious incidents. The practical combat work then began—the very work that the communications troops had always considered, and still do consider, to be their professional honor and dignity. The officers and young specialists, regardless of the difficult situation in which they had to increase their specialist proficiency, acted in quite precise and confident fashion. The deadline for the entry into communications with other centers and, through a space communications station, with a radio link of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Carpathian Military District and the radio nets of the division staffs was met with time to spare. There were a few shortcomings, of course, which were recorded by the review officers.

They were able to fulfill their mission thanks to the efforts and skill of the experienced officers, warrant officers and young specialists. The deputy commander of the field center for indoctrination work, Major Valeriy Nedavniy, could not even single anyone out. After reflection, he named the chief of the telephone center, Captain Kostyantyn Lotostkyy, the chief of the space communications station, Lieutenant Hryhoriy Hrish, and equipment chiefs Warrant Officers Viktor Lepko and Serhiy Hudzevych. The concertmaster for the entire tactical-special exercise, as always, was the commander of the field communications center, Major Petro Alekseyev. It would not be the whole truth, as they say, if we were to fail to mention one other thing. The review officers, without looking at the confident professional actions of the communications troops, nonetheless gave the center only a satisfactory rating during the TSZ.

They noted some regrettable trifles connected with the immediate work in the field. This is entirely understandable. The minimal quantity of field trips the regiment was able to make during the winter, after all, owing to the

shortage of motor resources, and the clear shortage of actual work had negative consequences. The proficiency of the subunits is dropping, and practical skills are being lost. The end-of-training-period special tactical drill testifies to this. It would be incorrect, however, to call it a failure.

This was a lesson—a lesson for the future.

Comments on 38th Army Corps

94UM0448C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
21 May 94 p 1

[Unattributed item from "Inf. NA": "Lessons for the Future"]

[Text] The inspection and final performance evaluation for the winter training period has been completed among the troops of the 38th Army Corps, commanded by Major-General Anatoliy Kalashnykov. It was carried out by a group of generals and officers from the central apparatus of the MO [Ministry of Defense] of Ukraine headed by Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan. The results of the evaluation have been summarized.

The principal conclusion drawn by the commission from the inspection was the fact that the military formation is, as a whole, able to fulfill the tasks entrusted to it to protect the state sovereignty of Ukraine.

Many shortcomings were also noted as well, pertaining first and foremost to the professional proficiency of the staff officers, unit and subunit commanders and personnel. That proficiency was conditional upon both objective and subjective factors. The former include those connected with the difficult economic situation of the country, where funds, fuel and other material resources to support the combat readiness and everyday activity of the troops are lacking. This was taken into account in the inspection. But how to explain the negative attitude of some of the senior and command officers toward the organization of instruction in those military disciplines that do not require large expenditures? The latter pertain to the maintenance of discipline and regulation order, and the performance of official duties. The commission ascertained that the state of affairs is the worst in the military units headed by Colonel O. Kandir, Lieutenant-Colonels L. Tkachenko and S. Manayev, and Major V. Ambros. A great deal of effort must be applied in order to instill order in the mechanized regiment commanded by Colonel V. Antsulov. The Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine became personally convinced of this when he visited the units and training areas.

However, as was pointed out at the council, the overwhelming majority of the officers and their subordinates have done everything in their power, despite all of the bad things and difficulties, and tried to demonstrate what they had learned during the last training period. The company tactical training exercise with live firing

that was visited by Minister of Defense of Ukraine General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetsky could serve as an example of that. He encouraged a group of officers and soldiers in their skillful actions. The exercise in the mountain training areas itself received a high rating.

The troops of the 38th Army Corps (Carpathian Military District) have given an accounting of themselves. But the inspection continues. The baton has been passed to the Odessa Military District as of May 23. The 6th Army Corps has to pass final examinations. The conclusions that the commission from the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in the Carpathian Military District, one would think, will be taken into account there.

Fighter Pilot Training, Utilization Questions Examined

Lack of Opportunity To Gain Experience

94UM0446A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
12 May 94 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Nykyfor Lysytsya under the rubric "Aviator Training": "Learn From Others, but Do Not Disregard Your Own"]

[Text] How can aviation be employed most effectively in conjunction with the ground forces in defensive battles? This question, very topical today, is arising more and more often for the commanders of flight units and formations. The young armed forces of our nation, after all, still do not have enough experience of their own. What was accumulated during the times of the former Soviet Union is not very useful—the army structures have changed and the Military Doctrine is completely different, as are views of the possible nature of combat operations and the employment of armed formations in general. It is thus necessary to gather, summarize and analyze, bit by bit, everything that we are able to get during flights and training. A whole series of measures have thus been carried out in the Air Forces of Ukraine for this purpose—practical-science conferences, seminars, operational-tactical training etc. The corresponding work in this area is being carried out by the lower echelons as well.

The 14th Air Army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Viktor Lyashenko, has conducted an operational-mobilization training session of the command personnel of the larger units and formations. It was held for five days at the Lviv training area.

Here is what Colonel Leonid Podnosov, acting chief of staff of the army, had to say about this session: "First, we studied—or rather, devised—new views on the utilization of frontal and army aviation in defensive combat operations," he said. "The participants in the session diligently studied the experience of combat operations during armed conflicts in recent years, and first and

foremost the employment of aviation in them. A considerable role, by the way, was assigned to it. The combat operations in the Persian Gulf testify to that. The combined armed forces of the NATO countries carried out a quite prolonged bombing of the battle positions and military facilities of Iraq before the ground forces entered into battle."

"Aviation was used quite recently on the part of some Western powers on the territory of the former Yugoslavia in order to halt the combat operations of the warring sides. Other examples could also be cited.

"All of these were cases in which aviation was employed in order to carry out preemptive strikes. We need primarily skills in the utilization of air power in defensive combat operations, since Ukraine has no intention of being the first to attack anyone. We are thus trying to perceive the experience of the cases cited above in a different way. We are selecting only what we need. That was emphasized both in the lectures given by the chiefs of directorates and services, and in the speeches of participants in the session during the group seminar.

"However rich other peoples' experience may be, however," emphasized Colonel Podnosov, "you cannot get by without your own as well. And we do have some of our own, even if it is not all that rich. Tactical exercises were conducted recently, as is well known, by a motorized-rifle regiment with live firing at the Lviv training area. Aviation took an active part in it, with the delivery of on-board weaponry. The leaders of our army intentionally saw to it that more aircraft and helicopters were allotted to this exercise than were stipulated by tactical norms. This was done, first of all, so as to give as many of the fliers as possible, from all branches of aviation, the opportunity to gain some skills. They had one task—know the capabilities of your aircraft during the performance of combat operations, so as to defend the territory of our nation. And they were able to do so."

Almost all of the unit commanders whose aviation subunits were assigned to the exercises—the experienced pilots Colonels Anatoliy Baranov, Oleksiy Kotov and Volodymyr Tsybaly, among others—expressed their ideas during the session with regard to new forms of combat employment of aircraft and helicopters. All of this provided grounds to conclude that the assigned tasks were achieved by the session. All participants gained a certain amount of the experience that they need in their everyday combat training.

It would be worthwhile to add to the story of Colonel Leonid Podnosov that the assembly was conducted in quite interesting and intensive fashion. The most diverse types of instruction were employed in it. They included, aside from the lectures, tactical drills and seminars during which each of the officers was able to express his opinion or point of view, make a suggestion or share his own experience. Staff gaming was also conducted here, during which the operation of command-and-control structures was practiced.

A number of demonstration classes, including on the troop services, were also held for the participants in the assembly. A visit was organized to a tank regiment of the Zaliznyy Division, where the commanders of aviation units were shown how the soldiers of that model military garrison live, serve, train and relax.

It would also be worthwhile to point out that the assembly did not require a great deal of material funding.

Training Constraints Mean Loss of Skill

94UM0446B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
20 May 94 p 2

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Nykyfor Lysytsya: "Those Who Flew Augmented Their Experience"]

[Text] The weather decided to arrange the first test for the fliers on the day of the flight proficiency performance evaluation in the fighter air regiment commanded by Colonel Bohdan Spodarko. The black clouds crawled across Carpathia and immediately covered the ground with heavy rain and powerful lightning. The meteorologists, of course, would not give the go-ahead to the missile-bearing aircraft under such conditions. The pilots can take up the aircraft in a combat situation, and even in peacetime, under extraordinary conditions, since they are fighters. All-weather fighters. The likelihood that one of the fiery bolts that were tearing from the clouds could hit an aircraft, however, was quite large. The flight operations officer and the commander of the 14th Air Army, Lieutenant-General Viktor Lyashenko, who headed the commission to summarize the results of the performance evaluation, decided not to risk it. The start of the flight shift was moved from 1500 to a later time, which forced certain corrections to be made in the flight schedule. This had no better effect on the mood of the aerial warriors. It is well known that a pilot begins his flight while still on the ground, readying himself psychologically and performing these or those operations in his mind, reflecting on each minute of the flight. And now the start was being pushed back, until who knows when, for what period of time, or whether it would go at all.

The engines of the MiG-29s roared to life at 2000 hours. Regimental commander Colonel Bohdan Spodarko took off. Behind him, in the rear cockpit, was the commander of the division, Colonel Ivan Ivanchuk, who performed the role of instructor during this flight. The commanders, as usual, were the first into the sky.

Reports soon started coming in from the aircraft to the command post—the headings of the route to the training area and some of the zones themselves, according to the data on the meteorological conditions, could be used for making the flights.

The aircraft called Hoshia in the regiment was the next to taxi out to the runway. Whence the name? I would point out, before answering that question, that there is also a Kesha here. Those names were taken from an animated

film, and the pilots called the aircraft that for their particular coloration, which reminds some of a parrot.

We have already noted in our newspaper that two MiG-29 aircraft had made demonstration flights to the United States and Canada more than two years ago. They were painted over at that time accordingly. The missile aircraft returned to their Fatherland after the completion of the air show. They were once more in the order of battle, they were making planned flights, and it is worthwhile to point out that it is considered quite prestigious in the regiment to take up the Hosha or the Kesha. Many interesting elements can be discerned in this story. First of all, the fact that the pilots have never lost their sense of humor, even during the harshest of testing. One also senses that they love their aircraft, so they even give them names. The main thing is that our Air Forces are getting their own history, their own traditions. Possibly these two aircraft, which were the first to announce to the Canadians and the inhabitants of the United States the existence of the state of Ukraine and its armed forces, will someday take their place of honor in some museum.

Major Serhiy Dorofeyev once had occasion to make a flight on the Hosha. It is worth noting that he performed the exercises in piloting technique quite successfully, and made a takeoff and landing. During subsequent flights that were made before nightfall, as well as at night, all of the pilots demonstrated good aerial proficiency. Squadron commander Yuriy Protsenko received outstanding ratings in aerial navigation and for the interception of airborne targets. His colleague, Major Volodymyr Veherynsky, also made a weapons-delivery flight in excellent fashion. Regimental Navigator Major Mykola Romanov received the highest grade for piloting technique and for the interception of airborne targets. Senior pilot Captain Serhiy Doroshenko and other aerial warriors also "brought home" a high rating to the airfield. The officers displayed considerable combat proficiency, flight experience and diligence. All of them are pilots of the highest qualifications, have been on combat alert duty to protect the airspace of our nation dozens of times, and strove to show themselves in the best light in the evaluation.

But do high results obtained in control flights testify to a high status of flight proficiency and combat training among all of the pilots in the fighter regiment? It would be a considerable exaggeration to say so. It should be noted that there were disruptions in the operation of aircraft hardware during the flight shift as well. The transmitter was not working for a certain time, for example, during the second flight on the aircraft of the regimental commander. The experienced pilot, of course, was able to get out of that non-standard situation successfully. There were also other problems that were not very substantial.

The main argument that was not in favor of the fliers, however, was the fact that the plan for combat readiness was not entirely fulfilled in the regiment. Fourteen flight

shifts were carried out in all, on which the pilots spent just 240 hours in the air. Why so little? That almost sounds like a rhetorical question. But the fact that the air units have a miserly quantity of fuels and lubricants has been discussed repeatedly in the pages of our newspaper. No aircraft can go up without aviation fuel. The motor vehicles that support the flights cannot leave the motor pool without gasoline and diesel fuel. The sharp reduction in the number of pilot sorties also tells on the level of readiness of these aerial fighters. A considerable portion of them have already lost their professional skills—more than half of the pilots in this regiment. Lieutenant-General Viktor Lyashenko emphasized when summarizing the results of the evaluation. The pilots should either be flying or they have to be let go to the four winds—this quite categorical conclusion of the commander has solid grounding. A pilot who has not taken an aircraft up for more than a year, after all, cannot now even be called a pilot, since he needs to learn again almost from square one. And this should not be taken as an insult, but rather as reality; such is the specific nature of the profession of the pilot. He can lead the life of a vagabond if he does not have his own apartment, he can agree to a reduction in his ration of flights or his material supply, but he cannot fail to fly. The principal conclusion that could be drawn, after the performance evaluation conducted in this and other flight units, can be phrased roughly as follows: the most important problem, which requires immediate resolution, is the provision of fuels and lubricants. There will be true aerial warriors—not just a handful of them, but the overwhelming majority who hold flight positions today—when there is fuel.

BALTIC STATES

Officials View Disposition of Facilities Left by Russian Army

944K1319A Riga NEATKARIGA CINA in Latvian
7 May 94 p 5

[Interview with Ilgonis Upmalis, chief of the bureau to control the withdrawal of the Army of the Federation of Russia, and Ludis Pavilonis, his deputy, by Viktors Berzins: "They Leave; Facilities Remain; The Russian Army Is Leaving So Briskly That the Latvian State Cannot Keep Up With Resolutions on the Former Army Facilities."]

[Text] In summary, the number of resolutions by the government, which would determine the future ownership of the facilities, is unable to keep up with the number of acceptance and committal acts.

[Pavilonis] During its time, the Supreme Council passed a resolution stating that the Council of Ministers must review the case of each such facility and adopt a resolution on awarding it to either the municipality or some other party, all within a ten day period.

In practice, this cannot be done because the process takes too long. Before the Cabinet of Ministers adopts the resolution, the resolution bill must be written, in conjunction with the judicial division and other institutions. In total, about 10 to 15 signatures must be collected. When these and the archival reports are gathered, the case is reviewed by the appropriate committee of the Cabinet of Ministers, and if the latter finds that all of the documentation is in order, only then is it presented to the administration. In a meeting of the administration, the final resolution is adopted on the disposition of the facility.

[Berzins] Then a whole month would go by ...

[Pavilonis] Ye-es (drawing out the word)... You said one month? Now let's take a look at the list of facilities returned. For example, Cesis rayon, Sarkani, medical warehouses. Committal act—April 27, 1993. Administrative resolution—March 5, 1994. Almost one entire year! Naturally, it doesn't take this long for everything. Now, here is another entry: committal act—June 8, 1993, resolution by the Cabinet of Ministers—January 4, 1994. Half of a year. And there are more and more.

[Berzins] At such a rate, we will never get rid of the Russian Army!

[Pavilonis] We are getting rid of the Russian Army, because they are no longer in these facilities. The Army says "so long" to those areas as soon as there is an acceptance and committal act.

[Berzins] What happens to the vacated facility during the time between the committal act and the adoption of the administrative resolution?

[Pavilonis] The municipality must provide protection to make sure that nothing happens, but it is not allowed to take over ownership. It cannot allow in a private organization, nor do anything else.

And what happens if the municipality has agreed to be the owner, but then some interested ministry turns up, which decides something as follows: Why should the municipality have it? We need it! We will turn it over to the municipality, then prepare a resolution to have it turned over to us. And they prepare and receive the resolution by the Cabinet of Ministers. Now the occupant selected by the municipality must be evicted. Can the municipality feel secure and confident: Although the Cabinet of Ministers is preparing these resolutions very slowly, they will be finished someday, and then—who will be the legal owner of the facility? There have been numerous precedents where the facility has been taken away from the municipality.

Now about protection. The municipalities are not paid for providing protection, and they must find the money from internal reserves. But, when the municipality is turned out of some facility, it says:—We are removing our protection, but pay us for the period during which we

provided protection.—But the ministries, in turn, have no money, and so they just don't pay.

[Berzins] What should be done to speed up the disposition of the former military facilities?

[Pavilonis] At the least, we should increase the number of members in the Ministry of Finances group that prepares the administrative resolution bills, so that we can catch up with the acceptance and committal acts. Naturally, this is impossible to do in ten days, since signatures cannot be obtained at such a rate, but let them attempt to do it in twenty days. Don't prolong it to a year.

[Upmalis] The next meeting of the commission led by Mr. Kosisis will be dedicated to a discussion on how to speed up production of these administrative resolutions.

In order to adopt a resolution, which will have a completely singular significance for the commission, and the administration, and so that there will be no basis for an argument by any entity, there must be clarity on what is under each facility; who owned the land? Has the owner submitted a claim? Who owned the facility built before 1940? All of this archival information is essential. Plus, we need the plans of the building or facility. In the beginning, while the military unit was still in there, they were impossible to obtain. Now, we have made an agreement with North West Military Group Commander Mayorov, and there are no longer any refusals. We even received them for the Maiznicas Street facility, which contains the counterintelligence unit. It is a complicated matter to gather all of the archival information, to obtain the necessary documents from the Land and Property Reclamation commissions.

If it is absolutely certain that the land under a facility belongs to the municipality, then, naturally, the facility belongs to the municipality. If a mistake is made at the meeting of the administration, then this could lead to the curious event that the administration, by its resolution, gives the municipality's land to some ministry. Mistakes happen, many mistakes—because incomplete documentation is submitted.

Commercial organizations are very quick in using this to their advantage when they are interested in a certain facility. As you could say, they climb over corpses, with the help of false information, with various incomplete reports, to attempt and sometimes even succeed to establish the grounds for their claim. Municipalities are also guilty. And there are cases where all of the interested parties do not want to settle their claims in accordance with the law, and then the only way to clear up the confusion is by the prosecutor and the court.

There will be a "mad dash", there will.

[Berzins] Let us assume that the Russian Army will leave by August 31. The majority of military units will probably prolong the turnover of the facilities as long as they can. The "mad dash", presumably, will occur in July and August...

[Pavilonis] Maybe there will be much more of a "mad dash" towards the end, but I can say that at present they are turning over their facilities on a somewhat regular basis. As soon as an area is empty, they draw up the acceptance and committal act: please, take it and do what you will. It is no longer the way it was at one time.—major discord: Mayorov was not signing the acts, Moscow was simply not allowing him to sign—the military unit area was empty, but it was not turned over. Now these matters are being handled promptly.

[Berzins] There is probably still a great deal left to settle.

[Pavilonis] Yes. There are still 191 Russian Army units in 247 facilities in Latvia.

[Berzins] How many have been turned over this year?

[Pavilonis] Twenty-one units with 86 facilities.

[Berzins] Twenty-one units in four months. For the remaining four months—191. How can this be accomplished without a "mad dash"?

[Pavilonis] There will be a "mad dash", there will...

[Berzins] They will make a "mad dash", but they are most likely prepared for it. But are we, likewise, prepared to handle such a mountain of returned property? The facilities should at least be protected. And it will also be necessary to make determinations...

[Pavilonis] Up until now, if there was an owner, the take over and protection did not create any major problems.

[Berzins] But there can be no owner until the Cabinet of Ministers confirms one. But that grindstone is turning very slowly.

[Pavilonis] The Cabinet of Ministers is issuing resolutions out of turn for certain facilities that may be needed more quickly. But even so, the number of resolutions has not managed to keep up with the number of committal acts.

[Berzins] So, we already couldn't keep up when there were relatively few facilities turned over. What will happen when the "mad dash" starts and there are many facilities to take over and decide on? How can these be protected to avoid their destruction and demolition?

[Pavilonis] It is possible that illegal activities will occur. If some official wants to "screw" someone, he could say:—You are managing this property illegally, and I am suing you and throwing you out.

[Upmalis] The only positive thing is that for those facilities where the Army unit is still present, likely owners have already appeared. As for what remains—I

don't think there will be a problem with taking over facilities located in Riga. The major facilities—training grounds, airfields—have already been taken over. There is still the matter of Adazi and Dobeles, where the 25th brigade is situated. There is still the matter of "Strautini" in the Aluksne rayon, where a few complications will most certainly arise. There is also the 32 meter high radio-telescopic antenna in the Ventspils rayon, which has not been awarded to anyone, yet. In turning over this facility, we are looking for possibilities of better utilization and preservation, because it is so specialized and so far into the forest that it will be impossible for the municipality to preserve it. Discussions about this facility are being held with the Russian Scientific Academy about cooperation among scientists from Latvia, Russia and other nations, all united under of the "Kvazar" program. Although the problems are monstrous—this facility takes up 209 hectares of the forest, Latvian scientists do not have the strength to manage it, and the Russian side does not have the strength to organize and finance it, because, in order to prepare this facility for scientific purposes, the equipment must be changed. There are also high ranking officials in Latvia who would like to see this unique antenna turned into ashes and dust, because this is what some foreign services have supposedly recommended.

However, delays can be foreseen in the preparation of the administrative resolution bills. It will be a major job, and, in my opinion, after just one year, it is doubtful whether we will have all of the administrative resolutions in order for a property to be legally registered, etc.

Insatiable ministries are swallowing up plans and priorities.

[Berzins] Four years have already elapsed since Latvia declared independence. Soon, it will be three years since Latvia was recognized as independent. After half of a century, the foreign army is finally leaving, but only now, at the last minute, we are starting to worry about what to do with the Latvian land and the buildings constructed on this land for military purposes. We are looking for owners. Haven't we composed any sort of comprehensive program?

[Pavilonis] There are no comprehensive programs. When the commission on the takeover of military facilities has examined the case agreed upon, the question may be raised: what do you intend to do in this facility? And this does not happen every time.

[Berzins] This question doesn't have to be raised? If no one else wants it, then just take it away?

[Pavilonis] Yes. But, if there is more than one contender, then each is asked what he intends to do there.

[Berzins] Is it possible that there are some good facilities that no one wants?

[Pavilonis] There are some. Then basically the Supreme Council's resolution is in effect that the municipality must provide protection.

[Berzins] Even if that means from now until eternity?

[Pavilonis] Let the municipality decide how to manage it.

[Berzins] But then it would manage everything which happened to be in its territory, as, for example, the cooperative and state cooperative farms, which appear to be unnecessary at present.

[Pavilonis] If no one wants to take over a facility, then the Russians could be requested to take down the facility and plant grass. A green meadow would be left behind.

[Berzins] Of course you can ask, but will they do it? And even if they would take it down, who will have the nerve to ask them, when everyone is celebrating that "Thank God! They're finally gone!" Let's keep them here, so they can dawdle with the demolition?...

[Pavilonis] In some cases, it was headed in that direction. The Ventspils military unit vacated the territory, but the Ventspils municipal government did not want to receive this territory, if it was not included as a property owner. However, this land belongs to the state.

[Berzins] It seems as though we have not had enough time to resolve these and other sticky questions. But then, while all details may not be worked out, we could at least form a general conceptual program...

[Upmalis] Such a program has been very difficult, if not impossible, to set up because the ministries and municipalities have been so greedy. In the beginning, when these facilities were still very far from being turned over, all of the ministries presented their proposals and requested so many facilities that, when they reached the stage of actual takeover and examined them with their own eyes, they understood: the territory is enormously large, and they would have to pay taxes on it, and so, at the very last moment, they started to refuse these facilities.

And all of our plans—we had beautiful plans!—were gone with the wind. For example, the Ministry of Defense was given absolute priority, and some others were also given priority. But now, the Ministry of Defense has refused, on more than one occasion, to accept facilities, which have been turned over already, and now, we don't know what to do with these facilities. I like the Daugavpils fortress, for example, and that is not the only one. In the Naujene rural district, close to Daugavpils, there is also a military facility that was requested by the Ministry of Defense, but then refused. After that, the Ministry of Internal Affairs refused it. In the end, after this facility was already ransacked, when there was no longer anything there, it was graciously offered to the municipality. But Mr. Geiba said: "Nothing can be done there anymore, so we are also refusing to take it".

The point is reached that a facility literally goes to ruin because of irresponsibility. That is what happened with Vainode airport, as well. If they had not granted the request by the Ministry of Transportation to be assigned this facility, without asking the Ministry of Transportation what it wanted to do with the Vainode airport, then, in my opinion, it may have been possible to save this facility. Now it has been totally ransacked, and a large number of residential buildings stand empty and destroyed. It all looks very sad. That is what happens when a ministry agrees to accept something, but when it is necessary to start managing the property, it is unable to do so.

[Pavilonis] The saddest aspect is that the residential buildings remain uninhabited. We see and hear in Riga that many have no place to live. But, there, they have large five story buildings remaining empty and going to ruin.

[Berzins] The misfortune lies in that the Russians could not take them along, and we cannot take them to Riga. Nor to some city closer.

[Pavilonis] And why not. Vietumis does that: the construction company can take apart a large five story panel building, bring it closer to the city and "set" it up. I am not sure what this accomplishes, but at least the materials don't have to be assembled from scratch.

In Paplaka, already quite some time ago, the municipality inherited large residential buildings that were unwanted by everyone. They said:—We don't have anyone to put in them, because, for the majority, we have our own private homes.

Private firms, fighting for a place in the sun, have a propensity for buying former military facilities from the Russian Army.

[Berzins] But you are saying that all types of illegal actions are occurring, court hearings, one company, wanting to get in, chases out another one, which happens to be there already...

[Upmalis] Some of the returned facilities have been bought up by firms, which none of the Latvian institutions have been unable to determine what type of company they are.

For example, what is Lat-West-East, which has purchased a petroleum base still containing an army unit from Russia, and the sales contract states that this army unit can remain in Latvia and on the firm's territory, until such time that Russia decides to remove its Army from there. In such a case, who decides whether the Russian Army can be present here in Latvia? The administration of Latvia, Russia, or the firm? And, unfortunately, we are unable to do anything concrete. The only thing was when members of this military unit, which is located in the Viesturs Prospect petroleum base, and is owned by Lat-West-East, came to me and asked if I

would please issue them driving permits for their automobiles, so that they could perform their routine activities, and I replied:—You sold your territory, and you no longer have any here.

There are very many similar occurrences.

Furthermore, it is still possible for firms to purchase a facility from the Army, and backdate the sale. This is because it is still not down in writing that firms must register and notarize the contracts for the sale of these facilities.

If you are a military unit commander and you have a seal, and I am a firm representative and I have a seal, and we perform the sales transaction using sales checks, then we would have no problem concluding a document dated, for example, August 1, 1991.

If everything has been performed to the letter of the law, plus, if the firm at that time was registered in the Latvian Registry of Businesses, then, in my opinion, no Latvian legal institution will be able to prove that this was an illegal action.

There is another painful matter that I would like to focus attention on: various firms that manufacture firearms have turned up in Latvia.

I am still uncertain about the licensing of such firms. One has moved in to an army manufacturing plant, which remains unreturned. It has made the purchase from Russia, and in quite an unusual manner. As we know, all manufacturing plants in Russia are part of the State Property Fund (SPF). That is not a military structure. Thus, the firm has made its purchase not from the Army, but from Russia's SPF. Thus, it would seem that SPF has property in Latvia, since it is able to make the sale.

With respect to the firm La Con, in the Daugavgriva fortress territory, which, according to our views, is not operating in conformity with the laws of Latvia, we have submitted materials to the prosecutor's office for review. Our bureau does not have the right to review—legally or illegally. We have not yet received the findings from the prosecutor, although we have in our possession agreements concluded between the firm and the Latvian naval forces on the use of the facility for 15 years. The facility is assigned to the Ministry of Defense, but the naval forces have already managed to conclude an agreement with the firm, without organizing any competitions, which they should have done. Many firms have signed up for this Daugavgriva port territory.

[Berzins] What is the major attraction there?

[Upmalis] Undoubtedly, the port. Agreements have been concluded with the blessings of the commander of the naval forces without, as far as I can tell, coordination with the Ministry of Defense. We can "thank" Mr. Zeibots, Mr. Zingis and the rest of the leading workers for this. This is no surprise, because the firm has a high ranking "benefactor", who is in the practice of lobbying.

He is Mr. Kaza, who is attempting to support this firm with all sorts of means. I have a list of its founders. It was founded by the tradition principle: at the forefront is a person of Latvian nationality, who is a citizen, and all the rest—people of Russian nationality. That is the traditional manner for companies. They say that the list of founders was later amplified with the name of Mr. Kaza.

I am most concerned in these cases, because they are not holding competitions on the basis of the business plan, as defined by the law.

This company, unfortunately, has taken down many major buildings which are still in unassigned territory.

I could mention many, many facilities for which the concluded actions will have to be reviewed by the prosecutor's office in time. This is because the documents concerning these actions, which we have available to us on the respective facility takeover, and those—most interestingly!—which the firms have not submitted, are, in our opinion, not too clean.

At one time, we had the plenary powers of the entire Council of Ministers, now we have only one—the plenary power of the Ministry of Defense, and that is too little for us to be able to control the conclusion of all these actions. We also do not have to right to use sanctions against firms that pursue illegal actions.

Often with the help of a high ranking person, they go around the bureau, and have various ministries do the resolving, in accordance with their own views.

The bureau is not involved with the takeover of facilities. The bureau is concerned with the control of facility takeovers—how they are turned over.

The commission led by Mr. Kosisis,—the commission on the takeover of military facilities from the military forces of the Russian Federation, can also only make recommendations, and on the basis of such, the Cabinet of Ministers adopts resolutions on the utilization of such a facility.

Only they understand

[Berzins] Can we assume that the bureau has a complete picture of the Russian military units and military facilities still remaining in Latvia?

[Pavilonis] Yes. All have been accounted for and entered in the records. Nevertheless, there are times when some military unit shows up which is not in our records. Either it had been very well hidden, or was newly formed. That happened when the 15th Air Army Headquarters at 55 Brivibas Street was eliminated. The military personnel remaining in Latvia relocated to Skulte airfield, where a new military unit was formed. Such a trick had not been anticipated in our documents.

[Berzins] Do they come to you for driving permits?

[Pavilonis] Not only that. If, for example, officers need to cross the border, drive somewhere on official business, they come to us for a permit. Permits to relocate automobiles. To bring out property. In this manner, we learn that a new unit has formed. This has been a rare occurrence recently. Thus, we have to assume that all of the military units present in Latvia have been accounted for.

[Berzins] When did it become clear that everything was included?

[Pavilonis] Two years ago, when the bureau started its work, two thirds of the military forces were known. The remaining third was accounted for in six months time.

When we started working, all units present in Latvia were considered to be secret. The Russian Army would not give any lists. When we could say: here you have such a military unit, there—that type, when we brought all ends together, only then did the veil of secrecy fall away. Recently they released a formerly highly secret document—a summary of how many military units have been in Latvia since 1940. And not only military units, but also equivalent units—institutions with various names which did not have a military unit number, but were simply issued a number. However, they have not admitted that the secret units with box office box numbers are theirs.

[Berzins] Then who do they belong to?

[Pavilonis] We are now trying to find out who started issuing post office box numbers for secret workshops and secret factories. Our bureau does not have extensive materials on the post office box factories.

[Berzins] But don't the factories exist? And what about their products?

[Pavilonis] The factories exist, but the products, which required the "post office boxes", have not been manufactured for a long time. There were secret workshops in VEF, Komutators, the Liepaja agriculture machinery factory, and many other places. As soon as ownership of the All-Union factories was turned over to the Republic of Latvia, the manufacture of military products was discontinued.

[Berzins] Minor battles are being waged over the special military factories.

[Pavilonis] We have to find a compromise. If both sides refuse to budge from their positions, then the factory will be ransacked. The Russian Army is secretly bringing out the major machinery. If they cannot manage to get it across the border, they sell it to some commercial concern, and the factory is left unable to function.

[Berzins] But maybe there is nothing wrong with bringing the machinery out. Let them do it in full force—there won't be anything for the followers of Interfront to rally behind. The Latvian Army, most

likely, will never have that many tanks to keep a factory busy doing repairs at full capacity for a whole growing season.

[Pavilonis] The factories that were not needed by Latvia were all low level and have already been eliminated. But there are also those, which can be utilized expediently, and which have relatively modern equipment. It is economically more practical to save them, instead of eliminating them.

[Berzins] But we already have factories standing, which cannot produce anything substantial. What good will it do to have additional factories?

[Pavilonis] While the products of Latvia's industries have remained in warehouses until now, none of the military factories have full warehouses. Everything was sold. Their products were not only for the needs of the military units, but also goods for their personal consumption. And, likewise, these did not remain in warehouses. They were either of better quality, or the management was more exacting in production, and issued only as many products as needed.

Worthy, worthless.

[Berzins] And nothing worthless will remain behind after the Russian Army leaves?

[Upmalis] There are at least three bunkers, which we don't know how to utilize. One in Adazi, in Muceniekos—two. The 15th Military Air Army Force Command Point in Muceniekos and the North Western Military Group Commander's Command Point in Adazi. They are two to three story underground buildings, containing equipment which consumes a great amount of energy to maintain suitability for occupancy—pumping out underground water, etc. There is very high electrical consumption.

[Berzins] Let Mr. Mayorov take them along.

[Upmalis] We could allow him to do that. The demolition involves major problems. Likewise, with the bunker in Muceniekos—it contains enormous amounts of reinforced concrete, all covered by soil. Should we allow it fill up with water? That is dangerous—it could cause accidents. Blow it up and then bury it? Or maybe keep it as a historical monument and turn it into a tourist attraction.

Mr. Pavilonis, however, is very economically minded—these bunkers would be suitable for mushroom cultivation, because a constant temperature and humidity can be maintained in them. The problem is that there are many bunkers and only one vegetable farming company, Riga, which would not be able to manage everything. If only there were funds to install an appropriate boiler system—the one built by the Army is too large to use for such purposes.

[Berzins] Aren't there also doubts about utilizing the formerly Baltic Military District, now North Western

Military Group's *Pentagon* (read—headquarters—V.B.) building for Latvian army purposes—even though a huge quantity of all types of listening devices remain planted there?

[Upmalis] We will have a great deal of problems with it. But how can you compare listening devices with live KGB agents, who are employed by our leading firms?!

[Berzins] Our Saeima, with amazing sincerity and for a long time, has been occupied with the KGB sacks and the five deputies suspected of collaboration, while several hundred KGB staff members are living high off the hog.

[Upmalis] I personally know a person who admits that he worked for the KGB. Looking at the list of a certain firm's founders, he showed me names of people he had worked with. And this is a very famous firm's founders list. Thus, if these gentlemen have healthy, very powerful firms, then why talk about five Saeima deputies, who probably don't have the financial means to influence anything today. Such firms have much greater possibilities. Everyone knows that, but nothing is done about it. That is why we need a law on these KGB agents, which, I believe, we will have soon.

I like the position taken by Mr. Bojars from the very beginning: yes, I don't deny I was such, but now I work for the good of Latvia, and so, accept me for what I am. If everyone who worked there would come forward to confess, and regret his sins... Patriotism is not dependent on **where** a person worked, but, rather, on **how** he did his job, **what** he did in his place of work, and **how** he is acting at present.

[Berzins] The Pentagon on Elizabetes Street will probably leave at the very end of the withdrawal term.

[Pavilonis] The 15th Air Army Headquarters left, even though some of its military units were still here. We assume that the North Western Military Group Headquarters will do the same. In private conversations, they are saying that they won't be the last to leave their premises.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Shevardnadze Abolishes Military Police

94UM0479C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Denisov: "The Military Police Has Been Ordered To 'Live Long'"]

[Text] The military police were abolished by an order of Georgian Armed Forces Supreme Commander-in-Chief Eduard Shevardnadze as "a structure failing to meet modern requirements." The order notes that the reorganization is being carried out in order to confirm the principle of one-man command. Military policemen will be placed into the composition of motorized rifle units,

the directorate has been disbanded, and the armament and equipment are being transferred to other units.

It is interesting that the republic's National Guard remains beyond the control of the Georgian Ministry of Defense. National Guard personnel were the main striking force of the coup of winter 1991-1992, as a result of which President Zviad Gamsakhurdia was removed from power.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Military-Industrial Complex Course Charted

944K1522A Almaty KAZAKHISTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 18 Jun 94 p 1

[KazTAG report: "A Planned Basis and Dynamism for the Development of the Defense Complex"]

[Text] A session of the Security Council was held on 16 June under the chairmanship of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The questions "Status of the Provision of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan With Equipment and Arms and Their Supply With Material and Technical Resources" and "Concepts of the Formation and Execution of Long-Term Defense Programs and the Development of the Defense Complex of the Republic of Kazakhstan" were considered. Reports were presented by General of the Army Sagadat Nurmagambetov, minister of defense, and Mars Urkumbayev, minister of economics.

Considering the difficult economic situation that has taken shape in the country, it was observed at the session, the Ministry of Defense and the corresponding departments are doing much to provide the troops with everything necessary and are using the allocated funds in extremely economical fashion. The arms and the pool of combat equipment of the units and combined units are being replenished mainly from the Russian Federation and Ukraine, in accordance with a number of agreements signed at chief of state level. But in practice the solution of these questions is attended by great difficulties. And it is necessary for overcoming them, a number of speakers believe, to exclude the services of middlemen, who are concerned primarily for their own profits, and to create an interstate conciliation commission for reciprocal military supplies within the framework of the CIS.

There was a detailed analysis also of the degree of provision of all branches and arms of the service with equipment and arms, fuel and lubricants, clothing and related gear, and food. Together with the positive aspects, there are many problems here also. Specifically, a particular quantity of the equipment of the radiotechnical troops, whose service life will expire in the very near future, of certain units of the air defense of major cities and industrial facilities is in need of replacement. There needs to be an improvement in the provision of the aviation units with fuel for the pilots to be afforded

an opportunity to complete the prescribed minimum number of flight hours logged to maintain and [word illegible] their professional expertise.

Of the armies of the Commonwealth countries, the men of Kazakhstan are the best supplied with food. But this is far from being the case when it comes to clothing and related gear. This applies particularly to the officer corps. In order to rectify matters, it is necessary, it was said at the session, to change the production structure or create in the republic our own enterprises for sewing military uniforms and making load-carrying harnesses and field gear. And when it comes to providing the troops with everything necessary, it is important to exercise stricter supervision of the fulfillment of the government defense order.

As the minister of defense reported, despite the objective difficulties, the Armed Forces are capable as of this time of tackling the assignments pertaining to assurance of the security of our state.

Mars Urkumayev considers it necessary to cooperate more actively in the solution of defense questions with countries of the CIS and the far abroad, to alter the production structure of our own industry for military needs, and to assure the precise work of the operating defense enterprises manufacturing the product necessary for the normal activity of the republic's army.

The exchange of opinions was summed up by Nursultan Nazarbayev. We must clearly make up our minds as to what kind of army and in what numbers we need, he said. We need to solve immediately all questions connected with supplies to the Armed Forces and to reduce as much as possible imports of military products from outside and, as far as possible, make them ourselves.

The head of state set the task of the creation within a week of a military industry commission. Its chairman will be directly responsible for the state of affairs in this important sector providing for the sure defense capability of our sovereign state.

In its decision the Security Council approved the concept of the formation and execution of long-term defense programs and the development of the defense complex. It also confirmed certain changes in its composition. Specifically, Bulat Bayekenov was appointed secretary of the council.

Abish Kekilbayev, chairman of the Supreme Council, First Deputy Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, deputy prime ministers Galym Abilsiitov and Asygat Zhabagin, leaders of a number of ministries and departments, and senior officials of the staff of the president and the Cabinet of Ministers took part in the session.

ARMS TRADE

Lt. Gen. Hnatenko Interviewed on Ukraine's Arms Trade Opportunities

94UM0444 Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
21 May 94 p 2

[Interview with First Deputy Chief of Weaponry and Chief of Staff for Weaponry of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Lieutenant-General Lev Mykolayovych Hnatenko by Valeriy Korol under the rubric: "The Arsenal of Ukraine: Today and the Future": "Even a Hero Is Weak Without Weapons"]

[Text] *The USSR and the United States once manufactured weapons independently in a self-contained cycle. Today, after the collapse of the empire, Russia, its legal successor, is trying to maintain the production and sale of weapons in the world market. How does Ukraine look against that background today? Our correspondent discusses that with Lieutenant-General Lev Hnatenko, first deputy chief of weaponry and chief of staff for weaponry of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.*

[V. Korol] Lev Mykolayovych, what is the "arsenal" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine today, is there enough powder for our "powderhorns"?

[L.M. Hnatenko] The Ukrainian Army is not experiencing any particular lack of weaponry or hardware. All of these are moreover the latest models, which were in service at one time with the weaponry of the former Soviet Army. What sort of arms are they? For example, T-64, T-72 and T-80 tanks, BMP-1, BMP-2, BTR-70 and BTR-80 combat vehicles, MiG-29 and Su-27 aircraft, S-200 and S-300 air-defense systems... This list could go on. The Navy actually does not have an adequate quantity of vessels. I hope that this problem, however, will be solved in the next few years. That portion of the Black Sea Fleet that goes to Ukraine will give us the opportunity of creating a powerful navy in the future. Approximately ten of the latest ships in various classes have also been laid down at Ukrainian shipyards.

[V. Korol] Even if the Army is equipped with the latest models of weaponry and hardware, it is still necessary to prepare for their replacement...

[L.M. Hnatenko] Yes, and there are many ways of resolving that problem—first, the creation of new models of weaponry; second, the upgrading of existing weaponry in order to increase its combat potential; and, third, procurements abroad.

[V. Korol] Which way is the most favorable for Ukraine?

[L.M. Hnatenko] We are now developing two state programs for the creation of weaponry. Minister of Defense General of the Army of Ukraine V. Radetsky is devoting the most steadfast attention to them. One of the programs is intended for the period to the year 2000, and the other for the long term, to the year 2010. They are

oriented toward bringing us as close as possible to a self-contained cycle for the production of weaponry and military hardware.

Ukraine unfortunately had almost no assembly plants. Our enterprises manufactured close to 30 percent of various elements and constituent items for weaponry and military hardware. We will thus obviously not have the capability of manufacturing all of these arms independently in the very near future. The solution of the problem of upgrading the weaponry and hardware will be pursued in comprehensive fashion—partly through the development and manufacture of our own weaponry, and partly through procurements abroad and, ultimately, the upgrading of existing models in cooperation with the CIS countries. You cannot get away from cooperation in this case, since most of the design bureaus are located on Russian territory. The solution of the problem of modernization is extremely difficult, and sometimes even virtually impossible, without the technical documentation they have and the necessary coordination.

We are also now developing a special program for the modernization of weaponry. We are studying the experience of its operation in the field, which suggests certain solutions pertaining to its further improvement. We are making attempts to set up, as I was saying, joint scientific research with the KBs [design bureaus] that created these or those models. We are carefully studying similar processes in the armies of other countries at the same time. The experience of Israel, which is upgrading the MiG-21 aircraft and giving it better qualitative features, for example, is very useful.

[V. Korol] But Lev Mykolayovych, Ukraine has strong scientific and production potential that is working for the Army...

[L.M. Hnatenko] Undoubtedly. The first evidence of that, for example, are the products from the Plant imeni Malyshev. It put out the T-34 tanks—the best in the world at one time—and the T-64 also came out of its gates. It is now "bringing to the surface" the T-80 UD tank, which has already won recognition among the military of many countries around the world. The plant also has long-term projects in the corresponding weaponry. The enterprise is also facing great financial problems today.

Another giant of the defense industry, the ANTK imeni O. Antonov, on the contrary, is on the rise today. The An-70 aircraft created by that collective has no analogue in the world among aircraft in its class. The aircraft will be in series production in the near future, and almost 40 countries from around the world have displayed an interest in acquiring it.

Ukraine has great capabilities—and they are being realized—in shipbuilding. We can build the smallest vessels to missile cruisers.

We have also traditionally been strong in electronics, and in radio and instrument building. The appropriate financing is essential so that we do not lose those positions...

[V. Korol] Financing—the Achilles heel of our existence...

[L.M. Hnatenko] The Army has lived without a budget for two years, and only pay and food are being financed. The situation has changed little this year as well, even though a budget was approved. It provides, as before, for the pay and food for servicemen. We are getting virtually no budget funds for the development of weaponry and hardware.

[V. Korol] But there is also extrabudgetary financing...

[L.M. Hnatenko] Yes, for example, the sale of military property and hardware or arms, the offering of various types of technical services... The funds obtained from that, however, unfortunately go not for weaponry, but to pay for various debts of our department, the procurement of foodstuffs, medicines, fuels and lubricants etc.

Not a single kopeck from extrabudgetary funds has been directed to the development of weaponry for two years. The sense of seeking out extrabudgetary receipts thus is lost, and our reserves for selling are finally being exhausted; there is nothing with which to replace them so far.

We can sell property and hardware that has exhausted its service life to the public. The department is flooded with such requests. A mechanism for such sales has unfortunately not been devised—it is not known who should do the selling, who should receive the money, how the documents should be drawn up. The Cabinet of Ministers has to make the appropriate decisions.

[V. Korol] Lev Mykolayovych, the question of the gathering of by-products that contain precious metals has not been resolved for a long time as well. That would also be considerable funds...

[L.M. Hnatenko] For the simplest of reasons—the Ministry of Defense did not have a structure that would be occupied with that. A department has now been created under the weapons staff for the gathering and processing of precious metals and minerals. The staffers of that department have performed an inventory of most of the units, and have developed a system for gathering scrap that contains precious metals. A new plant was also finally launched at Pivdenmash in May for the processing of precious metals. I very much hope that at least some of the funds that are received from the sale of those products will go to the development of weaponry.

[V. Korol] The state order for 1995 is being developed at the Ministry of Defense today. How is it being fulfilled this year?

[L.M. Hnatenko] The Ministry of Defense formulated the state order for 1994 in good time. The procurement

of weaponry was moreover in a certain order in the documents that were submitted by our department, in conjunction with the Ministry of Economics, for the consideration of the Cabinet of Ministers. But the money was not allocated for specific line items, as was envisaged, but rather as an overall sum for everything at once—foodstuffs, medicine, weaponry etc.; divide it up yourselves, they said. So only eight percent of the necessary amount was allocated for the procurement of weaponry this year. Those appropriations, moreover, did not take into account our debt to the defense industry for 1993. We were forced to cover it from the budgetary funds for this year.

[V. Korol] What is the way out of the situation that has developed?

[L.M. Hnatenko] There is one way out in this case—additional financing. The Ministry of Defense [MO] has sent the appropriate documents to the Cabinet of Ministers.

Our department, despite the financial difficulties, is already working on drawing up the state order for 1995.

[V. Korol] Have the financial difficulties also obviously strongly affected the state of military science? Is it realistic to hope for substantial achievements from the country's military scientists in such a state?

[L.M. Hnatenko] The scientific potential of Ukraine, including military, is one of the strongest in the former USSR. It is in a pitiful state today. Appropriations of 15 percent of the necessary amount were allocated for this year to the Committee for Scientific Research and Experimental Design of the MO. Those funds are moreover being received very irregularly. And if there is no money, then the science schools will collapse, and many design bureaus will be cut back by 30–40 percent. The outflow of scientists is 50–70 percent for projects in high, science-intensive technologies. The number of staffers at the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine who are occupied with military sciences has been reduced from 25 to seven percent over the last two years. That is a catastrophe. We could lose military science.

The Ministry of Defense is doing everything possible to see that this does not happen. "We have developed 28 programs of scientific research and experimental design, despite all of the difficulties. They are all directed toward the development of weaponry and hardware.

[V. Korol] Perhaps it would be worthwhile, in that case, to designate a few of the 28 projects as the most important ones, and to subsidize at least those in full?

[L.M. Hnatenko] Such proposals, as you know, come from the scientists themselves as well. That is an entirely acceptable solution at first glance. By supporting a few collectives, however, we risk losing the rest. Losing them forever. Continuity, after all, is very important in science. We can never, having ruined them, restore any special areas or science schools.

[V. Korol] There were large proving grounds in the former Union for trying out new models of weaponry. Where will Ukrainian innovations be tested?

[L.M. Hnatenko] We unfortunately have available only certain elements of scientific-research proving grounds and testing centers, which came to us as our inheritance from the former USSR. We want to create a unified state scientific-research proving ground that would include all of the leading test sites. Specialists from the Main Directorate for Science, Development and Testing that was recently created in the Ministry of Defense are currently engaged in the creation of a mock-up of such a proving ground.

[V. Korol] But if we find the territory to test models of conventional weaponry, where will we be able to test missiles? Where and when will we be able to launch the first Ukrainian satellite?

[L.M. Hnatenko] The launch of the satellite—it will be the SICH-1 satellite—is planned for the end of 1995 or the beginning of 1996. It will be put into orbit by a launch vehicle that was manufactured at enterprises in Ukraine in cooperation with Russian plants and design bureaus. The satellite is intended for remote sounding of the Earth. Its launch will begin the practical realization of the national space program. The interests of the armed forces of Ukraine will be taken into account without fail in the fulfillment of that program as well.

There are no test ranges for the launch of satellites from Ukraine. We thus intend to restore disrupted ties within the confines of the CIS, and with Russia and Kazakhstan in particular. We are making efforts, at the same time, to set up cooperation with the space agencies of a number of European countries.

The Ministry of Defense is planning to sign a "framework" agreement with Kazakhstan on space. They have a cosmodrome and we have rockets, after all. Many Ukrainians are working and serving at Baykonur, and they once expressed the desire to foster the realization of the Ukrainian space program. Kazakhstan, however, as it has turned out, is not able to maintain such a unique space facility alone. Russia, which has leased Baykonur, could do it. If we do not arrange cooperation on this question with Russia, the fulfillment of our program will be much more complicated.

[V. Korol] Lev Mykolayovych, perhaps a last question. I am convinced that we will surmount all of the difficulties and create new weaponry for our Army. Will we be able to break into the international market by that time?

[L.M. Hnatenko] We are not expecting a cloudless future. Our first swallows will soon appear at international military-trade exhibitions. A mock-up of the T-80 UD tank has been prepared, for example, for an exhibition this summer in Saudi Arabia. Other models are being prepared for the exhibition as well.

We are planning to launch a permanent exhibition in Kiev as well. The location has not yet been determined—several options are still under consideration. One of them is at Darnytsya. Models could be seen in action there, on the proving ground of the Darnytsya Tank Repair Plant.

We are, finally, hoping to issue a series of advertising booklets in the very near future. Then the whole world will be able to find out about our achievements and capabilities.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Military Medics Lack Funds To Buy Conversion Products

94UM0483A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Volkov: "Russian Defense Industry Aids Military Medics"]

[Text] Enterprises of the military-industrial complex demonstrated medical equipment, tools and instruments created within the framework of conversion at an expanded plenum of the scientific medical council of the RF Ministry of Defense's Main Military Medical Directorate, held in the Military Medical Academy.

Enterprises of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the State Committee for Defense Industry, Arzamas-16, LOMO [Leningrad Optical-Mechanical Association], the Az NPF Joint-Stock Company and many others offered their products. The exposition of Russian defense industry enterprises evoked high interest among the plenum's participants. Unfortunately military medicine is presently experiencing the same financial difficulties as civilian medicine, which is why the interest displayed by the majority was purely academic.

St Petersburg FSK Foils Enriched Uranium Sale

94UM0483B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jun 94 p 1

[News release by the Public Relations Center of the RF FSK: "Uranium Merchants Taken Red-Handed"]

[Text] The regional service of the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service] in St. Petersburg identified and detained a group of persons attempting to market over 3 kilograms of highly enriched uranium dioxide through an illegal deal.

An investigation established that this radioactive substance had been stolen from one of the enterprises of the Ministry of Atomic Industry near Moscow. The traders in strategic raw materials intended to sell the uranium, including abroad. A criminal case was instituted on the basis of this incident.

Eighteen MiG-29s Sold to Malaysia

94UM0483C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by Valentin Rudenko: "Russian MiGs 'Breach' the Malaysian Market"]

[Text] Difficult negotiations on the sale of 18 frontline MiG-29 fighters to Malaysia went on for more than 2 years. And even when it seemed as if all of the details had sorted themselves out (recall the well known statement by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahqthir bin Mohamad at the end of last year at the "Lima-93" International Naval and Aerospace Exhibition: "It's almost a done deal, and it's already time to order the champagne") suddenly some new sort of circumstances appeared, and signing of the contract was postponed indefinitely.

Sad as it may be to say this, but not only American firms, which have offered Malaysia the latest F/A-18 airplanes almost at dumping prices, but also Russian firms and even private individuals, which have literally besieged this country's government and military structures with assurances to one and all that they in particular had been granted the right to sell the MiGs, made their contribution to causing this deal to occur as late as possible and at the least advantage for us. According to the journal BROOKINGS REVIEW around 20 such firms visited Malaysia over a short period of time. The newspaper ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI asserts that there were 50 of them.

And in the meantime the exclusive right to conduct negotiations and sign a contract to deliver MiG-29 fighters to Malaysia was granted by a decision of the government of the Russian Federation to the Moscow Aviation Production Association. And it was precisely owing to the persistent and purposeful work by specialists of this association, as well as of the Rosvooruzheniye State Arms and Military Equipment Export and Import Company, with which the Moscow Aviation Production Association worked in close contact, that such a contract came into being. It is estimated at an amount on the order of \$600 million U.S. The initial proposal was to pay half of the contract with deliveries of palm oil. But as a result of negotiations conducted by First Deputy Chairman of the Government Oleg Soskovets, who headed the Russian government delegation that was to sign the contract, and his Malaysian colleague Anwar ibn Ibrahim, only a fourth of the value of the contract will be compensated with palm oil.

The first MiG-29 is to be delivered to Malaysia in April 1995. The issue of creating a special technical center to service our fighters is presently being considered.

Malaysian Defense Minister Mohamed Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak called the MiG contract "the largest deal with Russia," and expressed interest in developing military and technical cooperation further.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Danilevich et al on Development, Problems of Military Science

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[Individual articles by Colonel General A. A. Danilevich, candidate of military sciences; Major General (Reserve) Yu. Ya. Kirshin, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor; Major General V. I. Slipchenko, doctor of military sciences, professor, corresponding member, Russian Federation Academy of Natural Sciences; and Colonel O. A. Belkov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "Abrupt Conceptual Change or Deformation of the Past? (On Development and Problems of Russian Military Science)"]

[Text] VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 9, 1993 published an account about a conference held in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Military History Institute. The question discussed was on the place of military historical science in day to day activity of the Russian Armed Forces, which caught the interest of many of our readers. Fulfilling their numerous wishes, the editors asked specialists for their opinions on this problem. At the same time, we do not consider the materials published below to be indisputable and suggest that readers continue the discussion.

The present state of Russian military science could be characterized by one word—crisis. It stands to reason that this relates not only to the area of military knowledge, but to all other social sciences as well: philosophy, political economy, political science, history and so on. All are experiencing a period of profound conceptual change. The previous scientific-methodological base is collapsing and basic views and many fundamental aims and propositions are being revised. Seemingly settled and unshakable categories and concepts are being swept aside to be replaced by new ones in a number of cases, but a void often forms in their place. Thus, a very complicated, contradictory process is going on in which both negative as well as positive trends, and elements both of growth and of decline are interwoven.

This clearly reflects characteristic features of Russian society's present development: the country's difficult situation, confused public thinking, loss of precise reference points and of the majority of previous values, painful transition to new economic relations, exacerbation of internal struggle, a change in the foreign policy course and a reorientation of very important military doctrinal aims. Hence also the vagueness of development of military-theoretical thought.

In the history of Russian military science this is not the first sharp turn caused by radical transformations in politics and in the material means of warfare. The October Revolution became one of the first critical,

destructive stages, but at that time Soviet military science, the successor of previous traditions, still was able to create the nucleus of rational Russian military scientific aims by relying on what had been achieved in the past, was able to rework them with consideration of the altered historical conditions, and on this basis was able to achieve a high level of development, which helped us win the supreme victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Will the crisis in military science be overcome now? Evidently it will, but it is also obvious that this process in all likelihood will be more painful and will stretch out for a lengthy time. The present crisis in military science is extremely distinctive. At any rate, it is dictated by a very complex set of closely interwoven political, economic, ideological and strictly military reasons, by very profound changes for the better in the entire world military-political situation and, most important, by the intensive reideologization of the majority of aims and views. In cleaning communist dogmas from military science, modern theorists persistently try to reorient it toward standards of a new ideology. At times not just irrational, but also many rational kernels and true propositions are tossed overboard if they are based on Marxist dialectics or are linked with the names of classics of Marxism-Leninism and their statements, regardless of whether or not they meet the truth and actual practice. Doubt often is cast even on obvious things, particularly propositions about the essence of war as a continuation of politics by other, violent means, on the class sources of wars, on dependence of methods of waging war on methods of production and so on, although the truth of these propositions is confirmed clearly both by a millennium of experience as well as by everyday life. Almost all Soviet military history is being defamed. Instead of filling in the gaps in our country's history, many heroic pages of our past often are blackened. The very concept of "Soviet," "socialist" military science is refuted, just as is that of "bourgeois" military science, on the grounds that any truth is abstract, independent and international, although it is known that various social groups interpret many provisions of social sciences from their own standpoints, relying on different methodological principles. Doubt also is cast on the national character of military science, particularly the legitimacy of existence of a strictly Russian military science, in view of the fact that military knowledge knows no boundaries. The influence of national traditions and traits, which inevitably are reflected in the direction of military theory and practice and especially in the character of military organizational development, military strategy, operational art and tactics, is ignored, not to mention that it is impossible to separate military science from specific military thinkers, theorists and practitioners of military affairs and from their national soil.

It is without question that it would be incorrect to idealize Soviet military science and regard it as exceptional, sinless, and free of shortcomings and mistakes. Soviet military thinking interpreted many questions in a biased, tendentious, oversimplified manner, primarily

from a class standpoint, giving little regard to other objective factors. Nevertheless, only it (with appropriate corrections, of course) can become the basis of modern Russian military science, which always essentially was its main nucleus.

The crisis of Russian military science is being aggravated now by decreased interest in basic military-theoretical research and by attempts at substituting chiefly applied and momentary short-term developments for it. In the future this is fraught with serious miscalculations, loss of a general course, and a general lag in studying fundamental problems of military affairs, of ensuring national security and of strengthening the country's defense. A serious danger also is being created in connection with the sharp reduction in financing of military science and RDT&E and in connection with leading Ministry of Defense scientific research establishments being bled dry from the drain of skilled cadres. As a result, science's potential and capabilities are narrowing and timely, full-fledged development of military science problems demanding high professionalism and appropriate funds and time is being impeded.

Of course, with all this one cannot help but admit that Russian military science lately has succeeded in solving a number of important problems, moving forward in the study of new trends in development of military affairs, delving more deeply into problems of preventing war, and creating a scientific base for producing a new Russian military doctrine. But these achievements are relative and quite incommensurable with the enormous volume of problems which still must be solved. I would like to single out the following among the large number of problems facing Russian military science.

Evidently it is necessary to move away from the past narrowed interpretation of military science, which limited its subject only to one aspect of war, armed warfare, and that in a strictly professional sense. Obviously, war as a whole must become the subject of military science as a specific social phenomenon, including all its aspects and inner relations and new forms of warfare. This of course does not preclude the study of specific elements and components of war by other sciences, but their comprehensive study also is required, which can contribute to a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of war and to a revelation of its logical patterns, reasons for appearance, course and outcome.

Clarification of interrelationships of military science with other sciences and military art, and especially with military doctrine, is gaining urgency at the present time. This is determined by the fact that already now an intensive process is under way in the majority of world states for revising and reworking military doctrines. This is linked with global improvements in the disposition and correlation of world military-political forces. Radical changes in the direction of Russia's policy and new conditions for ensuring international and national security cannot help but affect all spheres of states' political and military activity. The Russian Federation presently

has adopted a fundamentally new military doctrine, but its scientific substantiation and, most important, development of rational mechanisms for its realization are required.

Military doctrine relies on conclusions of military science in one way or another. Depending on the extent to which this is supported, military doctrine may be progressive (vital) or adventuristic (faulty). Progressive military doctrine usually is built on a firm scientific foundation; adventuristic military doctrine, submitting to the aims of politics, most often ignores the demands of military science and is founded on attendant factors. Such military doctrine, however, cannot reliably guarantee either a state's security or attainment of other military-political goals. Therefore sooner or later it leads to military collapse, as happened with fascist Germany.

The Russian Federation military doctrine presently adopted as a result of lengthy, strenuous work is scientific in its basis, but its theoretical substantiation has not yet been completed. Specific principles of implementing basic provisions also have not been developed; moreover, some are not distinguished by clarity and definiteness, are at times abstract and are outlined with insufficient precision. This relates in particular to the classification of possible wars and military clashes, to an assessment of the nature of military danger and probable military threats, and to a determination of methods of deterring and routing an aggressor. It is asserted that Russia has no enemies, but Russia is forced to reckon with a broad set of hypothetically dangerous actions. Politically this is understandable, but from a theoretical and practical aspect this is tantamount to admitting that all states may be potential enemies of Russia, not to mention that reality is ignored with that statement of the matter. Most important, it is impossible to conduct military organizational development and prepare armed forces purposefully, since it is impossible to build them regardless of with what means, against whom and under what conditions they may be employed. Military science must find a solution to this contradiction and come up with rational approaches to an assessment of the geopolitical and military-strategic situation; to an analysis of military threats, the sources and causes of war, and measures for preventing it; and to principles of waging war against an aggressor who is pursuing particular goals and possesses a varying military-technical potential.

Evidently the internal structure of military science also needs refinement. A new approach to principles of the general theory of war, which until recently was artificially substituted for by the methodological base of science, is necessary in particular. It would appear that in this initial, determining division of military science it is advisable to examine the totality of general, fundamental problems of war, including its essence, content, reasons for appearance, classification, laws of development, factors determining its course and end results, and all forms of warfare being used (armed, ideological, economic,

diplomatic and so on). In our view, the opinion developed in the General Staff Military Academy is sufficiently substantiated in this respect.

Complex tasks arise in specific areas of military science, especially in theory of military art, theory of military organizational development, theory of military training and education, arms theory, military command and control theory, and in all closely related areas, above all military history.

The following are becoming very important tasks in developing the theory of military art: revealing the nature of possible wars, armed conflicts and other military clashes of varying scale and intensity both at the present time as well as in the future (for 10-15 years ahead at the very least); forecasting models of possible development of large-scale and limited wars waged using the newest and future weapon systems or only certain traditional kinds of military equipment; and revealing features of regional wars and armed conflicts. Not only must we take into account dominant traditional trends in the military-political and strategic situation and in the economic and military-technical base of warfare and means and methods of warfare, but also possible new objective and subjective factors affecting the content and forms of war as well as internal processes occurring in Russia and in the near, middle, and far abroad, new relationships forming in regions, the probability of disintegration or, conversely, unification of a number of states into regional blocs of varying orientation, and transformations of existing military-political alliances, above all NATO. A completely new page must be opened in this matter, since those wars toward which the Soviet Armed Forces oriented themselves and prepared for in the past, above all a global world war between the two world systems, now are absolutely ruled out. New forms of military clashes, insufficiently studied for now, have come to the foreground.

A theory of the modern system of armed forces operations as applied to missions of preventing war, deterring an aggressor, and being involved in medium and high intensity conflicts is to be studied comprehensively and essentially developed anew, and a finished theory of strategic and regional operations in their new conception and operations of defensive and striking forces, mobile groupings and peacekeeping forces is to be created. Special attention evidently should be given to researching methods of repelling aggression in its various forms and preparing and conducting protracted and fast-moving strategic and operational missile-air operations and joint operations of all branches, and to substantiating countries' broad military cooperation for ensuring regional and international security and organizing a collective defense and a defense designed primarily for one's own forces within limits of national boundaries or moved onto territories of neighboring friendly countries if necessary.

Fundamentally new directions are opening up in the theory of armed forces organizational development. We

are speaking of developing fundamental principles of forming and developing a Russian military organization under new conditions with the country's altered geostrategic position and transformed political, economic and military systems. The urgency of this requires no proof. Military reform is proceeding with great difficulties specifically because it was begun not with development of new theoretical principles, but with the resolution of separate, scattered practical problems and measures, with the vacillations, miscalculations and other costs inevitably stemming from this. It would appear that Russian military science has to ensure formation of a refined concept of full-scale, comprehensive military reform envisaging not particular transformations, but implementation of fundamental, radical, long-term solutions encompassing all aspects of armed forces organizational development and activity without exception.

In the area of arms theory, scientific principles of a new Russian Federation military-technical policy and corresponding military-technical concepts for the transition period and subsequent years are to be developed, figuring on a radical modernization, reduction, standardization and universalization of arms with a simultaneous significant increase in quality characteristics using the most advanced technologies. It is important to concentrate efforts on problems of creating and producing (in rational amounts) above all advanced, highly effective weapons with full factual realization of the "effectiveness-cost-time" principle and with consideration of the economy's transition to market relations, deep conversion, introduction of dual technologies and the need for establishing new scientific-technical and production ties. A scientific base thereby should be created for forming the future technical look of the Russian Armed Forces, developing more rational arms programs, and faultlessly determining priority and superpriority systems and kinds of weapons and military equipment.

Very important, labor-intensive tasks arise in the sphere of military command and control theory. The question arises of the most rapid development of principles of many-sided *perestroika* of entities, the material base and the entire armed forces command and control system in peace and wartime based on changed missions, new conditions for conducting military operations, and promising directions of military-technical progress opening up in information assets. Research and development of more effective forms and methods of command and control of troops and naval forces using new-generation automated systems and advanced communications equipment assume special significance.

Special mention must be made of military history. A new work front is opening up here connected with a reinterpretation of military-historical events of the past, with an in-depth study of World War II and the Great Patriotic War and their lessons and experience, with the development of military art, and with the study of military conflicts. At the same time, the need arises for a more thorough analysis of various military phenomena which accompanied past wars and of their immediate

and long-term consequences. A fundamental assessment both of deciding battles as well as of many local (including unfinished) operations, and an objective demonstration of all processes of war and of the real military leadership hand of military leaders of all belligerents are required with consideration of new facts and data. In this connection an objective need has matured for an urgent renewal of work to create both a multivolume history of the Great Patriotic War as well as other capital works on the history of military art and on individual problems of war. The development of military art in Russia should be researched especially. At the same time, work must be activated to study foreign military experience, and the preparation of fundamental works on the history of wars and of military art from ancient times up to our days must be organized.

In other words, we are entering a new stage of development of Russian military science, realization of which will require a sharp intensification of military-scientific work at all levels and the conduct of a set of closely interconnected, basic and applied military-political, military-theoretical and military-technical research. In accordance with this, the entire system of the scientific research structure needs reorganizing—involvement of a wide circle of skilled military cadres in performing tasks of scientific support of armed forces organizational development, evolution and employment, and genuine mobilization of the country's entire military-scientific potential. The discussion which has unfolded in the journal's pages can contribute actively to successful resolution of these problems.

Colonel General A. A. Danilevich
Candidate of Military Sciences

Philosophical problems of military theory are especially pertinent now, when Russia's national-state interests and military policy are forming and the Russian Federation Armed Forces are being reformed.

To create a modern army it is necessary to develop new ideological principles, determine basic directions, and formulate value ideals distinct from those which existed in Marxist-Leninist ideology. This task can be accomplished within the framework of various sciences, both traditional as well as embryonic: military science, military-historical science, philosophy of war, military political science, military economics, military sociology. For this it is necessary to "audit" them to establish the truth and depth of cognition of war and the Army and, most important, create new concepts meeting Russia's socio-economic and strategic situation. From this standpoint I would like to examine the interrelationship, social role and functions of totalitarian socialism and Marxism-Leninism.

Marxism-Leninism's function was to support CPSU and state political strategy theoretically, ideologically and spiritually and to protect and glorify the Communist Party and socialist system.

This task was accomplished both by developing true and truthful knowledge as well as by distorting reality and creating myths and legends. I will name some of them: world socialist revolution, dictatorship of the proletariat, complete and final victory of socialism, developed socialist, decaying capitalism, imperialism as the eve of socialist revolution, international duty, peaceful coexistence, and so on.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the Army played an important role in theoretical support of CPSU policy. This is explainable. It was impossible to achieve world socialist supremacy without armed violence and wars. Therefore the corresponding concepts, myths and legends were created here too: theory of socialist violence, absolutization of the economic factor as the source and cause of wars, concept of just wars, absence of a domestic function in socialist armies, victory with little blood, right to be first to initiate war, fight on foreign territories, victory in a nuclear war, the system of capitalism will cease to exist after a nuclear war, and so on. The very nature of the totalitarian socialist state was creating hothouse conditions for developing Marxism-Leninism and its teaching on war and the Army, and it contributed to establishment of its theoretical and organizational monopoly among all social and natural-technical sciences. It was more than the science of sciences. It was a superscience, having monopolized methodological and ideological functions with respect to all military theory.

Only party leaders and general secretaries acted as creators of Marxism-Leninism and the teaching on war and the Army. Only they could utter "truths." The CPSU created a powerful propaganda system, which forcibly introduced Marxist-Leninist ideology to the awareness of people, including Armed Forces personnel. The party created the "Iron Curtain" and isolated spiritual life and military-theoretical thinking from world spiritual values, from world military science. Party ideologues distorted scientific ideas of western scientists, falsified military history, and subjected the achievements of western military theorists to criticism using primitive arguments.

Political slogans and actual reality often contradicted each other in the Soviet Union. For example, party documents proclaimed that the socialist army performed only an external function, but practice did not conform to the myth. The army was used in putting down the Kronshtadt revolt, the Tambov uprising, and in Novochoerkassk, Vilnius, Tbilisi and Baku. Therefore the question is especially acute today: Just what is to be done when Marxism-Leninism and its teaching on war and the Army are in a state of crisis?

Marxism-Leninism cannot be reformed, just as it is impossible to reform totalitarian socialism, although its evolution is not precluded. Marxism-Leninism and its teaching on war and the Army cannot be the spiritual, theoretical basis for creating a new Russian Army. World military-philosophical and military-theoretical thought,

a great contribution to which was made by Russian and Soviet theorists, must become its basis

Marxism-Leninism contains true and false knowledge; it cannot be expunged from the history of the 19th and 20th centuries. True knowledge of the Marxist teaching on war and the Army should, in my opinion, be included in the newly forming sciences, above all the philosophy of war, military political science and military sociology. False propositions of Marxist-Leninist teaching are subject to oblivion.

A system of scientific knowledge on war and the Army was created in the Soviet Army. It needs substantial correction of course. And the most important thing in it is the replacement of Marxism-Leninism and its teaching on war and the Army with new sciences: philosophy of war, political science, sociology and its military aspects.

In my view, in forming a new system of knowledge it is advisable to remember that any science has an international character. There was no Soviet, socialist or bourgeois military science. There is no American, Russian or Ukrainian military science now. There is a single military science. But the contribution of each state's scientists to various sciences is not equivalent. One can speak of leader states and their outstanding achievements in particular areas. One people left the world more of a military-theoretical heritage, and another less. We can be proud both of the Russian as well as the Soviet military-theoretical heritage.

A correction of the scientific system of knowledge on war and the Army and formation of a new methodological base will contribute to creation of a powerful Russian Army and to a theoretical and spiritual base of a new concept for educating its officers and men.

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The importance of the problem under discussion is difficult to overestimate. Military theory is the unified ideological-methodological basis for many theories encompassing military science as a whole. As a form of scientific knowledge, military theory provides an integral conception of its fundamental principles and in particular of its important components such as object, subject, structure, boundaries, and correlation with other sciences. It is systematic in nature and quite legitimately includes other interrelated theories of those relatively independent disciplines and sectors of knowledge which are its components.

It is common knowledge that there was a period in the history of domestic military science when it was called "Soviet military science," and it was then that it was dissolved in the teaching of "Marxism-Leninism on war and the Army." As the principal object of cognition and research of military science, war was studied above all by

Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy and scientific communism. The objects of historical materialism were wars and armies in all historical epochs; objects of political economy were the interrelationships of economy, war and the Army; objects of scientific communism were revolutionary wars. And in the early 1960's a new direction also appeared—the "Marxist-Leninist teaching on protection of the socialist homeland, achievements of socialism, and communism in the process of being built."

This was one of the reasons why military science, divided up among many sciences, just was not recognized as an independent field of knowledge. And to this day there is no department of military sciences in the Russian Federation Academy of Sciences (previously the USSR Academy of Sciences).

The object of military science, war, and its subject, warfare, were defined fully correctly for military science. But it seems to me this now no longer fully reflects reality, since significant changes also occurred in the functions of armed forces. This is especially clearly visible in the new Russian Federation military doctrine recently adopted. Functions of the Armed Forces are defined here such as operational localization of the beginning of tension, stopping possible military operations, peacekeeping operations, involvement of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense troops in assisting organs of internal affairs and internal security troops, and so on. Nuclear weapons also have new functions now. They no longer are a means of conducting military operations, but have become a political tool for deterring aggression.

Thus, the subjective area of military science substantially broadened and went beyond the bounds of warfare. Perhaps for now only in the first approximation it can be called the "employment of armed forces," which would conform to these changes to a greater extent.

I agree that the new situation in Russia as well as in its Armed Forces requires resolution of long urgent problems of military theory.

The teaching of Marxism-Leninism on war and the Army considered general sociological laws and wars as a whole and was a unified methodological foundation of many sciences, including military science. Now this proposition is being revised. Basically this unified methodological foundation simply is being rejected, but nothing new is offered in its place. A distinctive vacuum has formed in military theory, which hardly will be filled by new areas of military knowledge which have appeared such as geopolitics, military political science and security theory. I would like to continue the thought connected with the study and research of military history problems. We studied this scientific discipline a long time with great distortions, since in fact military history and military art of the CPSU was studied in curricula of military educational institutions. We even looked at military history of ancient eras from this aspect. Evidently it still

is not soon that we will have an impartial military history such as it must be in reality. Not everything also is correctly stated in the methodology of research of military history problems.

As a rule, scientific methods are absent from dissertations being defended in this science. Basically there is only an enumeration of what occurred when. In the best instance, new historical documents are placed in scientific circulation, but little attention is devoted to the direct development of military science.

Major General V. I. Slipchenko

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The ideological and moral reassessment of values generated a profound, largely painful turning point in the life of the country and world, and we are its contemporaries. Society found itself in a situation where past scientific work, moral reference points and regulative standards are not working, but there are no new ones which characterize modern realities with objective precision. This has a pernicious effect on all walks of life of society and all kinds of human activity. The absence of a generally recognized system of value orientations has a devastating effect on statehood and all its attributes and institutions, including the Army.

The eroded nature of ideological principles which consolidate the state's military organization and elevate people's military activity turns the Army into a phantom, whose existence becomes a useless or even harmful waste of people's efforts and state assets.

A particular theoretical resolution of ideological, moral and ethical questions as well as rejection of any resolution of them whatsoever hardly is only of cognitive significance. It either gives the state and society reliable reference points of endeavor or directs their activity into a false channel and leads to costs and defeats. Suffice it to recall that a unilateral interpretation of conversion turned out to be not only a ruinous destruction of the military-industrial complex, but also a weakening of the country's scientific-technical potential; official discussion about unified and then Combined Armed Forces of the CIS and about a unified defense space engendered many problems for Russia in military organizational development that are difficult to solve to this day; the slogan "the Army is outside of politics" seriously disoriented the political elite and counterelite (opposition), society, and the Army itself. Today the "Army's peacekeeping activity," as any use of the Russian Armed Forces and various forms of its activeness (including combat operations and "fire for effect") are called more and more often, is included among such phantom words today.

Thus, development of a political and philosophical concept of the state's military activity must precede the

establishment of constitutional and legal rules regulating the military sphere of society's life and a determination of specific measures in this area.

Until recently the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the Army provided the "only correct resolution" of all such questions in our country. But the new conditions showed that this aggregate of officially approved theoretical propositions on the military-political realities of social life does not meet modern needs and requirements.

For familiar reasons, the "Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the Army" acquired in fact the nature of an illustration and substantiation of decisions made by the country's political leadership and became a canonic code of ideologized dogmas, which did not explain life, but drove it into the framework of a given scheme, leaving everything that did not fit into it on the outside.

The sober, even harsh reassessment of values natural for a transition period leads to the conclusion that propositions brought together into the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the Army are not, strictly speaking, Marxist-Leninist, since they include many conclusions and assessments formulated not only by K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, but to a considerable extent before or after them, and they cannot be viewed as a teaching, since they do not provide an integral, comprehensive development of the theory of war and the Army.

In reassessing the system of knowledge in question from the standpoint of new political thinking, it is impossible to slip to the position of reckless denial. It is necessary to see that there are propositions in it that were incorrect and erroneous from the beginning, that there are assessments correct for their time but now obsolete, and that there are generalizations of permanent significance. The task is to separate the wheat from the chaff. How can this

be done? What must come to replace the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the Army?

Without taking the liberty of providing an exhaustive final answer, I would like to direct attention to several points. A realization of the need for a social-science, humanitarian analysis of the military sphere of life is the result neither of Soviet nor of post-Soviet specifics. For example, N. N. Golovin was insisting on this back in the early 1930's. It is hardly possible and advisable to constitute a new system of views within the framework of a unified metascience. The nucleus of this system evidently is formed by military political science. This is a special branch of social science studying the theory and practice of military organizational development, the mechanisms, structures and institutions of military policy of modern states, and the status and development trends of military-political attitudes in individual countries and in the world as a whole. It studies those aspects of political life directly linked with the creation and use of military force as a factor of policy, and those military phenomena and processes which carry in themselves political content. This determines its difference both from general political science disciplines (science of the state, international relations theory, ethnology, conflictology and so on) and from military science (strategy, military art, theory of military organizational development and so on).

The development and spread of philosophical, political science, economic, psychological and other knowledge about war and the Army are not a strictly academic task and are of great practical significance. By acting as an important aspect of political culture of society and the individual, they help people independently understand political contradictions of history and modern times, see the deep-seated springs of political dynamics, and understand their own capabilities for entering into those dynamics.

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